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Introduction 
 
“In the early 1950s, Franco Modigliani and his student Richard Brumberg worked out a theory of 
spending based on the idea that people make intelligent choices about how much they want to spend 
at each age, limited only by the resources available over their lives. […] While there have been many 
challenges to the theory of consumption through the years, most recently from a coalition of 
psychologists and economists, the life-cycle hypothesis remains an essential part of economists’ 
thinking. Without it, we would have much less to say about many important issues, such as the 
private and public provision of social security, the effects of the stock market on the economy, the 
effects of demographic change on national saving, the role of saving in economic growth, and the 
determinants of national wealth. […] These are among the grandest issues in economics, and our 
thinking about all of them has been fundamentally shaped by Modigliani’s work. Indeed, his 
influence is so deep, and so automatic in economists’ thinking that it is no longer easily documented. 
Life-cycle analysis is so much a part of our regular everyday toolkit, that we pay Modigliani the great 
compliment of not citing him.” 
      
Angus Deaton (2005) on the influence of  
Modigliani and his life-cycle theory of consumption 
 
 
 
Since the seminal work of Franco Modigliani and Richard Brumberg (1954), the life-cycle model has 
gained substantial importance in the thinking of both, macro- and microeconomists. Against the 
background of Keynesian thinking, the implications of the life-cycle model were first perceived as 
counterintuitive. The innovations of modeling household behavior in a dynamic setting, however, 
became soon the state-of-the-art. Subsequent seminal research, e.g. on dynamic portfolio choice 
(Samuelson, 1969; Merton, 1969, 1971, 1973), on the substitution between private and public old-age 
provision (Feldstein, 1976), and on the mechanics of aging economies (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 
1987), is hardly imaginable without the concept of life-cycle optimization. At the same time, the 
discrepancies between the implications of the basic model and the empirical evidence have triggered 
both, amendments to the basic model as well as severe criticism. The amendments account for a 
number of independent threads of research which all take the basic model as natural framework. 
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They concern the inclusion of risk and precautionary savings, of bequest motives, as well as complex 
utility functions which allow e.g. for loss aversion. Step by step, the life-cycle model has grown to 
incorporate a wide variety of human decision motives and interacting environmental factors. Its 
success in providing an intuitive framework for human economic behavior has only been surpassed 
by innovations from the field of economic psychology. The use of heuristics as well as context 
dependent decision processes are intuitive and even closer to actual human behavior than the life-
cycle model will ever be. As they give up the corset of rational and optimizing choice, these models 
go clearly beyond the original framework of the classical life-cycle model. Consequently, economists 
sometimes seem unreconcilably opposed into supporters of the life-cycle model and those who 
consider it old-fashioned and incapable of reproducing certain empirical facts without major and 
sometimes complex extensions to the model. In fact, however, the two groups have rather been 
mutually stimulating. Remarkably, the life-cycle model has remained the point of reference for the 
majority of counterdraft models of human decision behavior.  
Despite the impressive history and evolution of the life-cycle theory, many questions and puzzles in 
this field are not fully understood. The chapters of this dissertation all circle around empirical 
household behavior in a life-cycle context and touch both, substantive issues and methodological 
hurdles. The methodological questions range from the problems connected to the unavailability of 
longitudinal household data to the identification of general life-cycle profiles. Regarding the content, 
we focus largely on saving behavior and portfolio choice. The last chapter which is dedicated to 
inequality concerns additionally includes income, consumption and wealth.  
Each of the following chapters is a self-contained paper with its own introduction and appendix and 
can be read independently. Apart from their common life-cycle background the papers share a 
common empirical database. Specifically, they all rely on the German Income and Expenditure 
Survey (EVS), from which we have six independent cross-sections available as scientific use files. 
The data spans the time between 1978 and 2003 and provides us with detailed information on 
income, consumption, savings and wealth on behalf of private households. Furthermore, the size of 
each dataset is sufficiently large at 40’-60’000 households to allow for a wide range of empirical 
applications. The cross-sectional nature of the data as well as conceptual issues related to the 
sampling process present serious challenges to any empirical work. We discuss these issues with a 
focus on the application for life-cycle analyses in a technical chapter which is appended at the end of 
this dissertation.  
In the remainder of this introduction, we give a short overview over the objectives and results of the 
four substantive and the final technical chapter.  
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The first chapter of this dissertation investigates life-cycle saving behavior with a special focus on the 
elderly. The basic life-cycle model implies that households should dissave after retirement. The 
empirical evidence for a variety of countries, among them Germany, documents however that the 
vast majority of households continues to save after retirement. The amendments to the basic life-
cycle model of uncertain life expectancy, of health related expenditure risks or of a bequest motive 
have helped to reconcile the implications of the theoretical model with the empirical evidence. The 
empirical evidence, however, must be put into question as well. The reason to doubt the empirical 
findings lies in the use of synthetic panels. Where true panel data is unavailable or provides only an 
insufficient panel dimension for life-cycle analyses, it is common practice to rely on repeated cross-
sectional data. The repeated cross-sections are used to follow groups of households from a common 
birth cohort over their life-cycle. The key issue about this procedure lies in the fact that we cannot 
directly control for selection effects that may change the composition of cohorts as they age. 
Previous studies, e.g. by Shorrocks (1980) and Attanasio and Hoynes (2000), have found strong 
effects of differential mortality in the life-cycle wealth trajectories of elderly households estimated 
from synthetic panels. They conclude that the degree of dissaving in retirement is underestimated. 
Von Gaudecker and Scholz (2006) and Reil-Held (2000) have shown that differential mortality with 
respect to income and socioeconomic status matters also for the case of Germany. It is hitherto 
unclear, whether these selection effects can also be found in the EVS and whether they carry over to 
the estimated life-cycle trajectories of savings and wealth. We therefore have to put a question mark 
on the stunningly high old-age saving rates in Germany – often referred to as the “German saving 
puzzle” (Börsch-Supan et al., 1999).  
To scan the EVS cohort data for selection effects like differential mortality or differential sampling 
success, we exploit a characteristic of the German public pension system which covers roughly 90 
percent of the retired population. Specifically, each individual accumulates so called earnings points 
over her life-cycle which are later used to determine the actual public pension payments. At 
retirement, the earnings points provide a summary variable for the earnings history and thus also a 
good proxy for permanent income. As job-market re-entry is rare in Germany, the individual 
earnings points will usually remain constant after retirement. To assess the prevalence of selection 
effects in the EVS we therefore control for changes to the distribution of earnings points over the 
life-cycle of cohorts. As a matter of fact, we find changes to the distribution of earnings points as the 
cohorts grow older. They turn out substantial for females and smaller, but still noticeable, for men.  
In a second step, we device re-weighting procedures to restore the initial distribution of earnings 
points over all age-groups of a retired cohort to correct for a possible bias in the corresponding life-
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cycle savings and wealth trajectories. By employing a time-invariant individual characteristic, we 
avoid estimating and applying wealth dependent survival probabilities, as it is done e.g. by Attanasio 
and Hoynes (2000). Their questionable but necessary assumptions call for alternative approaches to 
validate their results. Contrary to the results of most previous studies (e.g. Attanasio and Hoynes, 
2000; Jianakoplos et al., 1989; Shorrocks, 1980), we do not find evidence for a synthetic panel bias in 
our data. In fact, the life-cycle trajectories for savings turn out to experience similar numbers of 
upward and downward corrections. For wealth, we find barely any cases where the level of dissaving 
would be underestimated in an uncorrected synthetic panel.  
Overall, our results eliminate differential mortality as a possible explanation for the German savings 
puzzle. On the other hand, joined with the evidence provided in the technical appendix, the first 
chapter supports the EVS as a sufficiently good basis for a wide range of life-cycle analyses.  
 
Chapter two leaves the basic investigation of the data behind to focus on a first applied life-cycle 
analysis. Looking at the historical trends in household portfolio choice, we aim to understand the 
underlying life-cycle effects and the role of cohort-differences. For the assessment of life-cycle 
effects, we need to elicit life-cycle patterns of asset allocation. These in turn, can be used to compare 
the predictions of theoretical models of portfolio choice with actual household behavior. 
In a first step, we look at five broad financial asset categories and contrast the trends in portfolio 
shares and participation rates estimated from the EVS household data with the results of aggregate 
statistics. We then look at the underlying meta-trends in the investment behavior of different 
cohorts. We find for instance that households from all age-groups have participated in the trend 
towards stronger investments in securities. At the same time, we also find distinct differences across 
cohorts. In fact, younger cohorts show a higher propensity to invest in securities than their 
predecessors. Cohort differences can also be found for life-insurance policies and saving accounts 
who have both lost part of their previous popularity, although among different age-groups. We are 
surprised to also find some reductions in the popularity of life-insurance products between cohorts 
at young age. We return to the investigation of the possible reasons in the third chapter. 
The second objective of the paper is to compare empirical evidence for life-cycle asset allocation 
with the predictions of theoretical models. We therefore aim to elicit general life-cycle trajectories of 
portfolio choice from the synthetic cohorts. As the actual life-cycle patterns differ across cohorts, the 
estimation of one general life-cycle pattern is a non-trivial task. Given that we observe each cohort 
only in a certain age-window, there is no other way to arrive at a full life-cycle profile than to rely on 
the joint information of all cohorts. As the drivers behind cohort heterogeneity – be they different 
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preferences, expectations, initial endowments, or differences in the institutional environment – 
clearly outnumber the cohorts we observe in each age-group, it is virtually impossible to 
parameterize these factors for the estimation of a stylized life-cycle profile. Instead, simplifying 
assumptions about the nature of cohort differences are necessary. A number of different procedures 
has been proposed and discussed in the literature (Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Brugiavini and Weber, 
2001; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2001), the key issue being the collinearity of age-, cohort- and time-effects 
in a linear specification. Identification can easily be achieved by excluding either cohort- or time-
effects but in some cases neither may be justified. As our cohort analysis of portfolio choice suggests 
that time- and cohort-effects may be important, we rely on the Deaton-Paxson methodology which 
restricts time-effects to be orthogonal to a possible linear trend.  
The resulting life-cycle profiles look mostly plausible and in line with the savings motives we would 
tend to associate most with the respective assets. However, the results also highlight the problems 
connected to the estimation of a general life-cycle trajectory based on the behavior of different 
cohorts. A crucial aspect is the assumption that time- and cohort-effects only shift an unchanging 
general life-cycle pattern. As many trends will affect only part of the life-cycle profile or alter it in 
different directions at different points of the life-cycle, the above assumption is often to be 
considered unrealistic and may ultimately lead to biased age-profiles. Whenever we are uncertain 
about the true nature of time-and cohort-effects we should thus rely on the raw results of the cohort 
analysis. Furthermore, it conveys substantially more information about the changing nature of life-
cycle profiles. 
 
In chapter three, we set aside the analysis of life-cycle profiles and look instead at the drivers of 
household saving behavior. From our previous comparison of the age-pattern of cohorts’ saving 
behavior and asset allocation with the implications of theoretical models only a broad judgment of 
the ingredients of theoretical models is possible. We therefore revert to regression analysis to 
understand the drivers behind German households’ investment choices. We focus on the demand 
for life-insurance products which have the capacity to satisfy a wide range of saving motives. 
Retirement savings and tax advantages are probably the most named arguments for investing in a 
life-insurance policy. Additionally, the provision for the family in case of an early death of the main 
earner or a bequest motive may play a role. Finally, also the wish to acquire a piece of real estate may 
be a reason to sign a life-insurance contract. Given that life-insurance plays an exceptional role in 
German households’ portfolios, we can expect to gain important insights not only about the demand 
for life-insurance but also about Germans’ saving motives in general.  
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The chapter stands in the tradition of an earlier working paper by Walliser and Winter (1999) who 
suggest a theoretical model that allows for variation in the replacement rate of the public pension 
system, in the tax advantage connected to life-insurance products compared to other assets, and in 
the strength of a bequest motive. Building on the predictions of their model we add to their 
empirical approach in several dimensions. First, we include additional cross-sections of the EVS to 
obtain additional variation through changes in the tax system. This allows us to separate income and 
tax effects. Second, we generate detailed measures to quantify the tax advantages connected to 
investments in life-insurance products. Third, we include additional measures to identify households 
with higher need for additional private old-age provision and proxies for a motive to provide for the 
family against unfortunate events. Finally, we estimate a two stage model in which we separate the 
investment decision from the size of the investment.  
For part of the question whether households respond to tax incentives in their savings and 
investment decision, our results are split. The tax exemption for interest earned in a long-run life-
insurance contract turns out a distinct motive for investing in life-insurance products. The possibility 
to deduct contributions from taxable income, however, turns out ineffective. Although our evidence 
is mixed for the two types of tax incentives, our results clearly differ from those of Jappelli and 
Pistaferri (2001) who find no changes in Italian households’ investment behavior after a rigid cutback 
in tax incentives. Among the other saving motives, we find overall supportive evidence for the old-
age saving motive. We further conclude that the wish to provide for ones dependents is associated 
with higher investments in life-insurance products with a term-life component.  
From our results, we expect the reduction in the generosity of the public pension scheme and the 
recent reform of the tax incentive scheme to result in significant shifts on the German life-insurance 
market. Especially annuity insurance products must be expected to profit at the disadvantage of 
whole life insurance products. 
 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the analysis of inequality in a life-cycle context. Overall, the 
reasons for rising inequality are still not well understood, and hitherto the public and political debate 
has given little thought about natural trends in inequality which may in part be caused by 
demographic change or by skill-biased technological change. The subject, however, is not only of 
interest for political and sociological concerns, but also for applied quantitative macroeconomists. 
They have become more and more interested in inequality, as today’s quantitative models 
incorporate increasing dimensions of heterogeneity. For the calibration of the models, internationally 
comparable stylized facts about income, consumption and wealth inequality are required which are 
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hitherto unavailable. Empirical evidence about life-cycle inequality is especially important given the 
predominance of OLG models for the simulation of aging economies.  
Part of the research for this chapter has therefore been motivated by an international infrastructure 
project which aims to fill this gap of empirical evidence. We start by documenting the trends in 
inequality for the last 25 years in Germany. Disposable income and consumption exhibit little 
inequality growth, whereas wealth inequality has seen a significant increase. We then decompose 
these trends and illustrate the influence of the German Reunification and the trend towards smaller 
households. Finally, we investigate the evolution of in inequality over the life-cycle of cohorts. As we 
have shown in chapter two, the assumptions underlying the estimation of a general age-profile may 
have crucial influence on the results. We therefore employ two different approaches and arrive at 
ambiguous results for income and wealth. Only for consumption, we find a clear upward trend in 
inequality over age.  
In the last part of the chapter, we further investigate the drivers behind wealth inequality. It turns out 
that active savings account for the lion’s share of wealth growth in Germany. Passive savings, by 
contrast, have mostly caused wealth reductions. The reasons are the conservative asset allocation of 
financial wealth, as well as the poor performance of real estate wealth. The German housing market 
has generated only small positive nominal returns which were neither sufficient to compensate for 
inflation, let alone for the interest payments on the mortgages. Overall, the predominance of active 
savings for wealth growth implies a strong interdependence between the distributions of wealth and 
income. Accordingly, we observe a clear income gradient in projected wealth growth. While 
households in the top income decile have been able to increase their wealth by a compound annual 
real growth rate of almost 5 percent, those at the bottom of the income distribution have suffered 
small wealth losses. These results, however, have no direct implications on wealth mobility, given 
that households do not remain in the same income group over their life-cycle.  
 
Following these four chapters, a technical paper concludes this dissertation. It documents all 
imputation and harmonization work which was involved in the preparation of the EVS data for the 
above empirical analyses. These steps are necessary, as the EVS surveys are carried out with a focus 
on providing information for the construction of consumption baskets and the calculation of 
subsistence levels. The comparability of items across surveys has thus been of secondary importance. 
There are two important contributions of this paper: First, we suggest a new procedure to impute the 
EVS wealth data. Previous work has mostly involved some kind of mean imputation which has been 
– at least in part – also been applied by the imputations carried out by the Federal Statistical Office. 
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As this procedure is neither suited to preserve the true interdependencies between various economic 
variables nor to preserve the variation within the imputed variables, we rely instead on regression 
based imputation. We augment our approach by adding a random component which takes the form 
of cold-deck or hot-deck error sampling. Second, we discuss and analyze the possible influence of 
structural changes to the EVS sample on life-cycle analyses. Specifically, these are the switch from an 
annual to a quarterly household diary and the changing sampling threshold with respect to income. 
The latter can be expected to cause only minor disturbances and only for selected life-cycle analyses. 
The effects connected to the switch in the household diary are much harder to assess. We should 
expect the distribution of annual variables constructed from quarterly data to exceed that of regular 
annual data. A substantiated assessment would require outside information on the cross-quarter 
correlations of household incomes and expenditures. Distributional analyses based on the EVS 
should thus be careful in the interpretation of changes observed between 1993 and 1998.  
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 Chapter 1 
 
Are Germans really not dissaving at old age 
or are we just not seeing it? 
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I. Introduction 
 
Life-cycle saving behavior has attracted a large deal of attention since the fundamental work by 
Modigliani and Ando (1957). Despite the various extensions to the classical life-cycle model that 
have been suggested to reconcile empirical evidence with the theoretical predictions of the life-
cycle model, an astonishing number of aspects in household saving behavior remains opaque. 
Especially the saving behavior of elderly households is still not well understood. Specifically, it 
has been shown for a number of countries that households continue to save also after retirement. 
Examples are Brugiavini and Padula (2001), Börsch-Supan et al. (2001), and Takayama and 
Kitamura (1994) who present such results for Italy, Germany and Japan respectively. 
Economists have proposed several extensions to the theoretical life-cycle model to motivate the 
observed household behavior. The most influential additions concern uncertainty. In retirement, 
the important sources of uncertainty concern the life-expectancy (Yaari, 1965) and the evolution 
of individual health (Palumbo, 1999). Both aspects may induce precautionary savings and thereby 
lead to higher saving rates. But also the influence of a possible bequest motive – be it altruistic or 
egoistic – has been suggested.1 Independent of these extensions of the life-cycle theory, also 
deviations from optimal life-cycle behavior have been proposed. Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) 
justify the low level of elderly dissaving by the deteriorating health status of the elderly which may 
prevent them from spending more of their income. However, none of the above contributions is 
suited to explain why the elderly in countries with a tightly woven public safety net are among 
those with the highest saving rates after retirement. 
In this paper, we approach the disparities between theory and empirical evidence from the 
opposite direction and analyze the reliability of the empirical evidence on high old-age saving 
rates which the above extensions of the life-cycle model aim to match. In fact, the empirical 
evidence about life-cycle savings and wealth trajectories for a remarkable number of countries 
relies on synthetic panels constructed from repeated cross-sectional data. The possible bias 
induced by the use of synthetic panels has first been discussed by Shorrocks (1975) and more 
recently by Jianakoplos et al. (1989) and Attanasio and Hoynes (2000). They all conclude that 
dissaving among the elderly is underestimated in synthetic panel data, as the poor face higher 
mortality rates. That is, each cohort is observed with a more and more selective sample as it ages. 
Apart from considerations of differential mortality, also differential sampling may play a role. 
Jianakoplos et al. (1989) argue that sample attrition is higher among richer households. However, 
also conceptual aspects of the sampling process may produce an increasingly selective sample. 
                                                 
1 For an overview over the literature on bequest motives see Jürges (2001).  
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Among the elderly, the conventional exclusion of the institutionalized population can be 
expected to play an important and hitherto underestimated role. Despite the existing social 
insurance schemes, we have to expect them to be among the strongest dissavers given the costs 
involved in long term care. 
As mentioned above, all of the above previous studies find a strong inverse wealth gradient in 
mortality and conclude that the use of synthetic panels leads to upward biased age-trajectories in 
wealth. To the extent, that their correction procedure relies on estimating wealth-dependent 
survival probabilities it depends on strong assumptions. Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) for 
instance rely on the assumption of a time-invariant ranking of households in the wealth 
distribution. Heterogeneity in subjective life expectancies, in inter-vivos transfers, as well as in the 
importance of private retirement funds relative to public annuities are important reasons to 
question such assumptions and look for alternative procedures to validate previous evidence. 
We therefore suggest a different procedure of employing a proxy for permanent income to 
correct for possible selection effects in the life-cycle trajectories of cohorts. To do so, we exploit 
a characteristic of the German pension system. Specifically, the pension entitlements of each 
individual depend on a time-invariant factor of so called “earnings points” and a known flexible 
component, the monthly pension payment per earnings point. After the retirement of a cohort 
and in a constant sample, the distribution of public pensions therefore only changes according to 
the legal rule which determines the value of an earnings point and the distribution of earnings 
points should be time-invariant. All changes to the distribution of earnings points must therefore 
stem from selection effects. Given that roughly 90 percent of the German population are covered 
by the public pension system, we can assess the importance of selection effects for a broad 
population. Furthermore, the use of earnings points provides us with an almost ideal measure of 
lifetime resources, as they essentially summarize the earnings history of each individual. While we 
give up the direct link between survival and wealth, we are above all able to proceed without 
strong and questionable assumptions. 
Apart from our conceptual innovation, the use of German data allows us to join two strings of 
literature. Reil-Held (2000) and von Gaudecker and Scholz (2006) have shown that differential 
mortality with respect to income also matters in an economy with a reputedly tightly woven social 
security net.2 A yet unanswered question is to what extent these effects carry over to savings and 
wealth and how much of the German savings puzzle (Börsch-Supan et al., 2001) can be explained 
by differential mortality. We fill this gap and assess the influence of possible selection effects in 
                                                 
2 The analysis by Reil-Held (2000) is based on the GSOEP, while von Gaudecker and Scholz (2006) employ 
administrative records from the public pension fund, which we also employ in part of our analysis. 
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synthetic cohorts on the estimated life-cycle trajectories of saving rates and wealth. To do so, we 
employ data from the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) based on which Börsch-
Supan et al. (2001) have originally established the German savings puzzle.  
Our findings with respect to the prevalence of differential mortality in individual pension 
entitlements are broadly in line with those of von Gaudecker and Scholz (2006). Especially 
among females we observe a decreasing share of individuals without a public pension over the 
life-cycles of cohorts. But also among pension receivers, selection effects play an increasing role 
as the cohorts grow older. Correcting the life-cycle trajectories of saving rates and wealth, 
however, we do not arrive at higher rates of dissaving. These results contradict the findings of 
Attanasio and Hoynes (2000). Furthermore, we can conclude that the German old-age savings 
puzzle cannot be explained by the use of a synthetic panel. 
The paper is structured as follows. We start out in section two with a short summary of the 
German savings puzzle and present updated life-cycle trajectories by adding the most recent data 
to the previous analyses. Section three shortly describes the EVS data with a focus on selection 
issues and the concept of earnings points. We then present evidence for selection effects in the 
distribution of earnings points over the life-cycle of cohorts based on the EVS and evaluate the 
EVS sample in a comparison to administrative records from the German public pension fund. In 
section four, we then turn to the correction of life-cycle trajectories in saving rates and wealth 
and assess the importance of a possible synthetic panel bias. We summarize our results and 
discuss possible issues in section five. 
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II. The German Savings Puzzle 
 
The Germans’ high median and average saving rates at old age have made researchers wonder for 
more than a decade, what might be the reasons for this odd behavior. The rather generous public 
pension system may explain why the observed age-trajectories of savings and wealth are rather 
flat compared to the United States or the Netherlands (Börsch-Supan, 2002). Before the recent 
pension reforms, there was no need for large private savings in order to be well provided for old 
age. But also other institutional factors are unlikely to explain much of the German savings 
puzzle. Sommer (2002) compares a variety of possible institutional cross-country differences like 
the generosity of the public health insurance. Palumbo (1999) proposed the risk of high out-of 
pocket health expenditures as a possible reason against dissaving at old age. It turns out that the 
German public health insurance is rather generous by international standards so that the resulting 
precautionary savings should play only a minor role in explaining the German savings puzzle. 
Apart from these institutional considerations, health limitations as suggested by Börsch-Supan 
and Stahl (1991) as well as a strong bequest motive are candidate explanations for high saving 
rates among the elderly. However, there is no obvious reason why these factors should play an 
especially strong role in Germany. To our knowledge, Schnabel (1999) is the only paper which 
presents a German particularity to explain the German savings puzzle. He claims that the 
unexpectedly high growth rates of public pensions in the 1970s and 1980s had left households 
with much higher levels of retirement income than they had prepared for. Nevertheless, the high 
saving rates among elderly German households are still not satisfyingly understood. The same 
applies to similar evidence e.g. for Italy and Japan.3 In the subsequent sections of this paper we 
therefore investigate the influence of the use of repeated cross-sectional data. We start, however, 
by updating the existing evidence from Börsch-Supan et al. (2001). 
 
 
The life-cycle saving and wealth pattern updated 
Employing a cohort analysis based on a synthetic panel, the initial step is the definition of a 
cohort. For our analysis we employ six cross-sections of the German Income and Expenditure 
Survey (EVS) from the years 1978 through 2003. We define cohorts by grouping households 
from five adjacent years of birth. The age and year of birth of a household are defined by the 
                                                 
3 Different explanations have been suggested for the high saving rates among elderly Italians – specifically the 
importance of multi-generational households. 
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according figures of the household head, who in turn is defined to be the oldest male in the 
household. In the absence of male household members, we choose the oldest female.4 To ensure 
a maximum of homogeneity of cohorts over time, we restrict our sample to West German 
households and exclude households with a foreign household head.5 For each cohort, we present 
age-trajectories of total savings, saving rates, total net wealth and annualized wealth changes. 
 
Measuring savings 
Technically, savings can be measured in three ways: the sum of savings flows to and from certain 
asset categories, the difference between income and consumption, and changes in the level of 
wealth. The first two measures capture only active savings. The third also includes passive savings 
through appreciation or depreciation of asset values over time as well as through wealth transfers. 
In the EVS, income and consumption as well as contributions and withdrawals from the 
different wealth accounts are questioned by means of a household diary. Given that the diary 
includes essentially all incoming and outgoing payments, the Federal Statistical Office uses the 
available information to cross-validate the two sides of the household budget. Consequently, we 
obtain closely comparable results for both measures of active savings, as previously documented 
e.g. by (Börsch-Supan, 1999). For the results on active savings below, we rely on savings 
calculated as the sum of savings flows. Contrary to the first two savings measures, the difference 
in wealth levels also includes passive savings through appreciation or depreciation of asset values 
over time, as well as wealth transfers. Especially at old age, the importance of wealth transfers 
may be non-negligible. Thus, we may add important insights by looking additionally at this more 
comprehensive measure of savings. 
 
Active savings 
Median active savings show the expected hump over the life-cycle (see figure 1). Maximum 
savings are achieved between age 40 and 55. Towards retirement, savings drop considerably. 
However, median savings remain clearly positive throughout retirement. Specifically, the median 
household aged 65 and above saves between 350 € and 1500 €. Based on average savings we 
obtain quite similar results with slightly higher savings at all ages. 
                                                 
4 This deviates from the EVS definition where the main earner is considered the household head. We choose this 
definition to ensure that we would attribute a household to the same birth cohort if he was part of the sample in 
several cross-sections and remained intact. 
5 Foreign households as well as households from the former GDR were first included in the EVS in 1993.  
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Figure 1: Median household savings of West-German cohorts (in Euros (2001)) 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results; Note: the labels denote 
the birth cohorts. “46”, for instance, refers to households headed by an individual born between 
1944 and 1948. 
 
Saving rates 
To relate the above results for absolute savings to the available household resources, we next 
look at savings rates. Figure 2 displays the evolution of median savings rates, calculated as the net 
sum of savings flows divided by the net disposable household income. It turns out that the bulk 
of median saving rates in retirement lies between 2 and 7 percent. Again only few observations lie 
outside this band. To assess the prevalence of actual dissaving, we additionally looked at the share 
of households with negative savings rates. Pooling across cohorts we found roughly 28 percent 
of households in the age-group 65-74 to be dissaving compared to only 21 percent among pre-
retirement households. However, the share of dissavers declines again among higher age-groups: 
Among households aged 75 and above, we found only 23.5 percent with negative saving rates. 
Overall, the results for active saving confirm previous evidence that only a minority of Germans 
is dissaving in retirement.  
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Figure 2: Median savings rates of West-German cohorts 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
 
Wealth levels and wealth changes 
As mentioned above, there may be more factors determining the levels of wealth than just active 
savings. First, there are changes in assets prices which may change the households’ wealth 
without additions or withdrawals being made. Sommer (2008) shows, however, that among 
elderly German households, essentially only the top income decile has profited from such passive 
savings. All other households are barely affected by passive savings after retirement. The main 
reasons are the poor performance of real estate wealth and the conservative asset allocation on 
behalf of German households. Second, wealth transfers may play a role among elderly 
households. Even if the elderly do not dissave for the sake of their own consumption, they may 
deplete their stock of wealth by donating money or housing wealth to their children. If wealth is 
traded for the support of their children, this is quite closely comparable to dissaving for 
consumption purposes. However, wealth transfers between two cross-sections will occur largely 
unobserved given the five year intervals of the EVS data. Comparing the results for active savings 
with actual wealth changes, we therefore cannot distinguish wealth transfers and appreciation 
effects. Nevertheless, changes in median wealth levels and in the distribution of wealth within a 
cohort over time may supplement our understanding of the savings behaviour of the elderly. Put 
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differently, the resulting wealth changes provide us with a roundup of savings, transfers received 
and made, as well as valuation changes which happened between two surveys.  
Figures 3 and 4 depict the evolution of median net total household wealth of cohorts over their 
life-cycles. While figure 3 is focused at the median levels, figure 4 looks directly at the first 
differences. That is, it represents total savings and includes all kinds of wealth accumulation or 
decumulation. We have annualized the changes, so that e.g. the data point of an age-group 65-69 
can be interpreted as the average annual change in the median net wealth position of this cohort 
between age 60-64 and age 65-69. 
 
Figure 3: Median net wealth of West-German cohorts (in 1000 € (2001)) 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
 
 
Wealth levels increase throughout most of the working life. We then observe reductions in 
median wealth levels between the age-groups 60-64 and 70-74. As we have learned from the 
evolution of net savings, these drops are unlikely to be related to dissaving. We cannot fully rule 
out actual dissaving since we observe households’ sales and purchases of assets only over a short 
time span and not over the entire five years.6 As valuation changes should affect all age-groups 
                                                 
6 The diary was kept for a full year between 1978 and 1993. Since 1998, each household fills in the diary only for 
three consecutive months. 
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and cohorts in a similar way, it seems much more likely that inter vivos transfers explain the 
observed drops in median wealth levels. As the cohorts age further, we barely find any further 
reductions in median wealth levels. Somewhat surprisingly, the drops in median wealth levels are 
not matched in the corresponding averages, which we do not display here for brevity. This 
indicates that the observed wealth reductions do not apply for the entire distribution.  
The age-trajectories of wealth changes turn out to be dominated by strong fluctuations which 
take the appearance of time-effects. Specifically, most cohorts have experienced their strongest 
wealth growth between 1988 and 1993. Over the subsequent years until 1998 most cohorts have 
seen little if any wealth growth. Despite the strong fluctuations, the positive wealth changes 
before age 60 and the substantial drops in the median wealth between age 60 and age 75 remain 
clearly visible.  
 
Figure 4: Annualized differences in median net wealth (in 1000 € (2001)) 
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The saving puzzle re-visited 
Overall, we still find strong evidence for the German Savings Puzzle. Median active savings are 
strictly positive for all age-groups after retirement. Also the share of dissavers increases only 
slightly over the pre-retirement levels. Inspecting a more comprehensive measure of savings the 
changes in median wealth levels turn out to look much more in line with the life-cycle hypothesis. 
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We find drops in median wealth levels for roughly ten years into retirement which are most likely 
to be attributed to inter-vivos transfers. Last, there is an upswing in median wealth levels of 
cohorts reaching age 75 and above. If these results are reliable, they would be in line with the 
hypotheses raised by Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) of the elderly facing consumption 
constraints for reasons of bad health, but also with precautionary savings connected to health 
related consumption risks as suggested by Palumbo (1999). Before caring about a possible 
distinction between the two theories, the above evidence is to be tested for possible selection 
effects, which is what we turn to in the subsequent sections of this paper.  
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III. German savings and wealth data and the importance 
of  selection effects 
 
Having looked at the plain evidence based on which the German savings puzzle was established, 
we now take a closer look at the underlying sample. As we have mentioned before, Germany is 
still lacking a longitudinal data source which would be suited for life-cycle topics.7 Consequently, 
all life-cycle analyses have relied on a synthetic panel based on the German Income and 
Expenditure Survey (EVS). The available cross-sections reach back until 1978 and contain 
between 40’000 and 60’000 households each.8 The large sample size and the rather long history 
with 6 data points between 1978 and 2003 allow an investigation of age-trajectories of synthetic 
cohorts up to high ages. 
In the following, we shortly describe the general selection effects implied by the sampling process 
of the EVS before we investigate effects of differential mortality and finally turn to an actual 
evaluation of the EVS sample based on administrative data. For a more detailed description of 
the data, see Sommer (2008a). 
 
III.1 The EVS sample 
The EVS is supposed to be representative for the German population with an exception of the 
institutionalized. Additionally, the Federal Statistical Office applies an upper income threshold 
above which households are not included in the sample. The latter can be expected to have little 
effects on the estimation of saving profiles among retired households (see Sommer, 2005, 2008a). 
While the exclusion of the institutionalized is typical for household surveys, there is good reason 
to believe that it will lead to an overestimation of savings among the oldest.  
 
                                                 
7 The only other data set with a sufficiently long time series to permit life-cycle analyses is the GSOEP. 
Unfortunately, the savings question only refers to precautionary savings and essentially rules out negative savings by 
the way savings are questioned. A first attempt to question wealth was made in 1988 which caused substantial 
attrition. In the following, wealth was not questioned again until 2002 and 2007. However, also the 2002 data 
contains a number of problems. Most importantly, assets below 2500 € per category are not questioned. Among the 
other panel surveys, SAVE and SHARE both contain a substantial section on savings and wealth. Their panel 
dimension is still too short for life-cycle analyses though. 
8 The first EVS was conducted in 1962/63. However, only the cross-sections 1978-2003 are available as scientific use 
files. 
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Non-sampling of top income households 
We first look at the sampling threshold with respect to income. Specifically, households with a 
net monthly income of above 17’000-18’000 Euros were excluded from the individual cross-
sections. Merz (2003) has shown for the EVS 1993, that roughly 1 percent of German 
households are not sampled due to the threshold. He finds further, that also below the sampling 
threshold, high income households are somewhat underrepresented in the EVS. The harm done 
by the sampling threshold seems minor given that also surveys without such restrictions have 
issues to sample households with higher incomes. In fact, the GSOEP contains only a handful of 
households with incomes above the EVS sampling threshold even after the addition of a high-
income sample.9 The additional jumps in the sampling threshold over time can be expected to be 
harmless for our analysis of the savings behavior of the elderly.10 In fact, the marginal households 
are largely headed by a 40- to 55-year old, given the large household size and the high income 
levels at this age-group.  
 
Exclusion of the institutionalized 
The exclusion of the institutionalized may have similar effects like differential mortality. 
Households moving into a nursing home drop out of the sample just like households in which 
the last member dies. Table 1 illustrates the importance of institutionalization among the oldest 
old in Germany. Any survey excluding this population subgroup will hence miss up to a sixth of 
the population aged 85-90 – the oldest age-group we investigate in our analysis.  
The risk of institutionalization is higher among low income households, as shown by Börsch-
Supan (1989). This turns the remaining population into a selective sample. Yet we can only 
speculate about the actual savings behavior of the institutionalized given that most surveys tend 
to exclude them from the beginning. Given the costs of living in a nursing home we would 
expect the institutionalized households to save little or even dissave. Under this assumption the 
wealth and savings profiles estimated from a synthetic panel will be upward biased for the oldest 
old. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Sommer (2008a) finds between zero and 4 observations in the GSOEP of 1988, 1993 and 1998 with an income 
above the EVS threshold. In 2003, the income of 18 GSOEP households exceeds the EVS sampling threshold.  
10 We nevertheless apply the correction suggested by Sommer (2008a). 
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Table 1: Institutionalization by age-group 
age in need of care institutionalized 
institutionalized  
(in % of age-group) 
65 - 70 121’110 26’478 0.6% 
70 - 75 181’528 41’483 1.1% 
75 - 80 284’699 79’418 2.8% 
80 - 85 338’610 109’580 6.4% 
85 - 90 391’296 150’878 15.2% 
90 - 95 259’390 112’813 26.6% 
95 and above 69’318 34’943 27.7% 
total 2’039’780 604’365 0.7% 
Source: Pflegestatistik 2001 
 
 
III.2 Evidence for differential mortality in the EVS synthetic panel 
In the case of a true panel it is usually quite easy to evaluate the presence of differential mortality: 
Households can be followed over time and we thereby observe changes in the household 
composition – be it through the birth of children, the moving in or out of individual household 
members or their death. If a household leaves the panel altogether, survey agencies make efforts 
to learn about the reasons – be it death or the just the unwillingness to participate again. 
In a synthetic panel, none of this is possible. If households participate in several cross-sections, 
their observations cannot be linked over time. However, there are ways to deduce the presence of 
selection effects like differential mortality. Specifically, we investigate the evolution of time 
invariant household characteristics. In the absence of differential mortality in the population, we 
would expect to observe no changes to the distribution of time invariant household 
characteristics over the life-cycle of a cohort. A typical example is the distribution of educational 
attainments, which should be stable from a certain age. If we observe changes to the distribution 
of such variables in our sample, we take this as evidence for selection processes like differential 
mortality, differential institutionalization or differential sampling success. In the following, we 
uniformly denote all of the above selection effects as differential mortality as they have 
comparable effects and there is no way we could distinguish between them in a synthetic panel.  
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Choice of identifying variables 
The key to finding evidence in favor or against differential mortality in a synthetic panel are time-
invariant household characteristics, as outlined above. These variables should additionally be 
closely related to the drivers of differential mortality. Only then can we expect a good indicator 
for selection effects which is then also applicable for a later correction. That is, we essentially 
search for proxies of permanent income. 
In an analysis focused on the retired population, educational achievements are clearly a candidate 
variable. Given that education is usually completed decades before retirement, the share of 
individuals with different degrees should be constant throughout retirement. Unfortunately, the 
EVS data contains information on the individuals’ education only in 1993.11 
We therefore exploit a characteristic of the German public pension system. Specifically, public 
pensions Py  depend on the earnings points EP an individual has accumulated over his life-cycle 
and the value of an earnings point PV (see equation 1).12 The earnings points may be adjusted in 
the case of early retirement but the scaling factor AF will apply through all years after retirement.  
 
tii
P
it PVAFEPy         (1) 
 
It is important to understand that only the value of earnings points PV will be changing over 
time once an individual has retired while the actual number of earnings points will remain 
constant. Legal retirement age used to be at age 65 or below between 1978 and 2003. Job market 
participation beyond age 65 is close to zero in Germany and job-market re-entry is quite unusual 
after retirement. Hence the distribution of earnings points should be constant for each cohort 
once it has fully entered retirement unless there is differential mortality or other issues connected 
to the sampling process. Also the data-situation is quite favorable, given that the EVS contains 
information on the individuals’ income by source, among them public pension payments.13 Given 
that the value of earnings points is known for each year and common for all retirees, we can 
calculate the individuals’ earnings points. To be precise, we calculate effective earnings points 
                                                 
11 Instead, the EVS 1993 through 2003 contains information on the job education. However, for retirees this 
information is largely unavailable. 
12 Earnings points are accumulated annually depending the individuals’ contributions to the pension system. Also for 
child raising times earnings points are credited. For a description of the public pension system see Börsch-Supan and 
Wilke (2003).  
13 Dependant’s pensions are recorded separately. 
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EEP, which we define as the product of actual earnings points times the adjustment factor (see 
equation 2).  
 
t
P
it
iii PV
yAFEPEEP  {        (2) 
 
The main downside of using an estimate of the earnings points from the public pension system is 
that it cannot be calculated for the entire population. However, roughly 90% of today’s 
population aged 65 and above are covered by the public pension system. The sample is certainly 
not representative for the German population given that a large share of self-employed 
individuals is not covered. Yet learning something about 90% of the retired population seems to 
be an important step towards understanding the savings behavior of German retirees in general. 
Furthermore, public pension income is the main source of income in retirement and the earnings 
points essentially summarize the earnings history of employees. For individuals who have only 
worked in dependent employment we therefore obtain an excellent measure for permanent 
income. Only for individuals who spent part of their working life in self-employment or as a civil 
servant, the earnings points derived from a public pension yield misleading results. In fact, a 
number of individuals with extremely low earnings points have indeed rather high permanent 
incomes. This will be the case for if they left the public pension system early in their life-cycles 
towards the civil service or into self-employment, as argued already by von Gaudecker and 
Scholz (2006).  
  
Household size and household headship 
Our first approach to look for selection effects is focused on the household level. Mortality rates 
are non-negligible among the age-groups we consider and cause substantial changes to the 
households’ size and composition. Figure 5 illustrates how the average household size changes 
over the cohorts’ lifecycles. Over the first 10 years into retirement, the average household shrinks 
from about 1.8 persons to between 1.4 and 1.6 persons. The decline in household sizes is more 
pronounced among younger cohorts. 
More important are the changes in household headship though. The differences between male 
and female survival probabilities lead to a decline in the share of male household heads (see 
figure 6). Given the substantial amount of switching in household headship we are well advised 
not to focus on the distribution of the household heads’ earnings points for our analysis.  
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Figure 5: Average household size by age of household head 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
 
Figure 6: Share of male household heads by age of household head 
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In the following we therefore switch from a household perspective to an individual perspective 
and distinguish between the male and the female population. Note, that the administrative data 
we use below to examine the quality of the EVS sample also considers only individuals. Despite 
these strong arguments to switch to an individual perspective, we should keep in mind that the 
link between individual earnings points and differential mortality may be weakened if resources 
are pooled e.g. in couple households.  
 
Public pension status and earnings points 
As described above, almost 90% of today’s elderly population receive a public pension. The share 
of pensioners among males has been roughly constant at this high level over the last decades. At 
the same time, own pension entitlement among females has seen strong growth rates (see figure 
7). While only 55 to 65 percent of the females aged 65-69 received a public pension in the years 
1978-1983, this share had increased to the level of males by the year 1998, i.e. within only 15 
years.  
 
Figure 7: Share of individuals receiving a public pension by gender 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
Note: pension payments only based on the individuals own claims, i.e. dependant’s pensions are not included 
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Apart from the gender gap and the evolution of females’ own pension entitlement over time we 
also observe strong age-effects within the female cohorts. Look at females born between 1909 
and 1918: Where the share of pension receivers should remain constant once these cohorts have 
fully entered retirement, we observe this share to rise steeply by almost 20 percentage points. 
Given that the above results are based on individuals and split by gender, we can be rather sure, 
that some selection issues are at play among the elderly – especially for females. 
Inspecting the subgroup of pension receivers further, we look at the distribution of earnings 
points within cohorts as they age. Figure 8 gives us a first impression by looking at the 
development of median earnings points. First, we observe a strong gap in median earnings points 
between males and females. While males pensioners have accumulated 45-50 earnings points at 
the median, female pension entitlements are based on only 20-30 earnings points at the median. 
Again, the youngest female cohorts seem to be somewhat better off. Each cohort enters 
retirement with higher median earnings points than its predecessor. The subsequent evolution of 
median earnings points indicates that also here, selection effects play a certain role, although they 
seem smaller than what we observed for the participation question above. For males, the age-
trajectories exhibit some ups and downs in the median earnings points with no clear trend. 
  
Figure 8: Age-trajectories of median earnings points by gender 
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Being aware that the median of a distribution is a tentatively insensitive measure for changes in 
the distribution of a variable, we dig deeper and look at the actual distribution of earnings points 
in selected cohorts over time. Figures 9 and 10 depict kernel density plots of the distributions of 
earnings points of the male and the female cohort born between 1914 and 1918 as they evolve in 
the EVS samples 1978 through 2003. The changes in the distribution of males’ earnings points 
over the years show little clear direction (figure 9). Overall, the distribution is slightly flattened 
over age. The peak density at the upper end of the distribution is lowered and shifted further to 
the right, whereas the share of individuals at the bottom end of the distribution increases slightly 
over time.  
 
Figure 9: Changes in the distribution of earnings points among males born 1914-1918 
0
.0
0
5
.0
1
.0
1
5
.0
2
.0
2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
earnings points
age 65-69 age 70-74 age 75-79
age 80-84 age 85-89
 
Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
 
These results are in line with a finding by Gaudecker and Scholz (2006), who argue further, that 
the bottom end of the distribution of earnings points is quite heterogeneous. Table 2 supports 
their suggestion that a considerable number of civil servants are found there. In fact, we find as 
much as 48.2 percent of the males with a small public pension entitlement to also receive a civil 
servant’s pension. Among all males with up to 18 earnings points civil servants pensions are on 
average five times as high as public pensions. The prevalence of civil servants declines strongly 
among males with higher public pensions though. Generally, the same argument can be made 
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also for individuals who left the public pension system into self-employment and therefore 
accrued only a small number of earnings points in the public pension system.  
 
Table 2: Prevalence of civil servants among male public pension receivers 
 0 0< EP < 18 18  EP < 36 36  EP < 48 48  EP < 60 EP  60 
share of males 
w/ civil servants' 
pension 
73.4% 48.2% 13.6% 2.0% 1.5% 1.6% 
average ratio of civil servants' pension and public pension 
all males  5.65 0.44 0.03 0.01 0.01 
male civil 
servants  11.71 3.20 1.59 0.92 0.88 
 
Source: own calculations, weighted results; Note: pooled results for all years, all age-groups above age 65 
 
For part of the earnings point distribution among females we find more clear-cut evidence in 
favor of a changing sample (see figure 10). It is the bottom part of the distribution which catches 
the eye first: we find the share of females with less than 13 earnings points to decline steadily as 
the cohort ages. The reverse pattern can be found for females with 40 to 55 earnings points. Part 
of the reason why the selection effects appear so much clearer may be the considerably smaller 
effects of additional civil servants’ pensions, as illustrated in table 3.  
 
Figure 10: Changes in the distribution of earnings points among females born 1914-1918 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
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Table 3: Prevalence of civil servants among female public pension receivers 
 0 0< EP < 6 6  EP < 12 12  EP < 20 20  EP < 28 EP  28 
share of females 
w/ civil servants' 
pension 
5.6% 0.7% 1.2% 2.2% 0.9% 1.1% 
average ratio of civil servants' pension and public pension 
all females  0.23 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.01 
female civil 
servants  33.10 8.33 4.29 3.26 1.21 
 
Source: own calculations, weighted results; Note: pooled results for all years, all age-groups above age 65 
 
 
Overall, the above evidence suggests, that selection effects play a stronger role among females 
than among males. First of all, the share of females without a public pension declines strongly 
over the life-cycle of cohorts. Furthermore, also the share of females with rather low public 
pensions declines. We might have expected the evidence for differential mortality among low 
income females to be vague given that the socioeconomic status of the household is often be 
dominated by the male’s income. However, it is among males that we find no clear evidence for 
the importance of selection effects. The main reason may indeed be the significant share of 
individuals with additional civil servant’s pensions and of previously self-employed among alleged 
low income males. Looking at the share of individuals with a public pension over the life-cycle of 
cohorts, we did not find major fluctuations though. 
 
 
III.3 Evaluating the EVS sample based on administrative data 
Having established some stylized facts about the importance of selection effects throughout the 
retirement of cohorts, we last compare the EVS sample of public pensioners to administrative 
sources. We restrict our comparison to the age-group 65-69, i.e. the first age-group of each 
cohort entering retirement. We abstain from a more comprehensive comparison because our 
ultimate focus is on the correction of life-cycle savings and wealth trajectories. To mimic the 
characteristics of a panel based life-cycle analysis, we will ultimately aim to keep the distribution 
of time invariant characteristics constant over the remaining life-cycle of each cohort. Hence, 
knowing the true distribution of earnings points at the starting age of each cohort is fully 
sufficient for our purpose.  
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The administrative reference sample  
For the evaluation of the EVS sample of young retirees we rely on pension records provided by 
the German pension fund. The fund is the administration authority for the pay-as-you-go system 
and maintains records on all individuals who receive a public pension. Our scientific use file 
contains a 1 percent sample of all pension recipients for the years 1993 through 2003. It contains 
males and females without information on possible family links. Most importantly it provides 
information on the individuals’ total earnings points. 
Of the full sample we keep only individuals from West Germany and disregard East Germans 
and individuals living abroad, as we also exclude these groups from our cohort analysis. Further, 
we restrict the sample to individuals receiving an old-age pension and disregard e.g. pensions for 
reduced earnings capacity. The remaining samples for 1993, 1998 and 2003 have a size of about 
80’000 to 104’000 individuals. Restricting the sample further to individuals aged 65-69 the 
pension fund data still contains roughly 27’000 to 34’000 individuals, of which 52.5 to 56.6 
percent are female. The huge sample size is therefore well suited for distributional analyses. The 
corresponding EVS samples are considerably smaller but still sufficiently large at sample sizes 
that range between 3’300 and 3’900 individuals. 
 
Evaluating the initial EVS sample  
Given that the administrative data reaches back only until 1993, we essentially have only six 
cohorts which we observe at their entry to retirement, three male and three female cohorts. We 
restrict the presentation of the results of our comparison between the EVS and the 
administrative data to the cohort entering retirement in 1993. We skip the findings for the 
subsequent years for brevity as the structural differences between the two datasets remain 
constant across the years.  
We start with the distribution of earnings points among West German male old-age pension 
receivers aged 65-69. The dotted line in figure 8 describes the unweighted EVS sample, the solid 
line the benchmark from the pension fund data. Overall, the raw distribution of earnings points 
is too flat in the EVS. Males with a low public pension entitlement as well as males with earnings 
points near the top-coding level of 70 earnings points are over-represented in the EVS. Instead, 
there is a deficit of retirees with an upper middle pension entitlement of between 35 and 55 
earnings points. The weights provided with the EVS data, however, help considerably to narrow 
the gap between the survey data and the benchmark. 
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Figure 8: Comparing the distribution of earnings points among males aged 65-69 (1993) 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1993 and administrative pension fund data  
 
Figure 9: Comparing the distribution of earnings points among females aged 65-69 (1993) 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1993 and administrative pension fund data  
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Also for the case of female retirees applying the EVS weights helps a lot to receive a distribution 
of earnings points which is rather closely comparable to the benchmark (see figure 9). Despite 
the improvements achieved by the weighting, especially females with low pension entitlements 
remain underrepresented in the EVS.  
To account for the remaining divergence of the distribution of earnings points in the early 
retirement years of a cohort from the benchmark, we will proceed in two steps for the 
subsequent estimation of adjusted life-cycle trajectories. Specifically, we first apply a re-weighting 
of the initial distribution in the EVS to reduce the discrepancies between the survey data and the 
administrative data further. In a second step, we will then adjust the survey weights of each 
cohort such that the initial distribution of earnings points is kept constant.  
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IV. Selection effects in the age-trajectories of  wealth and 
savings  
 
As outlined above, our ultimate goal is to purge the age-trajectories in saving rates and wealth of 
different thinkable selection effects. It has been shown by Reil-Held (2000) and von Gaudecker 
and Scholz (2005) that differential mortality with respect to the socioeconomic status and 
retirement income play a certain role also for the case of Germany. Additionally, any survey 
where participation is voluntary will face issues of differential response. Among the elderly, 
additional factors may play a role – among them especially health and the exclusion of the 
institutionalized population. In the following, we first describe our procedures for the estimation 
of corrected age-trajectories. We then turn to the actual results and discuss remaining issues. 
 
IV.1 Conceptual considerations for estimating corrected age-trajectories 
Ideally, we would investigate the savings behavior of households, as they can be considered a 
decision unit. Correspondingly, all major surveys collect savings and wealth data at the household 
level. Given that savings decisions of couples should differ from that of singles (see Hurd, 1999), 
a separate analysis for different household types would be desirable. 
Nevertheless, we deviate from the traditional household context in our cohort analysis and 
instead focus on individuals. We have broached the reasons above already: First and foremost, 
the required time invariant characteristics are only constant at the individual level and not in a 
household context. This issue prevails no matter if we focus on characteristics of the entire 
household or of the household head: Total earnings points of a household for instance will 
change if a retired household member dies. Focusing on the characteristics of the household 
head, especially the death of household heads will lead to disturbances. The different survival 
probabilities of males and females lead to a considerable number of switches in the household 
headship as indicated above by the declining share of male household heads over the life-cycle of 
a cohort. Any changes in the household headship will entail changes in the level of pension 
entitlements and thus destroy the concept of time invariant characteristics. 
Apart from these conceptual considerations, it is furthermore impossible to link individuals from 
the same household in the pension fund data. The administrative data contains some information 
on the marital status of the individuals, but the according information is missing for roughly 30 
percent of the sample and it is impossible to distinguish unmarried and widowed individuals. A 
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direct evaluation of the household data from the EVS based on the administrative data is 
therefore impossible. Furthermore, also a comparative analysis of the saving trajectories of single 
and couple households is impossible if we want to involve the administrative data. We therefore 
add several analyses where we omit the adaptation of the EVS sample to the administrative 
benchmark. Contrasting the results from the estimations with and without involving the pension 
fund data we are able to disentangle the effects of the EVS sampling quality from the selection 
effects connected to the use of synthetic panel data. 
 
Savings behavior of individuals  
While there are good reasons to switch our analysis to the individual level, this leaves us with the 
question how we should break down household savings and wealth data to the individual level. A 
variety of concepts have been suggested how individual optimization may translate into 
household choices. In fact, if a household consists of several individuals, we may observe the 
outcome of independent individual optimization behavior, or of joint optimization. Among joint 
optimization processes, cooperative and non-cooperative decision processes may play a role. 
Important theoretical derivations for these cases have been proposed by Hurd (1999), Browning 
(2000) and Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000).  
The empirical evidence on the importance of the different possible decision processes is mixed. 
Without much empirical guidance, there is no way we could assign the individual household 
members a certain amount of savings and wealth, other than by making assumptions. It is 
important to understand that the actual assumptions will ultimately be of secondary importance. 
That is, because our correction procedures rely on re-weighting while the individual savings and 
wealth data thereby remains unaltered. 
For part of savings, we take a quite simple approach and assume equal saving rates for all 
household members.14 For part of wealth, the choice of sensible assumptions is considerably 
harder. It helps to deliberate over the question, what happens to the level of household wealth in 
the case of death of individual household members. Let’s assume that the death of an individual 
as such does not imply significant savings or dissavings. Any change in the level of wealth of the 
household then depends on wealth transfers. If the wealth of the deceased is bequeathed to the 
surviving spouse we should consider household levels of wealth also for the individual. The other 
extreme case is that all wealth of the deceased spouse is transferred from the household, e.g. to 
the children. To keep such effects out of the saving behavior of the surviving spouse, we would 
                                                 
14 In absolute terms this means that each individual contributes to household savings according to her income share. 
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need information about the individual shares of wealth owned by each spouse. As the data 
provides information about wealth holdings only at the household level, we decided to assign 
each individual the household levels of wealth.15  
 
IV.2 The re-weighting procedures 
We apply three different re-weighting schemes which aim to disentangle the different possible 
selection effects. Based on each set of weights, we calculate life-cycle trajectories of saving rates, 
wealth holdings, and the share of dissavers for males and females. All re-weighting schemes can 
be expressed by a general formula. Equation (3) below illustrates our procedures for the case of 
saving rates: 
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Specifically, for each cohort c at the age a, we calculate the weighted average over the Nca  
individuals in this group. The weights are adjusted with a correction factor CF which is common 
for all observations in a certain range of earnings points (“EPs”) from the same cohort at a 
certain age. The correction factor re-scales the weights in each of the k EP-bands such that the 
adjusted population weight in each cohort-age-EP-band cell ackw
,  equals the population weight of 
a target population Tck
,M . The correction factor can therefore be written as: 
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As the re-weighting schemes differ only in the choice of the target population, it is only the 
different Tck
,M that we report in the below description of the three correction procedures. 
Before turning to the description of the different target populations, a few words about the EP-
bands seem appropriate. The EP-bands are chosen such that they each contain a sufficient 
                                                 
15 An alternative assumption would we to split the household wealth evenly among spouses as e.g. under joint marital 
property regime. We can only speculate that for the cohorts under investigation joint property is in fact the 
predominant regime. 
Our procedure of attributing each household member the entire household wealth, wealth transfers to the children 
connected to the death of one spouse are then observed like any other wealth transfer from the household. 
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number of observations to allow a reliable adjustment of the EVS distribution of earnings points 
to the benchmark. For both genders, we decided for six bands, but with different cutoff points.16 
Additionally, there is the group of individuals without a public pension, i.e. with zero EPs.  
 
The baseline age-trajectories 
For the baseline life-cycle trajectories we apply the traditional EVS weights. Compared to the 
usual life-cycle trajectories, we only divert in looking at the individual level and by calculating the 
age-profiles separately for men and women.  
 
Correction I: adjusting for a selective EVS sample 
The first correction procedure is aimed at the quality of the EVS sample. We adjust the weights 
such that the EP distribution from the EVS matches that of the administrative records at all age-
groups. That is, we do not correct for a possible bias induced by differential mortality. For the 
initial age-groups, we have illustrated in the previous section that the EP-distribution elicited 
from the EVS matches the administrative benchmark rather well. This first correction shows to 
what extent the remaining discrepancies between the EVS and the GRV-sample have effects on 
the estimated saving rates and wealth levels.17 The differences in life-cycle trajectories between 
the benchmark and this first correction can therefore be interpreted as the selection bias of the 
EVS sample. Equations (5) define the according correction factor: 
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The target shares for each cohort-age-EP-band cell are obtained from the corresponding cell in 
the GRV data. An exception is the share of individuals without a public pension which we leave 
unadjusted.  
 
 
                                                 
16 A table describing the gender-specific clusters is contained in the appendix.  
17 The abbreviation “GRV” is derived from the German term “Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung” for the public 
pension fund. 
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Correction II: mimicking a panel and adjusting the EVS sample 
Our second correction can be expected to produce the closest approximation to panel based life-
cycle trajectories. Equations (6) describe that we adjust the EVS weights such that they restore 
the initial EP-distribution of each cohorts to its characteristics at age 65-69. We calculate the 
target share of individuals without a public pension based on the EVS age-group 65-69 of each 
cohort. The relative size of the EP-bands is drawn from the equivalent distribution at age 65-69 
of the same cohort in the GRV data. 
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We thereby keep the EP-distribution artificially constant as the cohorts age. At the same time we 
adjust for a possible selection bias at the initial age of each cohort. Hence, we achieve the most 
comprehensive correction of life-cycle profiles which is possible based on the joint information 
from the EVS and the GRV data.  
The differences between the second and the first correction approach can be interpreted as the 
“synthetic panel effect”. It comprises all kinds of selectivity other than a bias in the initial EVS sample 
at age 65-69. Most importantly, they will comprise differential mortality and differential sampling 
success. An exception is the question of institutionalization, which we will come back to in the 
discussion of our results.  
Unfortunately, our preferred correction procedure is limited with respect to the oldest age-groups 
due to the short time span covered by the administrative data. Given that the first observations 
reach back to 1993, this is also the time at which we observe the oldest cohorts at age 65-69. The 
remaining EVS surveys from 1998 and 2003 provide us with a ten year age-trajectory for this 
cohort. In other words, the age-trajectories which are anchored to the GRV data at the age-group 
65-69 only reach age 75-79. Correcting the age-profiles of the oldest old is impossible with this 
procedure.  
 
Correction III: mimicking a panel without initial adjustments 
To investigate selection effects among the oldest age-groups further we disregard any possible 
selection effects in the EVS age-group 65-69 and only adjust the subsequent observations of each 
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cohort to the initial distribution in the EVS. We have shown in the previous section that the EVS 
weights allow a rather close approximation to the distribution of earnings points that we find in 
the GRV data. 
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Equation (7) illustrates that we impose the share of individuals without a public pension as well 
as the distribution of earnings points at the beginning of retirement on all subsequent age-groups 
of each cohort.  
The life-cycle trajectories estimated based on this third approach should be compared to the 
baseline trajectories as they start from the same initial distribution at age 65-69. The difference 
can again be interpreted as “synthetic panel effect” except that we do not apply a correction to initial 
distribution. The difference between the results of the second and the third correction procedure 
are limited to the scaling effect of the different initial distributions that the subsequent age-
groups are adjusted to.    
 
 
IV.3 Evidence for synthetic cohort effects and initial sample effects  
Turning to the actual results from the above correction schemes, we present selected results of 
the male and female life-cycle trajectories in saving rates, net financial wealth, net total wealth and 
the share of dissavers. Each graph contains the four trajectories described above, denoted as 
baseline, GRV - synthetic panel (C1), GRV - pseudo panel (C2), and EVS - pseudo panel (C3). 
To forestall the most important findings: neither the remaining selectivity of the EVS sample nor 
the synthetic panel effects are suited to solve the puzzle about high old-age saving rates. In fact, 
the correction turns out to take both directions, sometimes even within a single age-trajectory. 
Overall, we find an almost equal number of cases where the age-trajectories are upward and 
downward adjusted. 
We start by comparing the results of all three correction approaches to the baseline age-
trajectories. As two of the correction procedures involve the GRV-data, our analysis is limited to 
two cohorts. Figures 10-12 are focused on male individuals born between 1924 and 1933 that we 
observe in their initial years after retirement. The baseline results and the EVS based pseudo 
panel always start from an equal point at age 65-69. The same applies to the two age-trajectories 
where our correction involves an adjustment to the initial distribution drawn from the GRV data.  
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Saving rates 
For saving rates, figure 10 illustrates, that the slight differences in the distribution of earnings 
points between the EVS and the GRV at age 65-69 implies almost no shifts in the initial saving 
rates when we correct for them. That is, we find no EVS-sample-effect for saving rates.  
The second important comparison relates the age-trajectories estimated from the traditional 
synthetic panel to the adjusted age-trajectories which mimic the constant population in a panel 
analysis. Already for the two cohorts depicted in figure 10, we observe that the adjustment may 
take both directions. Quantitatively, none of the corrections exceeds 0.6 percentage points, the 
majority being considerably lower. That is, at least until age 75-79, we find no significant evidence 
for a synthetic panel effect on saving rates. 
 
Figure 10: Life-cycle trajectories of saving rates, males 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS and RV data 
 
 
Net financial and net total wealth  
Figures 11 and 12 show the equivalent corrections for net financial and net total wealth. The first 
evident result is that the deviations of the initial EVS sample from the GRV benchmark at age 
65-69 play a more important role when it comes to estimating wealth levels than above in the 
context of saving rates. In fact, the EVS tends to overestimate the level of wealth held by males 
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aged 65-69.18 We can only speculate about the reasons why there are significant corrections for 
wealth and not for savings. Certainly, wealth is a stock variable and whereas savings are based on 
annual flows. Wealth can therefore be expected to be more closely connected to structural factors 
which determine health and mortality as well as the willingness to participate in a survey. 
Furthermore, the more skewed wealth distribution brings more leverage to the reweighting 
process.  
Following the age-trajectories of wealth as the cohorts age, we find also some differences in the 
slopes. In fact, the corrected age-profiles have smaller slopes than the benchmark, although only 
by a small margin. That is, in a synthetic panel we tend to underestimate the degree of wealth 
decumulation. It turns out that this finding is reverted if we look at females. This latter finding 
comes with some surprise given that we had found clear evidence for differential mortality 
among females. If the poor drop out from the sample with higher probability, we would expect 
our re-weighting to lead to a downward correction of the life-cycle trajectories and not vice versa. 
A possible explanation is the unclear connection between individual income and household 
resources. The subsequent distinction of singles and non-singles may shed some light on the 
underlying reasons of this surprising finding. 
 
 Figure 11: Life-cycle trajectories of financial wealth holdings, males 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS and RV data 
                                                 
18 The equivalent differences among females are much smaller (see the figures in the Appendix). 
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Figure 12: Life-cycle trajectories of total wealth holdings, males 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS and RV data 
 
Interim summary 
From the above, we conclude that selection effects cannot explain the high German saving rates 
and the limited evidence for declining wealth levels.19 Where our corrections yield lower age-
trajectories for males, we find the opposite fore females. However, we have ignored the oldest 
age groups so far. If differential mortality affects the survivors’ distribution of savings and wealth 
only after age 80, the above corrected age-profiles simply stop too early. In the following we 
therefore focus on correcting for selection effects within the EVS framework and omit the 
adjustment to the GRV benchmark at the initial age of each cohort. The above results yield a 
mixed picture about the damage of skipping the adjustment to the benchmark. In fact, the initial 
correction has barely any effects for savings. For wealth, however, the initial correction seems to 
have a non-negligible effect, although with different sign for males and females. Overall, there is 
little we can do about these concerns if we want to extend the life-cycle trajectories to the oldest 
old.  
                                                 
19 The share of dissavers turns out to be essentially unaffected by our corrections. We omit the corresponding figure 
for brevity. 
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IV.4 Life-cycle trajectories of singles and non-singles 
We try to make the best of being limited to the EVS data and split our sample with respect to 
singles and couples, whom we would expect to save differently (see Hurd, 1999). Given that 
death, divorce, and marriage may imply changes in the family status of individuals, a few 
additional conceptual considerations seem necessary. In fact, individuals may switch between 
unmarried/single, divorced, married, and widowed between two points in time. To sustain 
cohorts with a time-consistent EP-distribution, we split the sample into singles that have never 
been married on the one side, and couples, as well as divorced and widowed individuals on the 
other side (see table 4). Marriages and divorces are rare among the elderly but all we have to rule 
out is marriages of singles to ensure the homogeneity of cohorts over time.  
 
Table 4: Transition paths in the family status of elderly individuals  
period t  period t+1 
   
female single  female single 
   
married couple  married couple 
widow  widow 
divorced female  divorced female 
  
 
The subsequent procedure for the calculation of the age-trajectories remains exactly the same. 
The only change compared to the previous procedure is the refinement of the cells which now 
include the distinction of never-married individuals and individuals who have married at some 
point in their life. Conceptually, we would have preferred to further distinguish couples from 
widows and divorcées, as their saving decisions must be expected to differ. Based on a synthetic 
panel this is, however, not feasible.  
The EVS sample contains roughly 1’800 to 3’200 female individuals with marriage background – 
couples, divorcées or widows – between age 65 and 69 for each cohort. We start with a similar 
number of males, given the predominance of couples over widows and divorcées in this age-
group. The samples of unmarried women between age 65 and 69 are considerably smaller and 
count only 150 to 250 individuals per cohort. The corresponding samples of unmarried males 
start with only 25 to 50 individuals. Given that the cohorts shrink by more than 50 percent by the 
time they reach age 75-79 we quickly run into small sample problems. This is especially the case, 
as we split each cohort into earnings point bands for the re-weighting procedure. We therefore 
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abstain from correcting the age-trajectories of unmarried males as it would involve applying 
unreasonably large weights to tiny cells. Instead, we focus on single and non-single women. We 
first compare the corrected life-cycle trajectories of singles and non-singles and revert to the 
importance of correcting for a possible synthetic panel bias towards the end of this section. 
 
Saving rates 
While the saving rates of single and non-single females are rather similar among young retirees, 
the saving behavior of the two groups gets more and more dissimilar in older age-groups (see 
Figure 13). Above age 70, the age-trajectories of non-single females are slightly upward trending. 
Furthermore, they remain within close distance from each other. For single females, we observe 
lower average saving rates, especially beyond age 75, where two out of four cohorts dip into 
negative average savings. At the same time, we face larger dispersion between the age-trajectories 
of singles, which may in part be caused by the declining sample size.  
 
Figure 13: Age-profiles for saving rates of single and non-single women 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1978-2003, weighted. Note: for the cohorts 1911 and 
1916 the single age-groups 85-89 were dropped as the sample size dropped to 20 or less 
observations. 
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Wealth 
We find slightly lower levels of net total wealth for unmarried females at age 65-69 compared to 
their married or previously married counterparts (see figure 14). Given that we look at household 
levels this comes with little surprise, as the wealth accumulation of couples may be founded on 
two incomes. However, we find no significant wealth deculumation for single or non-single 
females. For married females the corrected wealth trajectories imply further increases, especially 
for the age-groups 80 and above. The result of no wealth reductions prevails if we focus on 
financial wealth. However, there are barely any differences between single and non-single females 
with respect to the level of financial wealth. That is, the additional wealth of married females is 
largely invested in real estate wealth.  
 
Figure 14: Age-profiles for total net wealth of single and non-single women 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1978-2003, weighted. Note: for the cohorts 1911 and 
1916 the single age-groups 85-89 were dropped as the sample size dropped to 20 or less 
observations. 
 
 
Share of dissavers 
The share of dissavers among single and non-single women starts out at roughly similar levels of 
25-35 percent at age 65-69 (see figure 15). Among married, divorced or widowed women, this 
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share gradually declines over the subsequent age-groups and reaches 20 percent or less for the 
age-groups 80 and above. Overall, the share of dissavers among singles remains roughly constant 
at all ages generating an increasing gap between singles and non-singles among the older age-
groups. Also the corrected age-profiles imply, however, that the majority of individuals do not 
dissave at any age beyond retirement.  
 
Figure 15: Age-profiles for total net wealth of single and non-single women 
11
11
11
11
16
16
16
16
21
21
21
21
26
26
26
11
11
11
11
11
16
16
16
16 16
21
21
21
21
6
26
26
1
0
%
2
0
%
3
0
%
4
0
%
5
0
%
 
65 70 75 80 85 90
age group
unmarried married, widowed, or divorced
s
h
a
re
 o
f 
d
is
s
a
v
e
rs
 (
in
 %
)
 
Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1978-2003, weighted. Note: for the cohorts 1911 and 
1916 the single age-groups 85-89 were dropped as the sample size dropped to 20 or less 
observations. 
 
 
The synthetic panel effect 
While the above results were focused on the comparison of corrected life-cycle trajectories of 
singles and non-singles, we now revert to the effects of using data from a synthetic panel instead 
of (emulated) true panel data. We present age-trajectories of the synthetic panel bias, calculated as 
the differences between the uncorrected and the corrected age-profiles. As the correction 
concerns the EP-distribution of older retirement age-groups to the respective initial distribution 
of the same cohort, the bias is by construction zero at age 65-69. 
Figures 16 and 17 present the bias – i.e. the counterpiece to our correction – in saving rates and 
total net wealth. Above, we had found upward biases for males and downward biases for females. 
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Looking now at more cohorts and life-cycle trajectories which are extended to the oldest age-
groups, the results turn out even more inconclusive. Specifically, we observe both, upward and 
downward biases, for some cases even within one cohort. Comparing the bias between single and 
non-single females, we find no distinct differences.  
Most interesting is therefore the size of the bias: For saving rates, the bias ranges between +1 and 
-1 percentage points with only few outliers. For the age-groups 65-75 – where the uncorrected 
saving rates were smallest and closest to zero – the bias is zero or negative. That is, the correction 
goes in the direction of slightly higher saving rates. Looking at the older age-groups the absolute 
size of the bias is slightly increasing. Contrary to Attanasio and Hoynes (2000), we do not find 
clear evidence for an upward synthetic panel bias in saving rates caused by differential mortality 
or other selection effects.  
 
Figure 16: Synthetic panel bias in the age-trajectories of female saving rates 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1978-2003, weighted 
 
For net wealth, the number of cases with a downward bias slightly outweighs the cases pointing 
in the opposite direction (see figure 17). Again, our estimations imply that there is no evidence 
for an underestimation of old-age wealth decumulation. Put differently, the selection effects 
which we have observed especially for the female EP-distribution do not carry over to an upward 
bias in wealth levels. Overall, we find the bias in life-cycle wealth trajectories to range largely 
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between +5’000 Euros and -10’000 Euros. In relative terms, this amounts to deviations of +6 to 
-18 percent. Larger deviations are the exception. 
 
Figure 17: Synthetic panel bias in the age-trajectories of female total net wealth 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1978-2003, weighted 
 
Last, looking at the share of dissavers among females, we find a similar number of cases with 
negative bias as with positive bias. The size of the bias ranges largely between +3 and -3 
percentage points and never exceeds 5 percentage points. 20 As for the above cases of saving rates 
and wealth, the selection effects in the female EP distribution do not carry over to savings in a 
way that would help us explain part of the German old-age savings puzzle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The corresponding figure can be found in the appendix.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this paper was to evaluate the quality of life-cycle saving pattern among the elderly 
which are estimated based on synthetic panel data. For many important economies, there is no 
representative panel survey available which contains information on savings and wealth so that 
economists have to rely on repeated cross-sectional data which they use to construct synthetic 
panels. In contrast to actual panel data, however, we have only limited possibilities to control for 
selection effects in a synthetic panel. Examples are differential mortality or differential sampling 
success which may both change the composition of a cohort as it ages. If the drivers of these 
selection effects are correlated with savings and wealth, we should be concerned about the 
reliability of life-cycle trajectories which are estimated from a synthetic panel. Previous analyses, 
have found a positive synthetic panel bias in the life-cycle trajectories of wealth (see e.g. Attanasio 
and Hoynes (2000) or Jianakoplos et al. (1989)). As they rely on the estimation of wealth 
dependent mortality rates, strong assumptions are necessary to deal with the endogeneity 
problems.  
We therefore suggest a different approach which relies on time invariant individual 
characteristics. We exploit a characteristic of the German public pension system which allows us 
to validate the quality of the survey data by means of administrative records. Specifically, each 
individual accrues earnings points over her life-cycle which remain constant throughout 
retirement and are thus predestined to help us control for possible selection effects and – if 
present – correct for them. Furthermore, for the sample of roughly 90 percent of the retired 
population the earnings points provide an excellent proxy for permanent income. 
We start by analyzing the prevalence of selection effects for the case of the German Income and 
Expenditure Survey (EVS) which has traditionally been used for life-cycle analyses of saving 
behavior in Germany. Germany is thus a prime candidate for a case, where high saving rates 
among the elderly coincide with the use of synthetic panels for the estimation of life-cycle saving 
pattern. We are not aware of a previous analysis which would assess the importance of selection 
effects as a possible explanation of the German (old-age) savings puzzle.21  
Our results imply, that the distribution of earnings points in the EVS sample of retirees matches 
the administrative benchmark quite well once the sample weights are applied. The sample does, 
however, change over age. In fact, the share of females without a public pension declines strongly 
throughout retirement. Furthermore, also among females with a public pension, those with low 
                                                 
21 The German savings puzzle was documented previously e.g. by Börsch-Supan et al. (2001) 
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pension entitlements tend to drop out from the sample more frequently. For males, the evidence 
for selectivity effects are much less distinct, which may in part be explained by alternative income 
sources like civil servants’ pensions. Overall, we find evidence for selection effects in the EVS 
which are broadly in line with previous findings by Reil-Held (2000) and von Gaudecker and 
Scholz (2006) which are based on other German data sources.  
In a second step, we re-weight the EVS sample such that the distribution of earnings points 
remains constant for each cohort throughout retirement. The corrected age-profiles aim to mimic 
the results based on panel. Vice versa, we denote the differences between the corrected and 
uncorrected age-profiles by “synthetic panel bias”. It turns out that the bias may take both 
directions, especially for average saving rates and the share of dissavers. Despite finding the 
expected selection effects in the distribution of earnings points, they do not carry over to biased 
life-cycle trajectories of mean savings. For wealth, we find a certain overweight of cases with a 
downward synthetic panel bias – which is at odds with what we would expect in the presence of 
differential mortality or similar other selection effects. Furthermore, this is in contrast to the 
typical results in this literature (see e.g. Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) and Jianakoplos et al. 
(1989)). Splitting the sample into singles and non-singles to account for the expected differences 
in saving behavior, the estimated corrected life-cycle trajectories indicate some differences, but 
overall the results for the synthetic panel bias remain the same.  
An open issue remains the non-sampling of the institutionalized which we would expect to 
dissave. Especially if the elderly continue to save for the case of institutionalization, the finding of 
positive saving rates among those who remain in the sample is exactly what would we expect. 
Institutionalization would then simultaneously imply negative savings and the exclusion from the 
sample. A major task for future research is thence to complete the picture of old-age savings 
behavior by gathering evidence of the savings behavior of the institutionalized. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1 describes the bands of earnings points used in the re-weighting process. Figures A-1 
and A-2 show how the EVS distribution of earnings points is adjusted by means of this re-
weighting process.  
Figures A-3 and A-4 present the results for the different correction procedures for females, 
where section four contained the equivalent graphs for males. Finally, figure A-5 presents the 
synthetic panel bias in the share of single and non-single dissavers. All graphs have been moved 
from the main text for brevity.  
 
Table A-1: EP-Bands employed for the re-weighting procedure 
k male female 
1 0< EP < 18 0< EP < 4 
2 18  EP < 36 4  EP < 10 
3 36  EP < 44 10  EP < 16 
4 44  EP < 54 16  EP < 22 
5 54  EP < 62 22  EP < 35 
6 EP  62 EP  35 
 
Figure A-1: EP-distribution among males aged 65-69 in 1998 in the EVS and the RV-data  
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS and RV data 
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Figure A-2: EP-distribution among males aged 65-69 in 1998 in the EVS and the RV-data  
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS and RV data 
 
 
Figure A-3: Life-cycle trajectories of saving rates, females 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS and RV data 
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Figure A-4: Life-cycle trajectories of total wealth holdings, females 
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Source: Own calculations based on EVS and RV data 
 
Figure A-5: Synthetic panel bias in the age-trajectories of the share of female dissavers 
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 Chapter 2 
 
Trends in German households’ portfolio 
behavior – assessing the importance of age- 
and cohort-effects 
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I. Introduction 
 
Germans’ investment behavior – like that of several European neighbors – is frequently 
considered outdated compared to the asset allocation in Anglo-American countries. In fact, 
saving accounts, building society saving contracts, and life-insurance policies have attracted a 
considerable share of private wealth in Germany. In the early 1980s, they accounted for more 
than 75 percent of Germans’ financial assets. Since then, a lot has changed, and Germans’ 
investment behavior has followed the path of Anglo-American countries towards higher 
investments in securities and mutual funds. While it seems that Germany and other European 
countries are just lagging behind, it is uncertain at what pace the convergence may continue and 
how much assimilation we should eventually expect.  
Overall, a considerable number of factors influence the investment behavior of private 
households. They can broadly be classified into accessible alternatives, institutional environment, 
demographic factors, and preferences. Stocks for instance have become accessible to a much 
larger community through the introduction of mutual funds and the reduction of transaction and 
information costs. Next, tax reforms may imply changes to the after-tax returns of certain assets 
and thereby alter the optimal asset allocation. A recent example in Germany is the reform of the 
favorable tax treatment towards certain life-insurance products. Furthermore, we observe 
structural changes in the population. Specifically, there is an ongoing growth of single households 
and of households with two earners but no kids. There are direct implications for income risk 
sharing, and subsequently also the optimal asset allocation of a household will be affected. 
Finally, preferences may change. It remains an open question whether preferences can change 
over the life-cycle. It is a common perception, however, that the younger (post-war) generations 
are less risk averse than the generation of their parents and grandparents. These and other factors 
are possible drivers behind the historical trends in household portfolios. Accordingly, differences 
in the environment or in preferences across countries may be reasons why we should not be 
surprised to find certain differences in households’ investment behavior to remain. 
But why should we care about the future trends in household portfolios in the first place? The 
obvious benefit for the players on the financial markets is the possibility to focus their product 
development and their sales efforts on the most promising products. However, there may also be 
important macroeconomic implications. Shifts in the desired portfolio allocation of the 
household sector may ultimately imply shifts in the market returns. Imagine an aging economy 
where households’ demand for risky assets declines. Unless there is a counterbalancing demand 
shift on the international capital markets we should expect an increasing risk premium. In a next 
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step, enterprises will have an incentive to shift their financing and lower their equity ratio. While a 
changing asset allocation on behalf of private households may thus have far-reaching 
consequences, predicting the future trends is far from trivial.  
Of the driving forces mentioned above some are easy to predict. Especially population aging is 
pretty straightforward to foresee. Also part of the political changes to the environment in which 
households are making their investment choices have been decided long in advance. A large 
number of factors, however, are essentially unpredictable and others must be considered 
unknown. Demographic changes and the known long run changes to the environment are thus 
the key factors which we can rely on to assess the chances of an ongoing assimilation in 
international portfolios.  
The first large-scale general equilibrium models to incorporate demographic transition as well as 
changes to the public pension system are the OLG models by Brooks (2002) and Börsch-Supan 
et al. (2003). A crucial ingredient to these models is choice of an appropriate utility function and 
the assumptions with respect to risky income and asset returns. The discussion about the optimal 
specification of a life-cycle portfolio model has occupied economists since the seminal initial 
works of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969). An overview over the most important extensions 
to the basic model and their respective implications to the optimal life-cycle portfolio allocation is 
given by Campbell and Viceira (2002). The actual choice of the portfolio model in an OLG 
framework, however, is characterized by the trade off between computational complexity and a 
decent match of the empirical benchmark. 
A comparatively simple alternative approach is therefore to project the future asset allocation of 
private households based only on the observed (historical) outcomes of household decision 
making. Specifically, a simple shift share analysis based on the empirical evidence on life-cycle 
portfolio choice may do a decent job in capturing the first order effects of demographic change. 
A crucial assumption is that the estimated life-cycle pattern will remain unchanged over time. 
Only in part can changes to the life-cycle pattern induced by the changing environment be 
accounted for – specifically by making assumptions about future time- and cohort-effects. 
Evidently, both above approaches rely on the identification of general life-cycle profiles of asset 
allocation. Over the past decades, a substantial literature has provided empirical evidence on life-
cycle portfolio choice and thereby incited many innovations to theoretical life-cycle portfolio 
models. However, many of the early empirical studies were based on cross-sectional data (see e.g. 
Yoo, 1994; Guiso et al., 2002; Haliassos et al., 2001). As their cross-sectional setting makes it 
impossible to control for confounding time- and cohort-effects, the resulting age-profiles may be 
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biased. To disentangle age-, time- and cohort-effects based on panel or synthetic panel data, 
identifying assumptions are inevitable to avoid multicollinearity.  
The first study on household portfolios to use synthetic cohorts to account for possible 
confounding cohort effects is Poterba and Samwick (2001). They provide evidence for a number 
of financial assets in the portfolios of American households based on the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF). A subsequent study by Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) is focused entirely on equity 
ownership and the portfolio share of financial wealth invested in equity. The results turn out 
quite sensitive to the choice of the identifying assumptions – a finding which has received 
remarkably little attention against the background of their respective core results. The sensitivity 
of the results with respect to the identifying assumptions is closely connected to the question 
under what circumstances the commonly used procedures to estimate general life-cycle profiles 
are suited to yield sensible results. To highlight the limitations of the pursuit of a general life-cycle 
profile is part of the goal of this paper.  
The first and overall purpose of this paper, however, is to help us understand the historical trends 
in German household portfolios and to provide empirical evidence for the typical life-cycle 
investment behavior in Germany. Most of the existing literature has been focused on the United 
States or has relied on cross-sectional data for the estimation of age-profiles. As we have argued 
above, this ignores possible distorting effects, especially of differences across cohorts. We 
therefore start with a plain cohort analysis of participation rates in the five most important asset 
categories and the respective portfolio shares. We discuss the broad age-pattern and pay special 
attention to cohort differences and year-effects. In a second step, we aim to elicit a general life-
cycle profile by means of the Deaton-Paxson decomposition which allows for both, time- and 
cohort-effects. We are able to draw some conclusions about the plausibility of different 
theoretical life-cycle portfolio models. At the same time, we highlight the conditions under which 
the procedures of eliciting a general life-cycle profile are promising or just futile.  
The paper is structured as follows: In section two, we describe the data from the Financial 
Accounts and from the German Income and Expenditure Survey and discuss issues connected to 
the different data sets. Section three documents the historical trends in aggregate German 
household portfolios based on both above data sets. We then exploit the household data further 
to investigate the structural changes underlying these trends in section four. At the core of this 
section are the cohort analyses of participation rates and portfolio shares and the subsequent 
Deaton-Paxson decomposition. Section five concludes.  
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II. Data 
 
We make use of two datasets: First, the Financial Accounts statistics published annually by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank covering aggregate wealth holdings by sector and type of wealth. The data 
is available back until 1960 and splits into two sub-datasets before and after the German 
reunification. Second, we exploit the wealth section of the German Income and Expenditure 
Survey (EVS). This cross-sectional survey has been carried out by the Federal Statistical Office at 
five-year intervals since 1962/63. Our subsequent analyses are based on micro data from the 
years 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003. Additionally, we use age-specific averages from the years 1978 
and 1983, which are drawn from a previous study by Börsch-Supan and Eymann (2000). 
 
II.1 Financial Accounts 
The Financial Accounts data is compiled annually by the Deutsche Bundesbank. It contains 
information on sectoral wealth holdings, liabilities and savings but none about participation rates. 
The household sector unfortunately includes private non-profit organizations, like the churches 
and trade unions. For Western Germany the data has been published from 1960 though 1992, 
disaggregated into 9 categories of financial wealth. With new asset categories like mutual funds 
becoming more and more important in the late 1980s the classification scheme was changed. 
Hence, time series on 13 – not fully comparable – asset categories are available for the reunified 
Germany since 1991. The latest data stems from 2007.  
The data is constructed using the monthly banking statistics, as well as the quarterly reports on 
wealth in insurance companies. These are augmented by capital markets statistics, depot statistics 
and balance of payments statistics, all statistics that are originally collected for other purposes 
than the Financial Accounts. The household sector is largely calculated as the residual from the 
entire private sector and the corporate sector. The household wealth data is therefore affected by 
the data quality for the corporate sector, especially valuation practices in corporate balance 
sheets. The Bundesbank corrects for secret reserves though, which are quite prevalent under 
German accounting standards. The main concern therefore seems to be the inclusion of private 
non-profit organizations in the household sector. Given that both, the banking statistics as well 
as the depot statistics carry more information on wealth allocation within the sector, Lang (1997) 
makes an effort to separate private non-profit organizations. We extended his work to include the 
most recent data. Securities that are not registered with banks turn out to be the main issue. 
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Counting only registered wealth holdings1, the private non-profit organizations (NPOs) account 
for roughly 4-5 percent of total financial wealth in the private household sector as defined by the 
Bundesbank. This share varies across asset categories from essentially zero (life-insurance) to as 
much as 14-16 percent (savings deposits). Directly held stocks (2-3 percent) play a much smaller 
role for the private NPOs than investment certificates (8-10 percent). This seems plausible given 
that many NPOs have their funds managed in special closed mutual funds. Building society 
saving contracts – just as life-insurance contracts – are held almost exclusively by private 
households. For a comparison of wealth holdings from survey data with these aggregate statistics, 
the varying importance of private NPOs across asset categories must be kept in mind. 
 
II.2 The German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) 
We use the German Income and Expenditure Survey as micro level database despite its lack of a 
longitudinal dimension. The available panel datasets suffer from different defects. The GSOEP 
includes wealth holdings only in the 2002 and 2007 waves. For 2002, the data has a few 
additional deficits: In fact, the individual asset categories are bottom coded and some assets 
cannot be distinguished at all.2 There is very little information on financial wealth for the earlier 
years of the GSOEP. The SAVE panel only covers a rather short time span so far. Furthermore, 
its rather small sample size is unsuitable for a detailed breakdown by age, especially if we want to 
investigate asset classes with small participation rates.  
We therefore use the detailed information on financial wealth in the EVS cross-sections to 
construct a synthetic panel, which allows us to track birth cohorts over time instead of individuals 
or households. Generally, information on savings and wealth in the EVS is recorded at the 
household level. Hence, households are attributed to birth cohorts according to the age of the 
household head. Schnabel (1999), Börsch-Supan et al. (2002) and Sommer (2002) have previously 
applied this procedure to the EVS data to account for cohort effects in saving behavior. The six 
available EVS cross-sections between 1978 and 2003 each contain between 40’000 and 60’000 
households. The large number of observations even in the oldest age-groups allows an analysis of 
saving and wealth pattern among even among the very old. To achieve comparability of cohorts 
over time, we restrict the sample to Western Germany. Apart from these pleasant features of the 
                                                 
1 I.e. assuming that all financial wealth which is not registered by public statistics is held by others than the NPOs – 
most likely the private households. 
2 Wealth in life-insurance contracts and in building society saving contracts are questioned as a combined asset class 
in 2002.  
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EVS data, there are also several issues to the EVS data. They can broadly be summarized in three 
categories: concerns of comparability and measurement, concerns of sample selection, and last 
but not least coverage. 
 
II.2.1 Comparability of asset categories and measurement issues 
The questions concerning wealth exhibit certain differences over the cross-sections of the EVS. 
First, the questioning and measurement of wealth in life-insurance contracts has changed 
considerably over time: For the years 1993 through 2003 the dataset contains the cash value of 
insurance contracts. Yet until 1988 only information on the insurance sum is available. The cross-
sections 1978-88 provide information neither on the inception date nor on the contribution 
history. Hence, there is no reasonable way to directly estimate the cash value of those contracts. 
For 1993, both, the insurance sum as well as the cash value are contained in the dataset. Schnabel 
(1999) estimated age-specific ratios of the cash value to the insurance sum from the 1993 cross-
section. Based on these relations, he was able to impute cash values for the previous cross-
sections.3 We use the age-group specific average wealth holdings in life-insurance contracts from 
Schnabel’s estimations for our analysis.4 
The second issue for our analysis lies in the changing level of detail of the EVS wealth 
questionnaire. In fact, in most EVS cross-sections some types of assets are grouped together. 
Unfortunately, some assets were regrouped into different categories over time. We therefore only 
use the broad asset categories “saving accounts”, “life-insurance”, “building society saving 
contracts”, and “securities” for our analysis, although the individual cross-sections offer more 
detailed insights into household portfolios.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Schnabel (1999) also deals with the switch from categorical data (1978-88) to exact values in the subsequent years. 
Again he uses information from the 1993 cross-section to impute the mean values for the different classes. 
4 The more recent imputations by Sommer (2008b) employ regression based imputation and aim to restore the 
dispersion of the imputed data by adding a random term. The analyses of this paper were carried out before the EVS 
1978 and 83 became available as scientific use files and therefore rely on the results of Schnabel (1999). The main 
difference between the two approaches is certainly the dispersion of the imputed wealth data. Given that the analyses 
of this paper are focused on age-specific averages, we are confident that the results are not too sensitive with respect 
to the chosen imputation procedure. 
  
 
73
 
II.2.2 Sample selection 
While the EVS is supposed to be a representative sample of the German population, there are a 
couple of noteworthy exceptions. In fact, households with a monthly income above a certain 
threshold as well as the institutionalized population are excluded. The exclusion of the tentatively 
poor institutionalized and of high-income households is the main reason why the EVS data 
cannot be expected to add up to national accounting figures. 
 
Exclusion of the institutionalized 
Exclusion of the institutionalized is serious among the very old. While only 0.7 percent of the 
population in need of care is living in nursing homes, this percentage increases strongly over age 
from 0.6 percent among the age-group 65-70 to 6.4 percent among those aged 80-85. More than 
25 percent of the population above age 90 lives in nursing homes (see table 1).  
 
Table 1: Share of Institutionalized by Age-Group 
age in need of care institutionalized 
institutionalized  
(in % of age-group) 
65 - 70 121’110 26’478 0.6% 
70 - 75 181’528 41’483 1.1% 
75 - 80 284’699 79’418 2.8% 
80 - 85 338’610 109’580 6.4% 
85 - 90 391’296 150’878 15.2% 
90 - 95 259’390 112’813 26.6% 
95 and above 69’318 34’943 27.7% 
total 2’039’780 604’365 0.7% 
Source: Pflegestatistik 2001  
 
 
The elderly in institutions are likely to be rather poor so that the old will on average look 
wealthier than they actually are. Börsch-Supan et al. (1998) find EVS-based poverty rates to be 
much lower than those reported in administrative sources. Specifically, the number of poor 
elderly widows in the EVS is lower than indicated by social assistance figures. With the rising 
importance of institutionalization over age, the remaining sample of a cohort may become more 
and more selective. Sommer (2008) takes a distinct focus on the importance of differential 
mortality for the estimation of age-trajectories from the EVS. He finds distinct selection effects 
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in the distribution of pension incomes, especially for females. However, correcting the age-
trajectories of savings and wealth for these selectivity effects he finds no clear evidence for biased 
life-cycle trajectories – unlike e.g. Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) for the United States. 
Obviously, the findings by Sommer (2008) cannot fully rule out a bias in the life-cycle trajectories 
of portfolio allocation. Even if the probability of institutionalization or mortality has little 
connection to pension incomes, savings and wealth, it may well be correlated with the 
households’ portfolio allocation. In fact, we would expect households to adjust their portfolios 
according to their expectations about their individual risks of institutionalization and mortality. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to control for the selection of households into nursing homes 
within the EVS framework. 
 
The sampling threshold with respect to net household income 
The EVS sample is restricted to households below a certain income. The threshold was 
introduced due to difficulties in gathering a sufficiently large sample of extremely high income 
households to allow reliable analyses of these top income households. While the Federal 
Statistical Office has frequently been criticized for applying the threshold, it turns out that the 
other large German household survey – the GSOEP – has not been very successful in sampling 
households with an income above the EVS threshold. Only since the addition of the high income 
sample to the GSOEP, we find a handful of households above this threshold (see Sommer, 
2008b).  
More important for life-cycle analyses is the fact that households from different age-groups face a 
different probability of being cut-off. In fact, households with high incomes and several earners 
have the highest chances to exceed the threshold which refers to monthly net household 
income.5 Thus, the resulting life-cycle trajectories may be biased. The issue is aggravated by the 
fact that the threshold has been altered repeatedly over the years. The threshold, however, is not 
adapted according to price or income growth but chosen arbitrarily (see table 2). Possible 
corrections have been suggested by Hauser (2006) and Sommer (2008b) but require micro-data 
for all years. 
 
                                                 
5 The appendix contains a small simulation to assess the different probability of households to exceed an income 
threshold. 
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Table 2: Sampling threshold (monthly net HH income) in the EVS 
year 
 thresholds 
(current EUR) 
 CPI  
(West, 2000 = 100)  
threshold  
(EUR, 2000) 
“relative threshold” 
(1993=100) 
1968       5’113            36.1          14’152     71.3 
1973       7’669            45.3          16’947     85.4 
1978      10’226            56.9          17’965     90.5 
1983      12’782            72.2          17’713     89.2 
1988      12’782            76.5          16’711     84.2 
1993      17’895            90.1          19’854     100.0 
1998      17’895            97.9          18’271     92.0 
2003      18’000          104.5          17’225     86.8 
Note: CPI available for West-Germany available only though 1999, 2003 data estimated 
using inflation rates for Germany (total) 
Sources: EVS, Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations 
 
There are a number of reasons why our analysis might not be too badly affected: First of all, we 
look at wealth and not at income. Furthermore, we mainly look at broad asset categories and take 
averages over age-bands of five-year width. The exclusion of marginal households should 
therefore have only minor impact on the estimated averages. Second, average portfolio shares are 
less sensitive to the exclusion of extreme values than absolute averages of a single asset category. 
And finally, participation rates will essentially be unaffected in a sufficiently large sample. 
 
II.2.3 Coverage 
The collection of wealth data in a household survey is a difficult task. Answering the questions 
thoroughly, a household will usually have to look up information from a number of sources – 
specifically the account statements of various accounts. Even if the questions are answered to the 
best of one’s recollection, valuation changes as well as the detail of items may have considerable 
effects on the declared wealth levels (see Juster et al., 1999). Furthermore, households may 
deliberately make inaccurate or false statements, as they consider their wealth holdings a delicate 
topic. As a consequence of the above issues, household surveys tend to capture household wealth 
only incompletely. To the extent that the data quality differs across asset categories, the survey 
data will result in biased portfolio shares. For the EVS 1978-88, Lang (1997) has assessed the 
coverage of the wealth data in a comparison with aggregate figures from the National Accounts. 
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He finds the coverage rates6 to vary considerably across asset classes: For 1983, they range from 
92.7 percent for building society saving contracts to 27.2 percent for time deposits (see table A-1 
in the appendix). Furthermore, Lang (1997) observes a decline in coverage rates for almost all 
asset categories over time. In fact, total coverage dropped between 1978 and 1988 from 49 
percent to 39 percent. 
So far, differential coverage will lead to biased portfolio shares. Time trends, as well as the slopes 
and patterns of life-cycle trajectories will, however, be unaffected unless the coverage of different 
asset categories takes a different evolution over time. The results of Lang (1997) indicate some 
differential shifts in coverage across asset categories between 1978 and 1988 – a period where the 
wealth questionnaire of the EVS remained largely unchanged. The changes to the questionnaire 
in the subsequent surveys may have caused additional shifts. Obviously, these shifts in coverage 
rates imply biased life-cycle trajectories. We could attempt to correct the levels by rescaling the 
portfolio shares to the levels reported in the National Accounts. As our focus is on the slopes of 
the life-cycle trajectories and the National Accounts data on private households is of arguable 
quality, we abstain from such a correction. For part of the biased slopes we assume that all 
cohorts are affected equally. Under this condition, the bias takes the form of time-effects and can 
thus be corrected for.7 We implicitly apply this assumption in section four, where we use the 
econometric specification suggested by Deaton and Paxson (1994) to purge the life-cycle 
trajectories of confounding time- and cohort-effects. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Calculated as the wealth accounted for in the EVS relative to the National Accounts. 
7 A severe complication would be variation in coverage across cohorts or age-groups. There is no way to control for 
differential coverage across age-groups, however, as the National Accounts data does not provide a breakdown by 
age. 
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III. Macro trends 
III.1. Financial wealth growth 
Despite the reputedly conservative asset allocation of German households, financial wealth has 
grown impressively since 1960, even in real terms (see figure 1). With the German reunification, 
per capita financial wealth of German households took a small drop, as the average wealth level 
in the eastern states was about 14 percent below the contemporaneous level in West Germany.  
 
Figure 1: Per capita gross financial wealth, 1960-2001 (in EUR, 2000) 
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Source: Financial Accounts, own calculations 
 
Growth rates have been somewhat cyclical over the entire time span covered by the Financial 
Accounts. Yet it was a first when per capita financial wealth declined in 2001 and 2002 as a result 
of the stock market downturn. Stock market wealth already declined by 8.7% in 2000 but savings 
and appreciation of other wealth components compensated for it.8 In 2000 and 2001, per capita 
wealth in stocks declined by almost 30 percent from 5846 Euros to 4135 Euros, in part, however, 
also due to sales. Since 2003, wealth holdings have been back on their previous growth path.  
 
                                                 
8 The components of wealth growth in Germany are assessed in more detail by Sommer (2008a). 
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III.2 Trends in the portfolio allocation (Financial Accounts) 
The above figures highlight the importance of changes in stock market prices on overall wealth 
holdings. The effects are quite impressive given that directly held stocks only account for about 
10 percent of household wealth in Germany. Looking at portfolio shares, the changes are 
obviously even larger.  
Table 3 (for West Germany) and table 4 (for the reunified Germany after 1991) give an overview 
of the changes in asset allocation since the 1960s. One of the most prominent trends has been 
the rising importance of life-insurance investments. Since 1960, the share of wealth held in life-
insurance policies has doubled from 12.3 percent to 25.2 percent in 2002. The fact that total 
financial wealth rose by more than 700 percent throughout that period underlines the importance 
life-insurance has gained. Given that one of the key motives to holding life-insurance is old-age 
provision, the rising portfolio share is in line with what we would expect in an aging economy 
where more and more people are saving for their retirement. We should note though, that also 
the tax treatment towards life-insurance policies used to be quite favorable until recently. 
 
Table 3: Asset allocation, Germany (West), 1960-1992 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 
investment with banks 45.7% 50.5% 52.4% 54.5% 52.4% 46.1% 43.1% 40.6%
thereof:         
cash and checking 14.3% 12.8% 10.6% 9.4% 8.6% 7.0% 7.7% 8.0%
time deposits 1.2% 1.1% 1.8% 2.1% 4.8% 5.0% 6.7% 8.0%
saving certificates - - 0.9% 2.9% 5.8% 6.5% 6.1% 5.3%
saving deposits 30.2% 36.6% 39.1% 40.1% 33.2% 27.6% 22.6% 19.4%
building society saving contracts 5.4% 6.9% 7.6% 7.8% 7.3% 5.5% 4.1% 3.7%
investment /w insurance companies 12.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.1% 14.5% 16.3% 18.6% 18.6%
fixed interest securities 3.3% 6.7% 7.7% 9.1% 11.5% 15.0% 16.7% 20.9%
stocks 24.2% 13.7% 11.3% 7.3% 4.8% 7.0% 6.4% 5.2%
other outstanding money 9 9.1% 8.9% 7.8% 8.2% 9.5% 10.0% 11.1% 11.1%
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Financial Accounts, own calculations 
 
                                                 
9 Subsumes money market funds and occupational pension claims. Pension claims account for about 80 percent of 
the category. 
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Building society saving contracts increased their importance in private households’ portfolios 
from 5.4 percent in 1960 to 7.8 percent in 1975. Their rise coincides with times when housing 
construction was a major political concern and savings in building society saving contracts were 
strongly subsidized. Per capita wealth in building society saving contracts stayed essentially 
constant between 1975 and 1990. As a consequence, their portfolio share dropped back to below 
4 percent. After 1991, building society saving contracts are not shown separately in the National 
Accounts. Instead, they are accounted as saving deposits until 1998 and as time deposits 
thereafter. 
 
Table 4: Asset allocation, Germany, 1991-2007 
 1991 1994 1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 
investment with banks 45.8% 43.5% 40.9% 35.2% 37.6% 36.4% 34.8% 35.5%
cash and checking 8.9% 9.4% 9.6% 9.7% 12.1% 13.6% 13.9% 14.2%
time deposits 10.0% 8.7% 5.0% 7.2% 7.4% 6.0% 6.1% 7.2%
saving certificates 4.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.2% 2.1% 1.8% 1.6% 2.0%
saving deposits 22.2% 22.0% 23.2% 16.1% 15.9% 15.0% 13.1% 12.1%
investment /w insurance companies 18.8% 19.7% 21.9% 23.4% 25.2% 25.0% 25.1% 25.5%
fixed interest securities 13.4% 11.9% 7.9% 6.4% 7.4% 8.1% 8.2% 7.2%
stocks 6.5% 6.8% 10.1% 12.7% 5.7% 6.9% 8.3% 8.6%
other shares 3.9% 4.2% 4.0% 3.8% 4.6% 4.6% 5.1% 4.5%
mutual funds 4.1% 6.9% 8.2% 11.6% 11.9% 11.6% 11.7% 11.9%
other outstanding money  7.4% 7.0% 6.9% 6.8% 7.6% 7.3% 6.8% 6.7%
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Financial Accounts, own calculations 
 
Overall, life-insurance and building society saving contracts have a differentiated standing in 
household portfolios, given their unique features. Most of the remaining assets are more exposed 
to substitution effects and have thus lost or gained substantially over the years. Saving deposits, 
for instance, have lost a lot of their former importance, first in favor of time deposits and saving 
certificates, later in favor of fixed interest securities and mutual funds. The overall decline of 
investments with banks has come to a halt at the beginning of the new century. 
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Mutual funds have gained substantial popularity since the early 1990s following several financial 
market promotion acts.10 In fact, this relatively young asset class has eased the access to and the 
fungibility of a wide range of different assets and provides easy diversification to private 
investors. Consequently, mutual funds have replaced wealth that had previously been invested in 
many different asset categories. Money market funds are close substitutes for saving deposits or 
time deposits. Saving certificates may be replaced by other fixed income funds. Last but not least, 
indirect investment in stocks and real estate through mutual funds may replace the respective 
direct investments. 
Looking at households’ investments in the stock market, a few more figures catch the eye. In 
fact, between 1960 and 1990, per capita stock market wealth remained flat in real terms letting its 
portfolio share plunge. While this aggregate figure would be in line with the assumption of 
constant absolute risk aversion, the micro data provides contrary evidence, as the rich invest a 
higher share of their wealth in risky assets. Hence, it seems much more likely, that entry and 
transaction costs are part of the explanation. For small investors, another issue may have been 
the high costs of diversification. Once these costs decreased with the spreading of the internet 
and the introduction of mutual funds, both direct and indirect investment in the stock market 
saw an unpreceded boom. In fact, stocks and mutual funds doubled their combined portfolio 
share in the 1990s. For directly held stocks, valuation effects have been the key factor behind 
rising portfolio share. Net saving flows into directly held stocks increased slowly at first. The 
share of savings going into stocks only rose from 1.3 percent between 1960 and 1992 to 1.8 
percent between 1991 and 1999. Only in 1999 and 2000 private households invested roughly 12 
percent of their savings in stocks, most of which was undone in 2001 when net sales of stocks 
accounted for 90 percent of the amount invested in the two previous years. Households have 
shifted a substantial part of the revenues from these sales into cash. 
Mutual funds attracted 12 times as much net inflow as directly held stocks between 1991 and 
2001 and kept a stable share of private household portfolios also throughout the stock market 
baisse. Overall, these figures provide a strong argument for the importance of entry costs and 
especially diversification costs.  
                                                 
10 Börsch-Supan and Eymann (2000) give an overview over the legislation and institutional changes promoting the 
development of the financial markets in post-war Germany. 
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III.3 Trends in participation rates and portfolio shares (EVS) 
As we have noted above, the Financial Accounts do not provide information on the share of 
households holding wealth in certain asset categories. We accordingly rely on the Income and 
Expenditure Survey (EVS) for this question. As the EVS data additionally provides information 
on actual wealth holdings, we can compare the evidence from the Financial Accounts with that 
from the household survey data. Both sources have their deficits: The Financial Accounts data on 
the household sector is largely generated as a residual and thus relies heavily on the quality of the 
data from the other sectors. Furthermore, the private non-profit organizations are included and 
non-trivial to disentangle. The EVS must be expected to suffer from the usual issues of 
household surveys – differential response and problems of accurate knowledge. Even willingly 
inaccurate answers may occur in the sensitive wealth part of a survey.  
Hence, none of the two data sets can be considered the benchmark and we take the two data 
sources as an opportunity to cross-check our results. Overall, we find the broad trends in the 
Financial Accounts data supported by the EVS household data. The levels of the portfolio 
shares, however, exhibit some disparities. Stocks are an example, where the differences seem 
rather obvious and likely connected to two main reasons: First, stock market wealth is highly 
concentrated among a small number of families which are obviously not sampled in the EVS. 
And second, German accounting standards permit undisclosed reserves in corporate balances. 
While the Financial Accounts will thus overestimate the stock market wealth of the household 
sector, the EVS will most certainly underestimate private stock market wealth. 
Figures 2 and 3 display the trends in participation rates and portfolio shares respectively. For 
both cases we restrict our analysis to West German households to avoid the structural break of 
the German Reunification.  
Looking first at saving accounts, we observe a steady decline in the probability to hold wealth in 
saving accounts (see figure 2), which is matched by a contemporaneous decline in the portfolio 
share (see figure 3). Note that the 1993 data includes checking accounts for this category, which 
is responsible for the jump in participation rates.  
Also the declining portfolio share of building society saving contracts is supported by the survey 
data. Like in the National accounts data, the portfolio share was almost halved over the last 20 
years. Notably, this trend is not matched by a decline in participation rates. In the late seventies, 
about 37 percent of the population had savings at a building society. This share rose to about 44 
percent in 1998 and somewhat dropped back in 2003. The stagnation in average wealth holdings 
in this asset category is likely related to the capped subsidization of the contracts.  
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Figure 2: Participation rates in selected asset categories (West Germany) 
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Source: Eymann and Börsch-Supan (2000), EVS, own calculations 
 
The rise of stocks and mutual funds, especially in the 1990s, is clearly reflected in the EVS data. 
Participation in both asset categories rose continually from 1988 through 2003. For part of 
stocks, the market turndown of the years 2001-2003 already shows in the portfolio shares. 
Participation rates in 2003 where still higher than five years before though. Between 1978 and 
1998, we observe a rising participation in stocks but a much smaller rise in conditional portfolio 
shares (the average portfolio share invested in stocks by those who actually hold stocks). Between 
1998 and 2003, the conditional portfolio share dropped from 22 percent to roughly 16 percent, 
which is lower than in any other year. Aggregate statistics imply that not only the drop in 
valuation but also actual sales have contributed to this decline. Comparing the evolution of 
conditional and unconditional portfolio shares, we conclude, that the new investors entering the 
market in the 1990s were rather small investors compared to those who already held stocks 
before. While some investors sold part of their stocks during the downturn, only few of them 
quit the market.  
At the same time we observe an ongoing rise in the popularity of mutual funds – again in line 
with the figures from aggregate statistics. In contrast to (direct) investments in stocks, mutual 
funds have only recently started to play a role in household portfolios. This short history is just 
the more impressive. Participation rates rose from 4.7 percent in 1988 to about 20 percent in 
1998 and 30 percent in 2003. Conditional portfolio shares also rose substantially over this time 
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span and leveled off at roughly 25 percent in 1998 and 2003. Where the drops in stock prices 
should have led to declining prices of mutual fund on stocks, other factors have obviously 
compensated for these losses. First, mutual funds on fixed interest securities have performed 
quite well over these years due to the decline in interest rates. And second, aggregate flow 
statistics indicate that net inflows into mutual funds have remained positive throughout the 
market downturn. 
 
Figure 3: Portfolio shares in selected asset categories11 (West Germany) 
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Source: Eymann and Börsch-Supan (2000), EVS, own calculations 
 
Last, there is life-insurance: Participation in life-insurance dropped back from 70 percent to 55 
percent between 1978 and 2003. The portfolio share remained more stable. It dropped from a 
high of 35-40 percent in the 1980s to roughly 30 percent throughout the 1990s. Remember that 
the trend in the Financial Accounts took the opposite direction. However, the portfolio shares 
estimated from the two sources have assimilated to a large extent. Overall, both sources show 
that wealth in life-insurance contracts remains the dominant asset in private households’ 
portfolios next to saving accounts. 
 
                                                 
11 For 1993 the category saving accounts includes checking accounts. 
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IV. Trends at the age- and cohort-level 
 
Breaking down the aggregate trends in households’ investment behavior may tell us more about 
the underlying reasons and thereby also about the prospects of further change. In fact, if 
households from all age-groups have participated in the trends towards higher investments in 
securities this would support our hypothesis that reduced entry, transaction and information 
costs have promoted these trends. Weather this trend is to continue will then depend on the 
question whether households have already fully adjusted or if new changes to the environment 
will produce additional shifts.  
 
IV.1 Trends and differences in age-groups 
It turns out that the rise of investments in securities and the reduced popularity of savings 
accounts are similarly prominent across all age-groups (see figures 4 and 5). Also the time 
patterns look almost identical.  
Comparing 2003 to 1978, the share of households holding wealth in saving accounts has declined 
by roughly 15 percent in all age-groups.12 This finding prevails also for the entire group of safe 
assets - saving passbooks, life-insurance or building society saving contracts. Whereas in 1978, 95 
percent of all households held at least one of the above assets, this share dropped below 90 
percent in 1998. At the same time, more and more people held assets in securities. The 
participation rate rose from only 25 percent in 1978 to more than 50 percent in 1993 and has 
remained roughly stable in subsequent years. The largest jump falls in the era of the First 
Financial Markets Development Act which abolished stock exchange value taxes and promoted 
the introduction of mutual funds.13 In fact, participation rates soared by almost 20 percentage 
points between 1988 and 1993. 
The speed of change in the participation rates in securities had essentially already excluded 
demographic factors as the underlying reason. The similarity of participation rates across age-
groups further strengthens the insight that population ageing cannot be the source. Furthermore, 
the uniformity of the time pattern suggest that the trends are indeed likely to be connected to the 
introduction of new investment possibilities and the reduction in transaction and diversification 
costs.  
                                                 
12 The peak in participation in savings in 1993 is again to be explained by the inclusion of checking accounts. 
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Figure 4: Participation rate in savings passbooks by age-group 
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Figure 5: Participation rate in (all) securities by age-group 
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13 The law was enacted in 1990.  
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The overall picture for portfolio shares looks similar with respect to the uniformity of the time 
trends across age-groups. At the same time, we find quite strong and stable level differences 
across age-groups indicating that population aging may affect portfolio shares in the future:  
Building society saving contracts, for instance, constitute a considerable share of gross financial 
wealth among the young (see figure 6). Their importance among older age-groups has been much 
lower for the older age-groups in all years. As the population ages, also the share of aggregate 
wealth invested in building society saving contracts must be expected to shrink. 
 
Figure 6: Portfolio share invested in building society saving by age-group 
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Saving passbooks display a similarly clear picture of level differences across age-groups (see figure 
7). At young age a lot of money is allocated to these safe and fungible assets. The portfolio share 
is considerably lower for the middle-aged households, increases for those approaching retirement 
and peaks for the elderly. Over the years, the portfolio shares have declined for all age-groups, 
but especially so among the youngest households. 
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Figure 7: Portfolio share invested in saving accounts by age-group 
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Figure 8: Portfolio share invested in life-insurance contracts by age-group 
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The picture is exactly reversed for life-insurance wealth (see figure 8). The portfolio share held in 
life-insurance policies starts at about 20 percent for those aged 25-29. Portfolio shares have been 
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highest for the age-groups 45-60. Around age 60, a substantial share of contracts becomes due, 
reducing the average wealth holdings and portfolio shares of those age-groups. For the first time, 
the time patterns look remarkably different across age-groups. Especially for the oldest age-
groups, we observe a continuous downward trend in the portfolio share invested in life-insurance 
products. For most other age-groups we observe a flat or somewhat hump shaped time-trend. 
Overall, we should be careful interpreting these historical trends given their lack of a common 
pattern. We will try to shed some more light on these stunningly heterogeneous patterns based 
on the different perspective provided by the subsequent cohort analysis. 
 
IV.2 Facts and figures at the cohort level 
Comparing the changes in participation rates and portfolio shares across cohorts over time we 
find the pictures to be confounded by age-effects, as different cohorts are observed at quite 
different stages of their life-cycle. We therefore plot the cohorts over age to compare the 
different cohorts’ behavior at equal stages in their lives. At the same time, these graphs give a first 
idea of the typical age profile and how it has been changing over the past 25 years. Yet again – 
following the observations of a specific cohort as it ages we cannot distinguish true age-effects 
and time-effects – at least not without some identifying assumption. In the following, we present 
evidence for a selection of assets and highlight life-cycle, cohort- and time-pattern either in 
portfolio shares or in participation rates. In the last part of this chapter, we revert to the issue of 
disentangling age-, time- and cohort-effects. 
 
Life-insurance  
Looking at figure 9, we easily observe the hump shape in the households’ portfolio share invested 
in life-insurance contracts. The portfolio share peaks somewhat before retirement, as other 
wealth categories exhibit stronger growth at that age. For the early years – 1978-1988 – the 
younger cohorts’ profile lies above their older counterparts. Moving from 1988 to 1993, we 
observe a slump in portfolio shares, especially for the young cohorts. This is largely due to the 
rise of stocks and mutual funds in the 1990s. There is an equivalent kink in the portfolio share of 
securities – just in the opposite direction. The portfolio shares then stabilized at this lower level 
in the years 1998 and 2003. The kink over time is also visible for the older cohorts but a lot less 
pronounced. Instead there are strong cohort differences at old age: younger cohorts hold less of 
their wealth in life-insurance contracts than their predecessors. While those born around 1900 
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held roughly 25 percent of their wealth in life-insurance when they reached age 75-80, today’s old 
only hold about 10 percent of their wealth in life-insurance. 
 
Figure 9: Age-profiles of portfolio shares invested in life-insurance by cohort 
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Partly, this may have been caused by the decreasing popularity of death benefit insurances among 
the old. The 2003 cross-section provides disaggregated data on the types of life-insurance (see 
table 5). Roughly 6.5 percent of the population held death benefit insurance. However, among 
the population aged 50 and below this share is only 1.7 percent. Between age 50 and 65, the share 
rises to 7.3 percent and averages 15.4 percent for those aged 65 and above. Wealth in death 
benefit insurance as a share of total life-insurance wealth is 1.1, 5.5 and 38.6 percent for the 
above subsamples.  
 
Table 5: Death benefit insurance by age (2003) 
  age 
  <50 50-65 >65 all 
ownership rate      
all life-insurance 60.2% 63.9% 34.4% 58.2% 
death benefit insurance 1.7% 7.3% 15.4% 6.5% 
portfolio share      
all life-insurance / gross fin. wealth 31.6% 37.5% 14.4% 28.6% 
death benefit insurance / total life-insurance 1.1% 5.5% 38.6% 8.3% 
Source: EVS (2003), own calculations 
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Generally, the portfolio share invested in life-insurance is the only one that exhibits a clear hump 
over the life-cycle. This is what we would expect for the asset category, which is most important 
for an individual’s old age-provision. There are a few technical aspects to be kept in mind about 
wealth in life-insurance contracts though. First, there are two ways to buy life-insurance: by 
regular payments over a certain time span or by a lump sum payment. Second, there are three 
different ways they can be paid out: as a lump sum, as an annuity, or as a combination of both. 
Life-insurance products can hence be used in different ways as a mean for old-age provision. We 
just sketch three short examples and illustrate their implications for what we observe in the data:  
A person that saves regularly until retirement and then chooses a life-long annuity will show up in 
the data holding life-insurance until retirement and none thereafter. A person that saves in other 
assets to buy a pure annuity at retirement will never show up as an investor in life-insurance 
products in our data, although she uses life-insurance to insure against longevity risk or 
premature dissaving for other reasons. Last, a person that saves in life-insurance products using a 
shortened contribution period and then chooses a lump-sum payout to consume out of the cash 
received: She will only show up in the data holding wealth in life-insurance for a quite short time 
span. We should keep in mind that many of these contracts with a shortened contribution phase 
and an intended lump-sum payout are not intended for old age provision but aim to best exploit 
the available tax favors. 
There are two main consequences for our analysis: we would expect a product being used in 
connection with the retirement saving motive to show persistent participation rates into old age. 
With life-insurance being paid out as a lump sum or as an annuity, participation rates drop back 
clearly after age 60. A similar argument applies to portfolio shares. We would expect a continuous 
decline of portfolio shares for a financial asset being purely intended for old-age provision. For 
the reasons mentioned above the observed portfolio shares in life-insurance drop back quite 
quickly around retirement. 
 
Savings passbooks 
The portfolio share invested in savings passbooks (figure 10) is u-shaped over age. Comparing 
the distances across cohorts at a specific age – which is equivalent to figures 4-7 – the decline of 
wealth invested in savings passbooks has been strongest for households in their twenties. As 
much as 75 percent of financial wealth was held this way by the young in 1978. For the same age-
group, the share declined to about 40 percent in 1998 and 2003. Cohort differences are 
comparatively small among the age-groups 35 through 50 and among the elderly. The 
intermediate age-groups 50 through 70 exhibit considerable cohort differences. The increasing 
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life-expectancy might explain why today’s old have postponed the reallocation of their financial 
wealth into safe and fungible assets like saving passbooks.  
 
Figure 10: Age-profiles of portfolio shares invested in savings passbooks by cohort 
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+
1894-98 1899-1903 1904-08 1909-13 1914-18 1919-23
1924-28 1929-33 1934-38 1939-43 1944-48 1949-53
1954-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-73 1974-78 1979-83
Source: EVS, own calculations 
 
Securities 
Figure 11 gives an example how strong trends look like in a plot of cohorts over age. Almost all 
cohorts show a common development over time: basically, their participation rates in securities 
rise from 1978 through 1993 and level off thereafter. It seems quite obvious, however, that 
following a cohort as it ages we capture a mixture of age- and time-effects. Certain differences in 
the slopes of the trajectories between age-groups indicate that a slightly hump shaped life-cycle 
profile may be mingled with the dominant time-pattern. In fact, the patterns for the oldest 
cohorts are less steep than what observe for the younger cohorts. 
On top of the common trends, we observe the younger cohorts’ profiles to lie above the profile 
of their predecessor cohort in almost all cases, indicating additional cohort-effects. The 
differences are especially large among the old: about 20 percent more of today’s old hold 
securities compared to previous generations.  
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Figure 11: Age-profiles of participation rates in (all) securities by cohort 
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IV.3 The Deaton-Paxson decomposition 
Connecting the observations on a certain birth cohort in a graph over age may give the 
impression that we are observing age-effects. However, even if we ignore the differences in the 
age-trajectories across cohorts and look at individual cohorts, the supposed age-pattern may be 
confounded by time-effects. The age-profile will e.g. look steeper if positive time-effects add to 
the true age-effects. Essentially, the slope of the true age-profile may even have the opposite sign 
of what the graph suggests. While the experienced economist may quickly come up with an 
interpretation of the observed pattern, each interpretation will rely on implicit structural 
assumptions, as age-, time-, and cohort-effects are by definition linearly dependent.  
We therefore add another perspective on how much investment behaviors change over age, and 
how much cohorts differ in their investment attitudes by employing the Deaton-Paxson 
decomposition. We start by motivating the inclusion of all three possible effects and then turn to 
the assumptions used by Deaton and Paxson (1994) in the identification of the different effects. 
Along the way, we discuss the key issues in the overall pursuit of stylized age-profiles. 
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IV.3.1 General considerations 
To be able to distinguish age-, cohort- and time-effects any approach has to impose additional 
structure. Two structural assumptions are usually made: first and often not explicitly discussed, it 
is assumed that there is an age-profile, which is common to all cohorts. Second, cohort- and 
time-effects are typically limited to parameters, which change the common age-profile along one 
dimension. 
Yet, considering different possible changes to the public pension system and their theoretical 
implications on the optimal age trajectories, it is obvious that cohorts might well differ in more 
than just one dimension. Let us assume for instance, that the legal retirement age is being 
postponed. We would then expect wealth accumulation to take a slower pace to a lower level at 
retirement, as time in retirement is shortened and thereby also the necessary financial resources 
for the time after retirement. At all ages until retirement, the implicit (safe) investment from wage 
earnings will account for a larger share of total wealth while the share of financial assets will be 
smaller. Hence we would expect the portfolio share of risky assets to be higher at all ages until 
retirement for cohorts expecting a later retirement age.14  
A second example is the reduction of the replacement rates in the public pension system. 
Cohorts will aim to compensate by accumulating larger amounts of wealth. Hence there will be 
differences in the relative size of the implicit save investments from the pension payments. 
Specifically, the younger cohorts are facing a less generous public pension system and will depend 
more on their private savings. We would therefore expect them to choose a less risky asset 
allocation for their financial wealth. 
Now let us translate the above argument to investments in life-insurance, which offer a close 
substitute to public pensions. If the retirement age is postponed, we would expect the portfolio 
share of life-insurance to start declining at later age. Following a reduction in the replacement rate 
from the public pension system, we would expect the portfolio share of life-insurance to increase, 
especially for the working-age years. Both examples highlight that restricting cohort effects to 
change a common age-profile along only one dimension is certainly a questionable assumption. 
If we nevertheless aim to estimate stylized life-cycle profiles we have to deal with the collinearity 
of age-, cohort- and time-effects. In fact, given the age and the year of birth of a certain 
observation, we can always calculate the year of observation and vice versa. To ensure 
identification in a decomposition of age-, cohort- and time-effects we therefore have to either 
                                                 
14 Obviously, the argument is reversed if work income is to be considered an implicit risky asset.   
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apply restrictions to some of the effects or achieve identification through the choice of the 
functional form. 
We are in a comfortable situation if we can rule out time- or cohort-effects, e.g. if we are 
confident to operate in a stable environment. In the case of portfolio choice, however, there is 
good reason to assume that all three effects might be important. Age-effects are suggested by 
various theoretical models as well as by financial intermediaries’ recommendations. Cohort-
effects will matter e.g. if generations differ in their risk-aversion, rate of time preference or – if 
the utility function is not of CRRA form – in their initial endowments. As argued above, also 
changes to the social security scheme may induce cohort-effects. In fact, the 2004 reform of the 
German pension system introduced different replacement rates for future cohorts. Finally, also 
time-effects must be expected to play a role: First, there are valuation date effects. The portfolio 
shares will vary with the fluctuation of asset prices unless households continually reoptimize their 
asset allocation. Second, changes to the questionnaire – e.g. with respect to the level of detail with 
which certain assets are questioned – may induce differences in coverage over the years. Finally, 
also the introduction and the abolishment of investment restrictions will typically affect all 
households at the same time.  
 
IV.3.2 The Deaton-Paxson approach 
We have argued above, that all three – age-, time-, and cohort-effects – should matter in the 
context of life-cycle portfolio-choice. Equation (1) describes the general problem: 
 
 uYCAy ++++ ygab        (1) 
 
A, C, and Y are matrices of age, cohort, and year dummies respectively. Let Ai (i=1…N) denote 
the age-dummies, Cj (j=1…M) the dummies for the birth-cohorts, and Yt (t=1…T) the dummies 
for the years of observation. The common age-profile is defined by the sequence of coefficients 
?. The levels of the age trajectories differ across cohorts according to the ?’s. Finally, the time-
effects may shift all cohorts at their respective ages by the year-specific parameters ?. 
Deaton and Paxson (1994) suggest treating time-effects as orthogonal deviations from a possible 
linear trend. We can think of this as a business-cycle effect, caused e.g. by valuation date effects 
in wealth holdings. A second assumption is necessary, however, to ensure identification. 
Specifically, Deaton and Paxson assume that the time-effects add up to zero. The identifying 
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restrictions can be substituted into the regression equation such that T-2 year-dummies are 
included in the regression, which take the following form: 
 
for t=3,…T:  ( ) ( )> @12* 21 ijijijtijt YtYtYY ---- .   (2) 
 
The year-effects can easily be backed out from the estimated coefficients in the transformed 
equation and the implied restrictions. Additionally, Deaton and Paxson include N-1 age and M-1 
cohort dummies in the regression. The left-out age- and cohort-dummies act as references 
categories. The age- and cohort-effects therefore describe changes relative to these reference 
categories. 
Although we generally adopt the fundamentals of the procedure proposed by Deaton and 
Paxson, we make some minor modifications: To obtain age-profiles that also have some meaning 
in terms of their levels we choose not to drop one age-dummy from the estimation but include all 
age-dummies and drop the constant instead. We further add the restriction that not only the year 
effects have to add up to zero but also the cohort effects. The cohort-dummies are therefore 
replaced according to equation (3): 
 
for j=2,…M:  tiijtijt CCC 1
* -      (3) 
 
Again, the cohort-effects can be backed out from the estimated coefficients and the applied 
restriction. The resulting cohort-effects can be interpreted as differences relative to the average 
cohort. Also the estimated coefficients of the age-dummies get a different interpretation: they 
now display the predicted life-cycle pattern for the average cohort in an average year. 
Summarizing, we estimate: 
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where C* and Y* are the transformed dummies. 
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IV.3.3 Decomposition results  
Treating the estimated year-effects as correction of business-cycle-, questionnaire- or 
deregulation-effects we subsequently focus on the estimated age- and cohort-effects. The results 
for the time-effects are reported in the appendix though (figures A-1, A-2). Before turning to the 
actual results, a few further notes seem necessary: Although the age-profiles are depicted for the 
average cohort, they still only imply relative changes over the life-cycle. While the percentage 
levels should be in a reasonable order of magnitude, the actual slopes of the profile can only be 
interpreted as relative differences in the participation rate or in the portfolio share across age-
groups. In fact – negative numbers as well as numbers beyond 100 percent are technically 
possible.  
 
Participation rates 
Looking at the age- and cohort-effects in participation rates for saving accounts (figures 12 and 
13), we see the previous results (see figure 4) supported: While there are little changes in the 
participation rate over the life-cycle, we observe a clear trend over cohorts. The oldest cohorts 
(born before 1928) are rather homogeneous, but all subsequent cohorts are less and less likely to 
hold saving accounts.  
 
Figure 12: Age-effects in participation rates (relative scale) 
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For building society saving contracts we observe a similar trend in the opposite direction. The 
oldest cohorts have a lower probability of holding building society saving contracts. The 
ownership rates increase steadily for the cohorts born between 1920 and 1940 and remain flat for 
the younger cohorts. The life-cycle profile for building society saving contracts is hump-shaped 
but flatter than the corresponding trajectory for life-insurance contracts. 
 
Figure 13: Cohort-effects in participation rates (relative scale) 
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The age-profile for life-insurance indicates that the likelihood of holding life-insurance increases 
until about age 35. For the subsequent age-groups, we observe a slow decline. Around age 60, 
participation rates start dropping back more sharply, when an increasing share of contracts 
becomes due. Looking at the cohort-effects we observe a clear downward trend over the 
generations, which only slowed down for the very youngest cohorts. Obviously our 
decomposition picks up two trends at separate parts of the age-distribution. As the oldest cohorts 
are observed largely at old age, the downward trend for these cohorts corresponds to the 
declining importance of death benefit insurance. The further decline of the cohort-effects for the 
young cohorts is obviously “caused” at the other end of the age distribution where the young 
cohorts are observed. The cohort-graph thus gives a summary of two declining trends, which 
happened at different times and at different parts of the age-profile. We will discuss this issue 
below in some further detail. 
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Finally, the decomposition yields strong age- and cohort-trends for the participation in securities. 
Between age 20 and age 80, the results imply an increase in ownership rates by 80 percentage 
points. At the same time the analysis implies a differential of close to 100 percentage points 
between the youngest cohorts and the cohort of their grandparents. Again, these results are not 
to be taken seriously given the obvious issues induced by the assumptions underlying the 
decomposition.  
 
Portfolio shares 
Before we discuss the conceptual issues of the decomposition, we have a look at the results for 
portfolio shares (figures 14 and 15): For securities and life-insurance, we find quite similar results 
for portfolio shares as above for the participation rates. In fact, the age- and cohort-effects for 
the portfolio share invested in securities are strongly upward sloping. The increase is slightly 
smaller than for the participation rate but still in an unrealistic order of magnitude.  
 
Figure 14: Age-effects in portfolio shares (relative scale) 
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The portfolio share in life-insurance exhibits a hump shaped age-profile. The similarity of results 
compared to the participation rates above comes with little surprise. As we have explained above, 
both payout options for life-insurance – be it as an annuity or in a lump-sum payment – imply 
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that the household is no longer considered an owner of life-insurance wealth after the payout. 
The decline in portfolio shares across cohorts turns out somewhat smaller compared to what we 
observed for participation rates, and the recovery for the youngest generation is more discernible.  
For the remaining asset classes – building society saving contracts and saving accounts – the 
results of the decomposition look much more reasonable. In fact, the estimated age-profiles 
match our first impression from the pure descriptives. Saving accounts make for a relatively high 
portfolio share at young ages. Their importance is reduced strongly until age 40, bottoms out at 
around age 55 and increases steadily until old age. The importance of building society saving 
contracts is highest at young age and starts to diminish early in the life-cycle when other financial 
assets gain more and more importance in private households’ portfolios. 
 
Figure 15: Cohort-effects in portfolio shares (relative scale) 
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IV.3.4 Issues in the decomposition of age-, time-, and cohort-effects 
The concerns about the identification of a general life-cycle pattern from repeated cross-sectional 
data are certainly justified. In fact, year-effects may imply shifts in the portfolio choice of 
households that have nothing to do with the contemporaneous aging of the cohort. Thus it is 
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quite natural that we would like to purge the age-trajectories from these fluctuations and shifts we 
usually denote as time-effects. 
There is, however, a second source of adversity – specifically, the short time horizon over which 
we typically observe households or cohorts in panel or synthetic panel data. We therefore have to 
rely on the various bits of information we can gather from each cohort about rather small age-
windows. Essentially all decomposition approaches estimate a general life-cycle profile by 
stringing together the average slopes of the cohorts’ age-trajectories over the sequence of age-
groups. That is, we ultimately interpret a life-cycle profile consisting of the behavior of three 
generations. From the youngest cohorts we adopt the behavior early in the life-cycle. To this 
initial phase of the life-cycle we then add the observed behavior of their parents and grandparents 
for the middle and later phases of the life-cycle.  
Let us illustrate the possible drawbacks of this procedure using the above example of securities. 
At almost all stages of the life-cycle we have been facing increasing participation rates. The young 
cohorts at young age as well as the old cohorts at old age provide information that the 
participation rates are increasing over age. Over the limited time span for which we observe each 
cohort, there was no sign that this trend would eventually level off. At the same time, there are 
technical limits to this rise in participation rates. The old could not have increased their 
participation rate in securities if they had increased them already at young age as today’s young 
generation did. Vice versa, today’s young simply cannot keep up their growth of ownership rates 
over several more decades as they will reach retirement already with a much higher participation 
rate than the generation of their grandparents. The assumption of a common general life-cycle 
profile does not allow for changes though. 
So far, the choice of possible structural assumptions for the identification of age-, time-, and 
cohort-effects has received considerable attention in the literature. In many cases, however, we 
should question the value of estimating stylized life-cycle profiles, especially if we have reason to 
believe that life-cycle behavior as such is in flux. Frequently, it will be advisable to stick with the 
raw age-trajectories of cohorts. On the one hand, they certainly provide a less clear impression of 
life-cycle behavior. On the other hand, they convey considerably more information, especially on 
the changing nature of life-cycle behavior. Furthermore, we may induce new bias in our attempt 
to purge the age-profiles of time- and cohort-effects.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
We start out from a comparison of aggregate trends in German households’ asset allocation 
focusing on participation rates and portfolio shares derived from micro data and from the 
National Accounts. We find the broad trends supported by both data sources: safe investments 
with banks, especially saving accounts have played an important role in private household 
portfolios and still do so. However, their portfolio share has been on a continuous and strong 
decline until recently. Only the bear market years made sure that this trend came to a standstill in 
2002. At the same time, life-insurance has gained substantial importance since the 1960s. The rise 
of life-insurance has been slowed with the increasing popularity of stocks and mutual funds in the 
1990s. While the participation in life-insurance products has dropped back in the last years, 
especially mutual funds have seen a strong and steady growth. Their popularity continued 
through the stock market downturn in 2001-03. In fact, mutual funds could still generate saving 
inflows while direct investments in stocks lost some of their previous importance. We find that 
despite the considerable divestments in the bear market years only few investors quit the stock 
market entirely. 
In a second step, we investigate these historical trends in more details by looking at the 
underlying developments at the age- and cohort-level. We find that the rising importance of 
securities as well as the declining share of saving accounts can be found among almost all age-
groups. Only the elderly participated in these changes to a lesser extent. For life-insurance we 
observe a declining importance among the old and among the very young. The reasons, however, 
are likely quite different. For the old, death benefit insurance has lost most of its previous 
importance. For the young, the declining guaranteed interest rates as well as the less favorable tax 
treatment of whole life-insurance may have been the main reasons. Furthermore, the later 
marriage and childbirth may be reasons to postpone investments in life-insurance contracts. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the reductions in the generosity of the public pension system have not 
triggered additional investments in this close substitute. Maybe the 2003 data is just too close to 
the enactment of the reforms. Analyses of the SAVE indicate data that households are indeed 
more and more aware of the need for additional private old age provision and have started to 
adjust accordingly in recent years (see Börsch-Supan et al., 2007).  
Our findings allow some conclusions about the plausibility of theoretical models of life-cycle 
portfolio choice and the sources of the observed trends in household portfolios. First, the 
allocation of financial wealth clearly changes over the life-cycle. Second, the share of safe and 
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fungible assets like saving accounts takes a u-shaped life-cycle path. It is highest among the 
youngest age-groups and declines until age 55. This finding is in line with theoretical models 
which include risky income streams and borrowing constraints. Assuming that labor income can 
be treated like an implicit risky asset, households would correctly choose a low risk allocation of 
financial wealth when this implicit risky investment – the present discounted value of future work 
income – is largest. For the second part of the life-cycle we observe a revival of safe and fungible 
saving accounts. The prime candidates to explain the changing investment behavior are again risk 
factors, especially risks of high expenditures on health and long term care.  
Third, we find a strong increase in the popularity of securities among essentially all age-groups 
and cohorts. Most of the surge has happened in the first half of the 1990s, when several financial 
market development acts were passed. Furthermore, information and transaction costs were 
reduced with the spreading of modern information technologies. The coincidence of these 
institutional changes with behavioral changes which we observe essentially for the entire 
population suggests that restrictions to household optimization were abolished or at least 
softened. So far, this does not explain, however, why German households do not reduce their 
exposure to market fluctuations after retirement. As the persistent asset allocation is matched by 
continuously high old age saving rates (see Börsch-Supan et al, 2002 and Sommer, 2008), it seems 
obvious to think of a strong bequest motive as suggested by Abel (2002). At the same time, the 
time-effects of easier market access may just have concealed a different age-effect.  
Forth and last: Investments in life-insurance are rather hard to reconcile with the predictions of 
theoretical portfolio choice models. In fact, life-insurance is often perceived as a safe investment 
although the insurance companies invest part of their portfolio in risky assets. That is, a 
comprehensive portfolio model should account for the asset allocation within a typical life-
insurance contract. Even if households consider this in the allocation of their remaining financial 
wealth, life-insurance contracts additionally incorporate a variety of features which are untypical 
to other assets. Specifically, there is the insurance against longevity risks and frequently also a 
term life-insurance. A detailed investigation of the determinants of the demand for life-insurance 
is beyond the scope of this paper though.  
The last part of the paper is dedicated to the issues around the identification of stylized life-cycle 
profiles. We use the decomposition approach suggested by Deaton and Paxson (1994) to 
highlight the general problems connected to the estimation of a common life-cycle pattern. The 
source of trouble is the fact that the estimation draws bits of information from the age-
trajectories of several generations. If changes to the institutional environment lead to differences 
in the life-cycle behavior across cohorts, the estimation of a common life-cycle pattern will likely 
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yield biased results. The attempts to purge an age-profile from confounding cohort- and time-
effects and to condense the information contained in a full cohort analysis should thus be carried 
out with much diligence taking into account the changing nature of life-cycle behavior.  
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Appendix 
 
Effects of the sampling threshold on life-cycle trajectories 
The age of households – or strictly speaking of the household heads – with a net monthly 
household income above 33000 DM in 1998 – the threshold being 35000 DM – ranges from 32 
to 52. The 99th income percentile exceeds 20000 DM for all age-groups between 48 and 57. 
Dropping those households in the 1998 cross-section whose income exceeded the indexed 1988 
threshold left average stock market wealth unchanged for 60 out of 66 age-groups. Affected were 
the ages 32 and 45-49 with changes in average stock market wealth for an individual age-group 
between (-0.5) to (-9.9) percent. 
 
 
Comparing the wealth levels from the EVS with the Financial Accounts 
 
Table A-1: Coverage rates in the EVS 1978-1988 
1978 1983 1988 
type of asset 
FA EVS 
EVS 
coverage 
rate 
FA EVS 
EVS 
coverage 
rate 
FA EVS 
EVS 
coverage 
rate 
saving deposits 459.1 216.3 47.1% 545.8 229.9 42.1% 699.6 273.7 39.1% 
building society 
saving contracts 93.5 86.7 92.7% 122.8 112 91.2% 118 102.2 86.6% 
time deposits 36.8 n.a. n.a. 125.7 34.1 27.1% 144.3 37.4 25.9% 
securities 240.4 103.4 43.0% 441.9 163.9 37.1% 646.4 211.2 32.7% 
saving bonds 59.9 n.a. n.a. 128.5 47.4 36.9% 164.5 72.1 43.8% 
bank bonds 48 n.a. n.a. 128.5 40.1 31.2% 104.3 29.7 28.5% 
government 
bonds 46.6 n.a. n.a. 69.1 26.9 38.9% 75.6 24.5 32.4% 
stocks 55 n.a. n.a. 71.2 32.3 45.4% 134.5 48.7 36.2% 
mutual funds 24 n.a. n.a. 31.8 8.4 26.4% 73.3 17.3 23.6% 
other securities 6.9 n.a. n.a. 12.8 8.8 68.8% 94.2 18.9 20.1% 
life-insurance                
other claims   n.a. n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. n.a. 
private pension 
funds   n.a. n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. n.a. 
other claims   n.a. n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. n.a. 
gross financial 
wealth 829.8 406.4 49.0% 1236.2 539.9 43.7% 1608.3 626.9 39.0% 
 
Source: Lang (1997), absolute numbers in billion DM 
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Time-effects from the Deaton-Paxson decomposition 
 
Figure A-1: Time-effects in participation rates (relative scale) 
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Figure A-2: Time-effects in portfolio shares (relative scale) 
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 Chapter 3 
 
Savings motives and the effectiveness of tax 
incentives – an analysis based on the 
demand for life-insurance in Germany 
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I. Introduction 
 
Life insurance traditionally plays an important role in Germans’ private savings. Roughly 60 
percent of all German households held some kind of life insurance in 2003. Its popularity might 
seem somewhat unusual from an international perspective. Yet life insurance products in 
Germany have some key characteristics, which are not common to life insurance in many other 
countries. The combination of characteristics also makes the German insurance market an 
interesting field for research on savings behavior and savings motives: old age provision, tax 
favors, protection of one’s family against income risks, bequest motives and the wish to acquire a 
piece of real estate may induce people to invest in some kind of life insurance. We exploit the 
remarkable aspects of the German insurance market in order to test, which of these determinants 
actually drive the demand for life insurance and shed some light on the importance of different 
savings motives.  
As of today, most Germans would probably think of a life insurance policy as a means of private 
old age provision. But there is more to it: Annuity insurance and whole life insurance contracts in 
Germany essentially combine the insurance against longevity risk with a highly tax favored 
savings plan. Hence, pure tax savings motives as well as the need for additional old age provision 
in the face of the declining generosity of the public pension system may drive the demand for life 
insurance. Further, life insurance contracts can aim at the insurance of the owner’s family against 
an early death of the main earner or serve a bequest motive. Last, also the possibility to use life 
insurance contracts as collateral to home loans adds to the popularity of annuity and whole life 
insurance contracts. Some term life insurance is frequently required for a successful application 
for a home loan.  
Our paper contributes mainly to two threads of research: The importance of tax incentives for 
household savings and portfolio choice and the relevance of savings motives in savings decisions. 
But also the demand for life insurance itself has attracted some attention in the past. Given that 
life insurance products have such extraordinary relevance for German households our dataset 
seems well suited to add some insights.  
A substantial literature has discussed the importance of tax incentives and after-tax returns on 
portfolio choice. The first paper to empirically document the importance of taxation on portfolio 
choice has been Feldstein (1976). Later, the favorable tax treatment of IRAs and 401(k) plans in 
the United States triggered a scientific debate on whether or not the tax incentives created 
additional savings or just crowded out other forms of savings. The literature is summarized by 
Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) as well as Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996). While this literature 
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remains somewhat undecided on whether or not tax incentives are suited to create additional 
savings it largely agrees that tax incentives shift households’ investment decisions in the expected 
direction. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2001) analyze the effects of a change in the tax treatment 
towards life insurance products in Italy. Unlike the American studies they do not find evidence 
for a reaction in household portfolio behavior.  
Also the question whether or not bequest motives play a role for private households’ savings 
decisions has received a great deal of attention: The majority of analyses test implications of a 
bequest motive on consumption or on the demand for term life insurance and private pensions. 
Bernheim (1991) focuses on the demand for life insurance, while Hurd (1987, 1989) analyzes 
total savings. Both make use of the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey. Lacking data on 
surrender values, Bernheim focuses on insurance sums. He concludes that households would not 
choose to annuitize their entire wealth even in the presence of perfect insurance markets. 
Bernheim argues further that a large segment of the population behaves according to what the 
presence of a bequest motive would imply. His findings are at odds with the conclusions of Hurd 
(1987), who investigated the rate of asset decumulation of elderly households. Hurd’s estimates 
show no significant differences in the degree of dissaving between households with and without 
children. While the childless have less reason to save in order to leave a bequest, the weaker 
family insurance may call for a stronger precautionary savings motive, offsetting the smaller 
bequest motive. In a subsequent analysis Hurd (1989) used a parametrized model of 
consumption and saving. He estimates the marginal utility from bequests to be close to zero. The 
most recent contribution to this literature stems from Kopczuk and Lupton (2005). They relax 
Hurd’s distinction between households with and without children and estimate the existence of a 
bequest motive using a switching regression. They find the bequest motive to be prominent 
among all households, no matter whether they have children or not. For a significant share of 
households, the bequest motive is also estimated to be economically significant. Yet, all these 
studies suffer from the impossibility to distinguish an operative bequest motive from other 
savings motives – e.g. a precautionary savings motive. Some studies therefore exploit survey data 
containing direct questions on the intention of leaving a bequest. Alessie et al. (1999) find only 
insignificant effects of intended bequests on savings for the Netherlands. But also the sign of the 
estimated effect is not robust across the years. Also Kazarozian (1997) finds no evidence for a 
bequest motive. His estimates for the United States have a consistently positive sign but none of 
them is significant. Laitner and Juster (1996) make use of the TIAA-CREF survey and find 
households with a bequest motive to have significantly higher wealth levels at age 65. At the same 
time, they find a large amount of heterogeneity among these households and point out that other 
household characteristics seem to be more important than the existence of a bequest motive. 
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Furthermore, the sample of TIAA-CREF annuitants is known to be not representative for the 
US population and consisting of rather high educated and well off persons. Juerges (2001) 
compares subjective and objective indicators for the importance of a bequest motive in Germany. 
Like Hurd (1987) he finds the presence of children to be of minor importance for the 
heterogeneity in wealth holdings, whereas differences in declared bequest intentions are 
associated with significant shifts in wealth holdings. Similarly, Schunk (2007) finds that there is a 
significant bequest motive for older households, even when he controls for the presence of a 
precautionary motive. While the evidence for a bequest motive remains at best ambiguous, it still 
remains unclear, whether egoistic or altruistic aspects are causing people to plan to leave a 
bequest.  
Last but not least there is a considerable literature which has focused on specific aspects in the 
demand of life insurance. Gandolfi and Miners (1996) argue, that there might be differences in 
the determinants of the demand for life insurance between husbands and wives and find support 
for their hypotheses. Chen, Wong and Lee (2001) describe the historical trends in the demand for 
life insurance in the U.S. They find differences in the historical sales between women and men 
and argue that labor force participation might be an important determinant. Like in Germany, 
they find a reduction in life insurance purchases over the last years, which is especially prominent 
among the young. They speculate the higher share of single households and the trend towards 
later marriages and later childbirth to be the main causes.  
Given that we observe a considerable amount of change on the German insurance market we 
aim to exploit our results to also shed some light on the past – and possible future – trends. 
Recent changes in the tax legislation and the pension reforms are likely to affect demand in the 
short and medium run. Over a longer horizon also sociological developments are likely to play a 
role: Between the 1970s and today we have observed trends to later household formation, later 
childbirth and higher female labor force participation which are likely to continue over the next 
decades. 
The paper is structured as follows: We start out in section two with an overview over the 
German market for life insurance products and illustrate the relative importance of the various 
products with recent data. Further, we describe in detail the subsidization scheme. Section three 
discusses the theoretical foundations of the demand for life insurance and derives hypotheses 
about the effects of various savings motives on the demand for life insurance. In the fourth 
section we describe the data we use for the empirical part, the results of which are presented in 
the following section. We begin the fifth section with a description of the historical developments 
and some basic regressions of ownership decisions for the various life insurance products. 
Bernheim (1991) presented strong evidence, that different processes are driving the ownership 
  
118
decision and the decision, how much to invest in life insurance. We therefore also employ a two 
stage model for the households’ demand for life insurance. Section six concludes. 
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II. Life insurance in Germany 
 
The high popularity of life insurance products in German households’ portfolios has – at least in 
part – an historical background: Capital accumulation on behalf of private households was one of 
the main political objectives in Germany after the Second World War. To promote this, public 
economic policy widely employed tax incentives. Hence, life insurance contracts have been 
designed to meet the requirements for the favorable tax treatment. Apart from a rather attractive 
combination of reasonably high returns and low levels of risks, these tax advantages will certainly 
have contributed to the high popularity of savings in life insurance products in Germany. With 
the stock market boom in the late 1990s the popularity of life insurance products has suffered, 
but wealth in life insurance products remains to be one of the most important components of 
German households’ financial assets. In 2003, roughly 60 percent of all German households held 
at least one life insurance contract and wealth in life insurance products accounted for as much 
27.5 percent of total financial wealth.  
 
II.1 Market overview  
The German market for life insurance products spans term life insurance, as well as whole life 
insurance and private pensions. The first is distinct from the two others, as it does not involve 
capital accumulation. We still consider it in our analysis, as term life insurance can be employed 
to insure the family against income risks connected to the death of the main earner. Comparing 
whole life insurance and private pension contracts the two products should be quite dissimilar 
from a theoretical point of view. Yet the way they are offered on the German market, they differ 
only in a few aspects. Essentially, they both combine an insurance against longevity risk with a 
highly tax favored savings plan. The main difference is that whole life insurance contracts include 
a term life component whereas private annuities do not.  
Additionally, we distinguish between so called “classical” and “fund based” contracts. Whole life 
insurance as well as private pensions are offered in either specification. In a “classical” insurance 
contract, the insured person is guaranteed a minimum annual return. The insured further 
participate in excess returns of the insurance company. The key characteristic of the “fund 
based” contracts is that the insured person essentially bears the risk of return. Additionally, the 
classical and fund based contracts differ with respect to their tax treatment, which we will discuss 
later. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the relative importance of the above products on the German insurance 
market since 1990. Mere fifteen years ago, essentially only term life insurance and classical whole 
life insurance contracts played a role. Since then, two major trends have changed the structure of 
the market. First, fund based insurance contracts have experienced a considerable growth. 
Second, the popularity of private pensions has increased considerably. These changes have 
happened at an impressive pace and are even more striking when we look at the number of newly 
signed policies. In fact, private pension contracts account for at least 50 percent of total new 
contracts since the year 2001.1  
 
Figure 1: Number of life insurance contracts by type of product (in 1000) 
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Source: Gesamtverband der Versicherungswirtschaft 
 
                                                 
1 excluding pure term life insurance 
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II.2 Market structure and investor characteristics 
These above aggregate figures already give us a broad impression of the importance of life 
insurance products in German households’ portfolios. The total of roughly 70 million contracts 
relates to a population of 82 million people in 39 million households, a lot of which hold several 
insurance contracts.  
The 2003 Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) allows us to inspect the structure of life 
insurance ownership and portfolio shares of the different products in more detail. Whole life 
insurance contracts turn out to be part of financial wealth in every second German household 
(see table 1). The EVS additionally allows us to distinguish certain special types of whole life 
insurance: Specifically there are death benefit insurances, apprenticeship insurances, and 
trousseau insurances. They differ rather little from regular whole life insurance contracts and the 
conditions for the favorable tax treatment are identical. Further, they all share the characteristic 
that their respective payout is linked to specific events. However, these special types of whole life 
insurance have lost most of their previous importance: In 2003, trousseau insurance and 
apprenticeship insurance were held by only 1-2 percent of all households. 6.4 percent owned a 
death benefit insurance contract.2  
 
Table 1: Ownership rates and wealth in life insurance contracts by type of life insurance (2003) 
    wealth  portfolio share 
  ownership rate average cond. average average cond. 
term life insurance 12.7% - - - - 
whole life insurance 51.5% 9’940 19’308 24.6% 37.2% 
"regular" 46.9% 9’517 20’286 23.6% 38.1% 
"apprenticeship" 1.7% 88 5’207 0.2% 10.3% 
"death benefit" 6.4% 266 4’172 0.7% 8.7% 
"trousseau" 1.1% 67 6’250 0.2% 11.7% 
private pension 
insurance 13.3% 1’134 8’511 2.8% 15.9% 
 
Source: EVS (2003), own calculations. Note: all results are weighted and in Euros (2001); the 
conditional figures refer to the group of households holding wealth in the respective type of 
insurance.  
 
Looking at the surrender values of life insurance contracts, we find them to make up for a 
substantial share of total household financial wealth.3 The conditional wealth levels and 
conditional portfolio shares illustrate the substantial importance of life insurance wealth for those 
                                                 
2 The appendix contains a small analysis of the historical developments in the ownership of death benefit insurance, 
apprenticeship insurance and trousseau insurance. 
3 Average financial wealth in 2003 accumulated to 40327 Euros. 
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households who actually had some money invested in the various kinds of policies. Note that 
also private pensions account for an important share of financial wealth for their owners, but still 
play only a minor role in the aggregate portfolio of all German households.  
Next, we aim to know more about the characteristics of life insurance owners: We find them on 
average to be richer than their counterparts without any life insurance. This gap is tiny between 
households with and without term life insurance but huge if we distinguish by the ownership of 
capital accumulating insurance products. This finding prevails if we restrict our view to financial 
wealth other than wealth in life insurance contracts. 
Table 2 presents some further stylized facts: Life insurance products are more popular among 
married couples, households with children and households with a self-employed household head. 
 
Table 2: Life insurance ownership and household characteristics 
  
term life 
insurance whole life insurance
private pension 
insurance 
        
Household Type       
single 5.5% 35.2% 9.6% 
couple 10.1% 53.5% 9.4% 
single + cohabitants 13.9% 50.9% 18.4% 
couple + cohabitants 25.5% 73.6% 20.2% 
        
Marital Status       
married 17.7% 63.5% 14.7% 
not married 7.7% 39.3% 11.9% 
        
Children       
no children 7.9% 43.8% 10.3% 
1 children 17.8% 61.7% 19.0% 
2 and more children 26.1% 70.3% 19.4% 
        
Work Status       
self-employed 19.1% 69.2% 26.7% 
civil servants 19.5% 68.5% 15.6% 
employees 18.8% 62.6% 19.4% 
        
Income4 
      
1st quintile 4.7% 34.9% 4.9% 
2nd quintile 12.3% 48.8% 18.1% 
3rd quintile 18.1% 63.4% 19.6% 
4th quintile 21.4% 70.3% 20.1% 
5th quintile 24.6% 76.0% 21.9% 
        
All 12.7% 51.5% 13.3% 
 
Source: EVS (2003), own calculations, weighted results 
                                                 
4 Income is total household income from work. To avoid strong age- and retirement-effects in the income 
distribution, the sample is restricted to households with a household head aged 65 and below. 
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We further find a strong income gradient, which is especially steep between the first and the third 
income quintile. While this might hint at some possible motives to purchase life insurance, we 
leave this aside for the moment and return to the matter in the context of multivariate 
regressions. 
 
 
II.3 Taxation and life insurance products 
We now turn to one of the key sales arguments for life insurance products: their favorable tax 
treatment. We first describe the German income tax scheme as the basis to which the tax favors 
are applied and then turn to the actual privileges and the conditions under which they are 
granted. 
 
The German personal income tax scheme 
The German income tax scheme is characterized by its progressive tax rate. A number of tax 
reforms have touched the amount of tax allowance and the actual tax rates (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Marginal tax rates between 1983-2003 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000
taxable income [Euros (2001)]
m
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
1983 1988
1993 1998
2003
Source: Own calculations based on German tax laws; Note: Tax rates for a single person with no children  
 
  
124
Note that the level of tax allowance also depends on the number of children and that certain 
types of transfer income remain untaxed or are subject to reduced tax rates. Further, different 
and independent amounts of tax allowance apply to different kinds of income.5 Last, there is a 
splitting option for married couples which taxes each spouse on half the total of their combined 
incomes. Hence, there is a certain level of variability in household tax rates for a given level of 
income. This is crucial to our target of separating income- and taxation-effects, which we will 
further discuss later.  
Capital income is subject to general income taxation and hence taxed at the individual tax rate. 
That is, Germany does not have a flat tax rate which applies to all capital income like some other 
European countries. There is an independent tax allowance for interest and dividend payments. 
Realized capital gains are taxed only if they exceed a tax exemption limit. Unrealized capital gains 
remain untaxed. The same applies to realized capital gains after a certain holding period.6 
 
Tax favors towards life insurance products 
German tax laws provide two kinds of tax subsidization towards life insurance contracts. First, 
expenditures for various kinds of insurance – and among them life insurance policies – can be 
deducted from taxable income. Second, interest income earned in a life insurance contract 
remains untaxed. These two ways of subsidization can be claimed simultaneously but are subject 
to certain conditions. If the conditions are not met, interest payments within an insurance 
contract will be treated just like any other capital income: The share of interest income will be 
taxed at the personal interest rate with every payment from the contract. In the case of a lump 
sum payment, the entire accumulated interest is taxed in the year of the payout.  
 
Tax-deductibility of expenditures 
All types of private life insurance and private pensions have to fulfill certain conditions to qualify 
for tax deductibility: First, there have to be regular contributions, i.e. no lump sum contributions 
are allowed. Second, payments from the contract are not allowed within 12 years after the 
                                                 
5 The German tax system differentiates e.g. between income from employment, from self-employment, from 
financial assets, and rental income. For most of them, a certain tax allowance applies and advertising costs like costs 
for commuting may – at least partly – be deducted. The resulting subtotals are then added up to calculate the 
assessment basis to which the main tax allowance is applied. 
6 A fundamental reform of the taxation of financial assets has been enacted for 2009 but has no effects on the data 
we analyze in this paper. 
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inception date. Expenditures for private term life insurance are deductible without such 
condition. Contributions to mutual fund based insurance contracts cannot be deducted.  
Two aspects make deductibility a rather complex topic though. First, not only contributions to 
life insurance contracts are deductible but so are other expenditures. The core set of expenditures 
relates to some kind of insurance. Second, the deductibility is capped, which is why we have to 
bother in the first place. Let us assume that certain deductible expenditures are inevitable for the 
household or decided upon before it comes to the question whether or not to buy life insurance. 
Then the deductibility cap may already be reached without further expenditures. Most important 
among the inevitable tax deductible expenditures are the employees’ contributions to the social 
security system as well as to private health insurance.7 Apart from insurance premia, also 
expenditures for tax consultants, premia for private liability insurance or car liability insurance 
etc. are deductible.  
 
Deductibility cap and lump sum deduction 
The deductibility of expenditures is capped in a rather complex way. For each year and all tax 
payers, there is a general upper cap. In 2003, this cap was 5069 Euros for singles and 10138 for 
couples who are jointly assessed. Yet these amounts essentially only apply to individuals who earn 
income solely from self-employment. The reason is that employers’ contributions to social 
security remain untaxed for the employee, so that the deductibility of additional expenditures is 
lowered accordingly. At a gross income from employment of roughly 19500 (39000) Euros, the 
cap reaches its minimum at 2001 (4002) Euros for singles (couples) (see figure 3).  
At the same time, German tax authorities apply a lump sum deduction of 20 percent of the 
taxpayer’s income from employment up to certain limits. This takes into account that all 
employees pay roughly 20 percent of their incomes as social security contributions. Hence, the 
lump sum deduction rises with a taxpayer’s income while the deductibility cap is reduced. As a 
consequence, for employees with an income of about 17500 (35000) Euros, the lump sum 
deduction equals the upper limit for deductions (see figure 3).  
 
                                                 
7 The social security system includes the public pension system, public health insurance, public unemployment 
insurance, as well as long term care insurance. The self employed can freely choose to contribute to the social 
security system. For employees, the contribution is generally compulsory. Only employees with earnings above a 
certain income threshold can opt out of the public health insurance and buy private insurance instead. The 
membership in a public or private long term care insurance is always linked to the equivalent status in health 
insurance. 
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Figure 3: Lump sum deduction and deductibility caps for employees (2003) 
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For civil servants, the deductibility cap is the same as for all other employees but the lump sum 
deduction is lower (see figure 4). Therefore, civil servants can always enjoy at least some tax 
advantage from additional tax deductible expenditures – independent of their income. 
 
Figure 4: Lump sum deduction and deductibility cap for civil servants (2003) 
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Deductible expenditures and utilization of the deductibility cap 
So far, we have described the theoretical framework for the deductibility of certain expenditures. 
In the following, we now investigate, how different expenditures matter for civil servants, self-
employed and employees, and how these different employment groups make use of the possible 
deductions. To keep things comparable we restrict the respective samples to single households. 
Individuals are assigned to the respective occupational groups depending on their main source of 
income. We categorize the different expenditures in what we consider inevitable expenditures 
and expenditures on life insurance premia. For the inevitable expenditures, we use two different 
definitions – a rather tight one and a second, which we call “extended definition”.8 
We first add up the inevitable expenditures and present subtotals for the tight and the extended 
definition. We then calculate the corresponding deduction from taxable income. Additionally, we 
indicate the share of households which reaches the deductibility cap at each subtotal and the 
average excess expenditures – i.e. expenditures above the amount needed for maximum tax 
savings. After investigating the situation without life-insurance investments, we combine the 
inevitable expenditures and the contributions to life-insurance policies and repeat the above 
calculations. Table 3 displays the respective calculations for the subsamples of civil servants, self-
employed and employees. 
Section I of table 3 shows that over 83 percent of the employees already reach the deductibility 
cap declaring only their inevitable – and largely compulsory – expenditures. The equivalent shares 
among civil servants and self-employed are 37.6 percent and 28.3 percent respectively. Looking at 
the extended definition of inevitable expenditures, the overall picture does not change much (see 
section II). We should note though that occupational pension funds play an important role for 
some groups of self-employed, e.g. lawyers.  
Looking at the third section of table 3, we find average contributions to life insurance contracts 
by the self-employed (2266 €) to be considerably higher than for the other two groups (704 € 
among civil servants and 575 € among employees). Looking at the ratios of additional tax 
deductions to additional expenditures from life insurance premia, we find them to reach only 6.5 
percent among civil servants and self-employed and an even lower 2.5 percent among employees. 
Hence, at least on average, the tax subsidy on life insurance premia amounts to less than 3 
percent of the expenditures. Looking at these numbers, tax deductibility seems rather unlikely to 
be an important argument for purchasing life insurance – at least for the majority of the 
population. 
 
                                                 
8 For a detailed overview over the expenditures included in the two definitions see the appendix. 
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Table 3: Utilization of the deductibility of contribution by type of occupation 
  civil servants self-employed  employee 
age 38.7  45.9   39.4  
labor income 31'000 € 27'355 €      28'545 €   
       
ownership rate (any kind of life 
insurance) 62.2% 63.7%   55.8%  
       
observations 723  373   3836  
         
I. "inevitable" expenditures      
public pension system -   €      1'186 €        2'678 €   
public unempl. insurance -   €           5 €          893 €   
public health insurance -   €        163 €        1'578 €   
voluntary publ. health insur.  147 €      1'184 €          278 €   
private health insurance 1'651 €      1'542 €          210 €   
additional priv. health insur. 260 €        356 €          125 €   
publ. long term care insur. 19 €        147 €          231 €   
private long term care insur. 161 €        167 €            15 €   
car liability insurance 342 €         432 €          309 €   
  2'580 €       5'181 €        6'316 €   
deduction ( I.)    1'700.5 €  3'717.2 €     2'063.0 € 
share of households at the 
deduction cap ( I.)  37.6%  28.3%  83.4%
excess expenditures ( I.)   489.8 €    1'214.5 €     3'673.1 € 
            
            
II. "inevitable" expenditures 
(extended definition)       
occupational pension funds            7 €   110 €            53 €   
civil servants pension funds             5 €           5 €          103 €   
voluntary public pension 
system           19 €       482 €        14 €   
            31 €        597 €          170 €   
  2'611 €  5'778 €        6'486 €   
deduction ( II.)   1'707.7 €  
  
3'863.0 €   
 
2'065.4 € 
share of households at the 
deduction cap ( II.)  38.1%  33.1%  83.5%
excess expenditures ( II.)   509.7 €    1'632.4 €    3'839.8 € 
        
        
III. total expenditures incl. 
life insurance premia       
life insurance premia       704 €  2'266 €          575 €   
     3'314 €       8'044 €        7'060 €   
total deduction ( III.)    1'754.0 €    4'010.6 €     2'078.9 € 
excess expenditures ( III.)   1'037.6 €    3'529.1 €     4'388.5 € 
        
max. possible deduction  2'238.5 €    5'029.2 €      2'315.2 € 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the EVS (2003), weighted results 
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Table 4 suggests further, that it might rather be a question of financial means whether or not 
people decide to save in life insurance. We split the above samples depending on whether 
households reached the deductibility cap based on their “inevitable” expenditures or not. We find 
households at or above the cap to be more likely to invest in life insurance and to hold more 
wealth in life insurance contracts. For civil servants the differences are both highly significant. 
Among the self-employed, the difference in ownership rates is not significant but the conditional 
wealth holdings are again significant at the 1% level. Among employees, the difference in 
conditional wealth levels is not significant, but the difference in ownership rates is9. Comparing 
the financial means of the two groups, we find the households at or above the deductibility cap 
to earn significantly more income and to have higher saving rates. To rule out that households 
below the deductibility cap just save in different products we calculated the saving rates without 
savings in life insurance contracts and found our results to be robust. 
 
Table 4: Life insurance ownership and wealth by opportunity of further deductions 
  civil servants self-employed  employees 
  
at or 
above the 
cap  
below the 
cap 
at or 
above the 
cap  
below the 
cap 
at or 
above the 
cap  
below the 
cap 
317 406 116 257 3395 441   
observations 723 373 3836 
life insurance 
ownership 68.6% 58.3% 70.0% 61.2% 59.3% 38.1% 
  (0.006***) (0.113) (0.000***) 
wealth in life 
insurance (cond.) 19'263 € 10'363 € 50'614 € 24'398 € 11'579 € 9'566 € 
  (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.138) 
income from work 39'201 € 26'052 € 44'838 € 20'466 € 32'387 € 9'259 € 
median saving rate 
(w/o life insurance) 11.1% 7.8% 10.3% 3.4% 7.7% 0.0% 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 2003, weighted results. Note: p-Values in brackets for tests  
of equality in ownerships rates and cond. wealth levels. *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
 
Tax free interest 
Additionally to the tax deductibility of insurance premia all capital gains and interest earnings 
within the contract remain untaxed if contributions are made regularly and the first payments 
from the contract lie at least twelve years after the inception date. In contrast to the deductibility 
                                                 
9 Using the extended definition of inevitable expenditures does not change our results. Only the difference in 
ownership rates among the self-employed turns significant (p=0.06). 
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of contributions no cap applies to this tax favor and mutual fund based insurance contracts enjoy 
the same tax favor as “classical” insurance contracts.  
From the above tables 2 and 4 we know that households with life insurance products receive 
higher incomes from work. Given the progressive German tax scheme we can expect these 
households to also face higher marginal tax rates. While we might take this match of high tax 
advantages with high actual investments as a first piece of evidence for the importance of this 
second tax favor, there is also reason to be careful. The fact that income and tax rates are 
positively correlated may lead us to the false conclusion that we are observing actual tax-effects. 
We therefore abstain for such speculations and revert to microeconometric analyses for a more 
thorough inspection of the importance of tax advantages for German life insurance buyers. 
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III. Theoretical considerations 
 
Several authors have proposed models for the demand of life insurance products and derived 
testable hypotheses. Some of these models are motivated indirectly – i.e. their ultimate focus is 
not on the demand for life insurance but on some other phenomenon. Yet there is a lot to be 
learned from these models: They all cover specific aspects to the demand for life insurance and 
thus matter for our rather comprehensive analysis. 
 
III.1 General relevance of the demand for life insurance products 
First, we are interested in the determinants of the demand for life insurance as such. Life 
insurance wealth plays an outstanding role in German households’ portfolios and it seems 
important to reach a better understanding of the factors influencing this vast market. 
Furthermore, the life insurance industry is an important employer and used to be a core element 
of the highly interwoven corporate sector in Germany. Hence, all political reforms affecting the 
market environment tend to trigger an intense debate, which also calls for a sound understanding 
of the actual mechanisms behind private households’ decisions and possible reactions to such 
reforms. The reduction in tax advantages towards whole life insurance products is a recent 
example. Among the literature touching the demand for life insurance products, two analyses 
take a similar original interest in the demand for life insurance products: Jappelli and Pistaferri 
(2001) focus on a change in the tax treatment towards life insurance products which bears a 
strong resemblance to the recent German reform. They exploit this natural experiment to 
estimate the effects of tax incentives on the demand for life insurance products as they are 
suggested by theoretical models of portfolio choice. Walliser and Winter (1999) focus on the 
German insurance market and propose a small theoretical model, which incorporates some 
important characteristics of this market. We adopt some of the hypotheses developed in these 
two papers and extend them in some dimensions.  
 
III.2 Savings motives 
Apart from this general interest, our second focus is on the identification of the savings motives 
at work in connection to the demand for life insurance. The coexistence of several savings 
motives is also the main reason why we do not adopt the very basic hypotheses suggested in the 
literature, e.g. by Yaari (1965) and Bernheim (1991). One such basic hypothesis derived from a 
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very simple model is, that nobody should hold term life insurance and annuity products at the 
same time. A considerable share of households still holds both – a puzzle which has been 
established for several countries which is also supported by our data.10 Note that the above 
hypothesis is based on a model where term life insurance products and private annuities are 
bought to arrive at an optimal level of annuitized pension wealth. Now it is important to know 
that the typical German annuity insurance product can always be paid out in a lump sum. Hence, 
purchasing a private annuity and term life insurance is not necessarily a contradiction to this basic 
hypothesis. Furthermore, other savings motives are not included in this rather parsimonious 
model but might cause a simultaneous demand for term life insurance and private pensions. 
What we learn from this example is that although a variety of testable hypotheses can be derived 
from theoretical models, it is important to keep in mind the contextual market environment.  
In the following, we go through the list of possible savings motives and refer to hypotheses 
suggested in the literature as they connect to the demand for life insurance products. We make 
adaptations where necessary and add aspects, which have not been discussed in the literature, 
where they naturally arise in the context of the German market. 
 
Old age provision 
First and foremost life insurance has been promoted as a means of private old age provision. 
Feldstein (1974) suggested that private and public old age provision should be substitutes. Once a 
household receives less than his desired replacement rate from public pensions, his private 
savings will fill the gap. Savings in life insurance contracts can be paid out as an annuity and are 
therefore a close substitute to social security wealth. We therefore expect the probability of life 
insurance ownership to rise and more savings to go into life insurance products the higher the 
need for additional private old age provision is.  
Unfortunately, there is no generally available data source for Germany providing information on 
social security wealth and wealth in life insurance contracts. The income and expenditure survey 
(EVS) which we base our analysis on, is the only data source in Germany which contains a 
sufficiently detailed level of information on household savings and wealth. While we describe our 
data in more detail later, it is important to know at this point, that the EVS has no longitudinal 
dimension and also does not provide an earnings history, which would allow the calculation of a 
proxy for social security wealth. We therefore rely on different proxies for private old age 
provision needs:  
                                                 
10 2.73 percent of all households hold both, annuity insurance and term life insurance. 21.4 percent of households 
who have a term life insurance also have annuity insurance.  
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First, replacement rates in the public pension system differ across households for a number of 
reasons. The self-employed are typically not covered by the public pension system. That is, their 
replacement rate is essentially zero and the need for additional private old age provision will tend 
to be high. Civil servants are covered by a separate public pension scheme which differs from the 
employees’ scheme in a few minor aspects. We therefore compare the self-employed to 
employees and civil servants and expect the self-employed to be considerably more likely to hold 
life insurance policies and to accumulate more life insurance wealth.  
Second, there is a certain degree of variation in replacement rates within the group of employees. 
As contributions to the public pension system are capped, the pension claims also rise only up to 
the corresponding income level. Figure 5 illustrates how many earnings points a person receives 
for a given gross annual income. Without the assessment ceiling pensions would be a linear 
function of pre retirement income. Given that contributions and earnings points are independent 
of the income above the ceiling (61200 € in 2003), the actual replacement rate of individuals with 
a higher income declines with income.  
 
Figure 5: Effects of the assessment ceiling on the public retirement income of high income households 
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If people save to achieve a certain target replacement rate, they will need additional private 
savings. Accordingly we expect households with an income above the contribution ceiling to be 
more likely to invest in life insurance products and accumulate more life insurance wealth. At the 
same time it is questionable, how large this effect will be. Only few individuals will receive 
incomes considerably above the contribution ceiling for an extended number of years. Figure 5 
shows the annual annuity which would have to be bought for one year of income above the 
assessment ceiling if the individual meant to make up for the reduced public replacement rate. 
 
Bequest motives and insurance for the family 
The second savings motive which is often mentioned in connection with the purchase of life 
insurance products is the bequest motive. Talking about a bequest motive, we do not distinguish 
an actual bequest motive from a motive to insure the family against the early death of an earner. 
Given that the EVS does not contain a question on planned bequests we employ several proxies 
for a possible bequest motive. Like Hurd (1987, 1989) we employ the presence of children. 
Generally, all accumulated wealth can be bequeathed and serve as an insurance for the family. 
Term life insurance can provide an additional coverage at rather low expenses. The term life 
component also makes a whole life insurance more suitable for the task at hand than for example 
stock market wealth or wealth in an annuity insurance. We thus start with the hypothesis, that the 
existence and the number of children will increase the probability of purchasing a policy with 
some term life component. Apart from the pure existence and number of children, the age of the 
children may matter. Consider the stream of child related expenditures up to the age at which a 
child could provide for herself. The present value of these expenditures will typically decrease 
with the child’s age. Hence, we further conjecture, that families with young children are more 
likely to purchase a policy which includes term life insurance than families with near-grownup 
children. 
Bernheim (1991) suggests that also the intra-household allocation of assets may matter for the 
demand for term life insurance. He argues that if the survival-contingent incomes of the two 
partners differ substantially it may make sense to purchase term life insurance to reduce this 
imbalance. Insuring the death of the spouse with the higher income will leave the other spouse 
with the insurance sum. We are not aware of an empirical analysis which tests the corresponding 
hypothesis: We expect the probability of some sort of term life insurance in a household to be 
higher the more the income flows of the spouses differ. 
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Home loan motive 
Third and last, the intention of buying or building a house of one’s own will often trigger demand 
for life insurance products. First, banks frequently require a household to have some kind of term 
life insurance to get the credit in the first place. And second, it is not uncommon to pick the 
lump sum payout option and use the life insurance savings to buy back the outstanding mortgage. 
We conjecture that home owners with outstanding credit will be more likely to have some term 
life insurance. 
 
III.3 Tax incentives 
Some households would probably name the possibility to save taxes as an independent savings 
motive. The importance of the favorable tax treatment as a sales argument for life insurance 
products would suggest ranking the tax savings motive second behind the need for private old 
age provision if not even first. Nevertheless, we separate the aspect of tax incentives from the 
original savings motives. The reason is that tax incentives affect the characteristics of an asset 
rather than determining the preferences of the investor.  
 
Taxfree interest  
Strictly speaking, tax incentives change the after tax return of an asset. Note that while the pre tax 
returns are equal for all investors, after tax returns may vary substantially depending on the 
person’s individual tax rate. In most standard theoretical models of portfolio choice the optimal 
asset allocation depends on the expected returns of the available assets, their risk and their cross-
correlations.11 Apart from the asset allocation, also the consumption-savings decision may be 
affected – the reason is the income effect connected to the return of the selected portfolio.12 Yet 
under standard assumptions concerning the form of the utility function all these models imply, 
that the portfolio share invested in life insurance products should rise in the level of tax 
incentives.  
Walliser and Winter (1999) tailor a stylized model of portfolio choice to the German case and 
explicitly model the tax advantage for life insurance products. They allow households to invest in 
                                                 
11 The capital asset pricing literature goes back to Markovitz (1952). First dynamic asset pricing models were 
suggested by Merton (1969, 1971, 1973) and Samuelson (1969). 
12 Campbell (2002) gives a nice overview over the literature which integrates life-cycle consumption decisions with 
portfolio choice. 
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life insurance and bonds. Their numerical simulations imply that the tax favors for life insurance 
contracts are a key determinant of the demand, especially early in the life cycle. 
We follow their hypotheses and expect households with higher tax rates to invest more in life 
insurance contracts, as the difference in after tax returns between life insurance products and 
other assets increases with the households’ tax burden. We further expect the probability to hold 
life insurance products to increase in the household’s tax rate. Simple portfolio choice models 
imply that essentially all available assets will be part of the optimal portfolio. Indivisibilities or 
market entry costs may prevent some people from investing in all assets though. Hence, the 
probability to actually invest in a certain asset increases in those factors that increase the optimal 
amount invested in a world without such restrictions. Thus we can conjecture that households 
facing higher tax rates will also be more likely to invest in life insurance contracts. Note that the 
above argument also holds for possible other determinants of the demand for life insurance 
products, especially the savings motives discussed above.  
At this point a note on the importance of income seems necessary. Looking only at the portfolio 
choice, there is no consensus, whether income should play a role. Campbell and Viceira (2002) 
give an overview over the circumstances under which portfolio choice should depend on the 
level of income. Apart from these theoretical considerations it has repeatedly been argued that 
the co-movement of income and tax rates will always prevent us from distinguishing the two in 
an empirical analysis. The basic argument is that the effective tax rate will always be a (nonlinear) 
function of income. We are confident, that the situation is not all that bad in our case as we have 
outlined in the previous section.  
 
Tax deductibility of contributions 
The effects of the deductibility of contributions to life insurance contracts have been ignored by 
earlier studies although the two ways of favorable tax treatment are conceptually independent and 
different groups of households may benefit most from the one or other advantage. We have 
described in detail, why there may be substantial variation in the amount by which households 
will profit from the deductibility of contributions. Following the above logic we expect 
households with a higher tax advantage to be more likely to invest in life insurance products. We 
further hypothesize them to invest more and thence accumulate larger amounts of wealth.  
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IV. Data 
 
We make use of six cross-sections of the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS). The 
most recent data stems from 2003, the oldest from 1978. The data was collected in 5-year 
intervals and originally aimed at the calculation of consumption baskets. Hence, the Federal 
Statistical Office never bothered to add a longitudinal dimension to the survey although a 
considerable number of households is known to have participated repeatedly. The data includes 
sociodemographic and economic information both at the individual and at the household level. 
To a large extent the data is fully imputed but given the cross-sectional nature, some 
harmonization is necessary.13 Each dataset contains between 40.000 and 60.000 households, 
which allows us to analyze population subsamples. The sample size and the rather long time span 
between 1978 and 2003 also allow us to investigate age trajectories of synthetic cohorts up to 
high ages. Aside from the extensive sociodemographic information, the EVS data contains 
detailed information on the household members’ income by sources and taxes paid. Further, 
there is detailed data on the households’ expenditures, be it for consumption goods, for 
insurance premia, for the purchase of assets or for the repayment of debt. Last, there is a section 
on household wealth.  
A few issues are to be mentioned when using the EVS data. While the sample is designed to be 
representative for the German population, the institutionalized as well as households with 
extremely high incomes are excluded from the sample. For 2003, this sampling threshold was a 
net monthly household income of 18.000 €.14 Furthermore, foreigners are included in the sample 
only since 1993. Apart from these sample restrictions, we should note, that the EVS is carried our 
as a quota sample. The sample is aimed to include 0.2% of the population in each quota cell. The 
quotas are generated based on a number of household characteristics, including household type, 
income and social status of the household head. The quotas are known to be reached with 
differential success though. While the quotas for civil servants are reached rather well, the quotas 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, little of the imputation procedures employed by the Federal Statistical Office is documented. 
Especially for the cross-sections 1978-88, the imputation of conditional means is not unusual.  
14 Sommer (2008) discusses the possible effects of the income threshold on life cycle trajectories of synthetic 
cohorts. Contrary to common criticism, the sampling threshold does not lead to substantial losses at the top of the 
income distribution compared to a random sample. It turns out that only the new sample of rich households which 
has been added to the GSOEP in 2002 has been able to question a handful of households above the EVS sampling 
threshold. In fact, both German surveys miss a considerable part of the German income distribution as shown by 
Merz (2003) for the EVS and by Sommer (2008a) by comparison of the GSOEP with the EVS. 
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for farmers and unemployed households have turned out to be difficult to reach. To compensate 
for the differential success to fill the quotas the federal statistical office provides weights. While 
the choice of a quota sample seems problematic experiments to switch to a random sample have 
turned out to generate even lower response rates from certain population subgroups. Instead, 
several measures have been taken to compensate for the issues of a quota sample. Especially the 
non sampling issues were reduced by assigning the interviewers the households to be 
questioned.15  
 
 
Life insurance in the EVS 
The EVS 1993 through 2003 contain data on wealth holdings in life insurance contracts - 
specifically the surrender value. For 2003, we can distinguish between various types of life 
insurance products. For the years 1978 through 1993 the questionnaire only contains the 
insurance sum. Given that we have information on the surrender values and the insurance sums 
in 1993, we exploited this information to impute the surrender values for the years 1978-1988 
using regression based imputation.16 Further, we know about the households’ expenditures on life 
insurance premia, as well as pension payments and lump sum payouts received from private life 
insurance contracts. For our empirical analysis we focus on four variables: life insurance 
ownership, premium payments for life insurance contracts, wealth in life insurance contracts, and 
the portfolio share of financial wealth invested in life insurance products. 
 
                                                 
15 For a detailed methodological description of the EVS see Statistisches Bundesamt (2005). 
16 The imputation employed for this paper is closely comparable to that described in Sommer (2008a). 
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V. Empirical results 
 
In the section describing the German market for life insurance products, we have pointed out 
important trends which have evolved over the last decade and which coincide with two recent 
developments: First, there have been substantial cutbacks in tax favors towards whole life 
insurance contracts. At the same time private pensions continue to be strongly tax favored. 
Second, private old age provision has gained additional importance after several reductions in the 
public pension system. Given these changes in the market environment these trends seem only 
reasonable reactions on behalf of private households. The most drastic reforms, however, date 
from 2002/03 (the “Riester Reform”) through 2005 (the “Rürup Reform”). Given that the latest 
EVS data stems from 2003, we can not expect to see behavioral reactions to these reforms in our 
data. We will therefore start with a more in depth inspection of past trends in the demand for life 
insurance – specifically at the cohort level – and then turn to regressions to better understand the 
importance of the various motives for an investment in life insurance products. Understanding 
the determinants of the demand in the past may help us assess the future perspectives on this 
market in the face of a further changing market environment. 
 
V.1 Historical developments at the cohort level 
Before turning to the actual results, a few notes should be made: We use all six cross-sections but 
exclude East German households to keep the cohorts as homogeneous as possible over time.17 
Furthermore the households’ age has to be defined. We follow the common procedure of 
assigning each household the age of its household head. Defining the household head to be the 
oldest male in the household and the oldest female in a household with no male members we 
deviate from the traditional EVS definition.18 Our definition ensures that intact households will 
always be attributed to the same birth cohort if it is sampled in consecutive surveys. Note that 
                                                 
17 The EVS contains East German households starting in 1993. Unfortunately, we only know the actual place of 
residence of a household and have no information about their place of residence before the reunification. Hence, 
migration will bring in some heterogeneity but including the East German sample must be expected to cause 
unequally larger disturbances. 
18 The EVS defines the household head to be the main earner. Based on this definition, the household head may 
switch between two years because of changes in the composition of the household income, e.g. following the 
retirement of the previous household head.  
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throughout the following cohort analysis we do not present confidence bands for our estimates. 
A short discussion of the accuracy of our estimates can be found in the appendix. 
 
Ownership rates of life-insurance 
We start our cohort analysis with the first decision connected to any investment: whether or not 
to invest in the first place. Looking at the age trajectories of the synthetic cohorts, our first 
observation is the clear hump shape in ownership rates over the life cycle. 35 to 50 percent of the 
households own a life insurance contract between age 20 and 24. Between age 35 and age 55 we 
observe cohorts with as much as 80 percent life insurance owners. Around age 60 the share 
drops steeply and declines continually towards 20 to 40 percent after age 80 (see figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Age-trajectories in life insurance ownership by cohort (West Germany)19 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
 
                                                 
19 Households who indicate ownership or give a positive value for the insurance sum are considered life insurance 
owners. Birth cohorts are highlighted in the graph with tags. Each label indicates the middle year of birth of a five-
year birth cohort. That is, following the dots labelled “66” we observe the age trajectory of the households whose 
heads were born between 1964 and 1968. 
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What strikes us at the second look are the differences between cohorts at certain ages. First, 
among the elderly, life insurance ownership is much less popular today than it was until the late 
1980s. Part of the reason is likely the much lower popularity of death benefit insurance 
contracts.20 But also the reduction of composite households at these age-groups may be a reason. 
With less young cohabitating children the likelihood of a life insurance owner in the household is 
obviously reduced.  
Second, we observe substantial shifts in life insurance ownership between young cohorts up to 
age 45. Chen, Wong and Lee (2001) report similar drops for young cohorts in the United States. 
They speculate later marriage, household formation and childbirth to play a key role. Following 
their argument, we would expect the age-profiles of the young cohorts to be steeper. Indeed, we 
find that the differences between cohorts tend to grow smaller towards age 50 in the German 
data which is in line with what we would expect under the above hypothesis.  
 
Wealth in life insurance contracts 
Comparing the cohort graphs for wealth holdings with the ownership rates above, a few 
disparities catch the eye. At young age, the lower ownership rates we observed for young cohorts 
are not matched by lower wealth levels (see figure 7). Towards age 45, the wealth levels of today’s 
generations are rising more quickly compared to their predecessors. The gap is widening until age 
55 before it collapses in the following 10 years. That is, there are barely any differences in average 
wealth holdings across generations around age 70. Only among the oldest old, we observe a steep 
drop in average wealth holdings across cohorts that broadly matches the discrepancies in 
ownership rates.  
However, there is more to be learned from the combined trends in ownership rates and average 
wealth holdings. Obviously, the young generation of life-insurance owners holds higher levels of 
wealth in life-insurance contracts during all of their working life. At the same time, the size of the 
gap in average life-insurance wealth between cohorts seems to be largely driven by trends in 
ownership rates. In fact, average wealth levels diverge especially between age 40 and age 60 as the 
ownership rates of the young generation are catching up with the ownership rates of the 
preceding cohorts. A similar logic applies to the oldest old: Here, the participation rates have 
dropped back considerably across cohorts, which is mimicked by reductions in average wealth 
levels. Again, the drop in average wealth levels can be largely attributed to the drop in ownership 
rates. 
                                                 
20 For an illustration of the developments in ownership rates of death benefit insurance, apprenticeship insurance 
and trousseau insurance see the appendix. 
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Figure 7: Age-trajectories of wealth in life insurance contracts by cohort (West Germany) 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
 
So far, we have neglected the influence of a skewed distribution on the estimated averages. As a 
matter of fact, the evolution of ownership rates is much less sensitive to trends at the top of the 
wealth distribution than actual wealth measures. Thus, part of the above trends in average wealth 
holdings may be driven by trends at the top of the wealth distribution. To this point, we know 
little about changes in wealth inequality over the life-cycle and across cohorts. Sommer (2008) 
sheds some light on this question but focuses on total wealth holdings rather than individual asset 
classes. 
 
Portfolio shares in life insurance contracts 
Looking at the share of financial wealth invested in life insurance, we again find huge changes 
among the old (see figure 8). In 1978, the average household with a head aged 65 and above held 
25 to 35 percent of its financial wealth in some kind of life insurance product. 20 years later, this 
share had dropped to below 10 percent. The displacement of life insurance contracts through 
other kinds of financial wealth shows clearly also among other age-groups. Yet up to age 60 the 
development over the last decades has been an up and down. Until 1988, the younger cohorts 
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show higher portfolio shares invested in life insurance than their predecessors. With the growing 
importance of stocks and mutual funds in the 1990s the portfolio share invested in life insurance 
has dropped back behind the levels of the preceding cohorts.21 
 
Figure 8: Age trajectories in portfolio shares22 of life insurance contracts by cohort (West Germany) 
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 Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003, weighted results 
 
Contributions to life insurance contracts 
To conclude this overview, we look at the age-trajectories of contributions to life insurance 
contracts (see figure 9). The age-profile is clearly hump shaped for all cohorts. We observe little 
cohort differences among the youngest and the oldest age groups. Yet in the middle of the life-
cycle, we find younger cohorts to save significantly more than the previous generation at the 
same age 20 years before. Given that ownership rates among the young and among the very old 
have dropped considerably, the conditional contributions to life insurance contracts must have 
increased for all age-groups.  
                                                 
21 For a more detailed analysis of asset accumulation and portfolio choice over the life cycle, see Sommer (2005). 
22 The portfolio shares are calculated as the average wealth in life insurance contracts divided by the average financial 
wealth holdings of each cohort at a certain age.  
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Figure 9: Age trajectories in contributions to life insurance contracts by cohort (West Germany) 
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V.2 Regression analysis 
From the above we have gained some insight on the importance of life insurance products over 
the life-cycle. Our cohort analysis also allows us to track back some of the aggregate trends to its 
underlying meta-trends in the savings behavior of different generations. To actually relate the 
observed savings behavior to the underlying savings motives and to assess the effectiveness of 
tax incentives, we now turn to the microeconometric analysis.  
 
Life insurance ownership 
We start out with an indicator variable for wealth in life insurance contracts. We do not 
distinguish between the different kinds of capital accumulating policies and estimate probit 
regressions based on the pooled sample (1978 – 2003). Table 5 presents three specifications 
which aim to test the hypotheses derived in section 3. Note that all coefficients reported are 
average marginal effects. Most of the control variables are left out from the table.23 Our control 
variables include dummies for the years of observation, the age of all household members, net 
wealth and net income. We experimented with a number of specifications with respect to the 
chosen functional form to test the sensitivity of our results and the core results remained 
essentially unchanged.24  
Column (1) presents our basic specification: First, we find households with children to be more 
likely to hold wealth in life insurance. Yet throughout all specifications we tried, we observe the 
probability of life insurance ownership to be non-increasing with the number of children. 
Households with three or more children are not significantly more likely to hold life insurance 
than households without children. A married household head also increases the probability of life 
insurance wealth in the household. Hence, these first results are broadly in line with our 
hypotheses connected to the presence of a bequest motive or the desire to insure the family.  
Turning to the retirement savings motive, we find one of our hypotheses supported. The self-
employed turn out to be more likely to invest in life insurance products, whereas civil servants are 
slightly less likely. Our results concerning the self-employed remain consistent throughout all 
analyses and have the expected sign. Looking at households with work income above the 
contribution ceiling, we find their income above the ceiling to increase the probability of life 
insurance ownership as expected25. Yet the basic level effect has a negative sign and the overall 
probability contribution of the joint effect for incomes above the contribution ceiling is at first 
                                                 
23 The complete results are available from the author upon request.  
24 A description of the variables used in the specifications but unreported in the results is included in the appendix. 
25 Note that we converted the income above the contribution ceiling in millions of Euros 
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negative. Further, the results are quite sensitive to the specification of the income term among 
our control variables. We restricted the sample to working age employees but did not receive 
evidence in support of our hypothesis. In other words – there is no convincing evidence that 
employee households above the contribution ceiling invest in life insurance to offset their lower 
replacement rate from the public pension system. Higher income households might just be happy 
with a lower replacement rate as the absolute level of public retirement income is not reduced. 
Yet while it is easy to come up with a possible explanation, we have to concede that our 
regression analysis cannot help us answer this question.  
Looking next at the importance of home loans for the ownership of life insurance wealth we find 
a positive effect for the presence of a loan. The estimated coefficient is not significant in all 
specifications though. Instead, the ratio of outstanding mortgage to gross housing wealth turns 
out to be an important predictor of life insurance ownership. The higher the share of debt on 
housing wealth, the more likely is the household to hold wealth in life insurance products. Note 
that we do not distinguish different types of life insurance products at this point. Hence, we will 
pay more attention to the matter of home loans later.  
Finally, we inspect the importance of tax motives for the probability to invest in life insurance: 
As expected we find the households’ average tax rate to be a positive and consistently significant 
predictor for life insurance ownership. Note that this finding is robust to the chosen specification 
with respect to income and wealth. 
The second specification adds to the question whether couples with highly unequal contributions 
to household income are more likely to hold wealth in life insurance products. Again, we employ 
the pooled sample but restrict the sample to couple households with at least one work income. 
We choose a reference group of households with rather equal contributions to household income 
from the two partners (distributions lying between 40/60 and 60/40). Moving towards a more 
unequal composition of household income we find the probability of life insurance ownership to 
increase. The effect is at first insignificant but turns significant at the 1 percent level for 
households in which one partner contributes only 10 to 25 percent to the household income. Yet 
the size of the effect of income inequality becomes smaller for households where one partner 
contributes no income or only a tiny share of less than 10 percent. We consider our results weak 
evidence in favor of an additional insurance motive among couples with high income risk. 
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Table 5: Probit-Regression - life insurance ownership 
 life insurance ownership 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
HoH male (D) 0.006 0.016 0.006 
 (2.32)* (3.56)** (1.77) 
unmarried, 1 child 0.052  0.059 
 (11.05)**  (8.59)** 
unmarried, 2 children 0.035  0.038 
 (5.12)**  (3.93)** 
unmarried, 3+ children 0.003  0.009 
 (0.25)  (0.54) 
married, no children 0.091  -0.088 
 (23.68)**  (4.92)** 
married, 1 child 0.098 -0.008 -0.079 
 (22.07)** (2.51)* (4.25)** 
married, 2 children 0.124 0.013 -0.071 
 (26.14)** (3.67)** (3.86)** 
married, 3+ children 0.103 -0.005 -0.088 
 (19.05)** (1.16) (4.55)** 
HoH self-employed (D) 0.083 0.020 0.094 
 (20.34)** (4.72)** (14.91)** 
HoH civil servant (D) -0.019 -0.021 0.020 
 (6.52)** (7.12)** (4.27)** 
above contr. cap (D) -0.010 -0.008 -0.048 
 (2.18)* (1.79) (6.60)** 
income above the contr. cap  
(in MEUR) 0.286 0.340 0.590 
 (1.37) (2.18)* (2.21)** 
mortgage (D) 0.014 0.001 0.018 
 (4.40)** (0.01) (3.68)** 
debt share (real wealth) 0.053 0.055 0.039 
 (8.93)** (8.94)** (4.28)** 
average tax rate 0.300 0.088 0.233 
 (8.51)** (3.85)** (7.19)** 
smaller inc. Share 25-40%  0.005  
  (1.18)  
smaller inc. Share 10-25%  0.015  
  (3.22)**  
smaller inc. Share <10%  0.007  
  (1.80)  
deductibility cap reached   0.046 
   (10.22)** 
possible further tax savings   -0.038 
   (3.95)** 
Observations 267282 157175 116523 
Pseudo R² 0.1198 0.0501 0.1183 
Note: The t-statistics in brackets are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent estimators.  
* denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level 
 
 
The third column inspects the importance of the tax deductibility of contributions. Looking only 
at households for which we can calculate the tax advantage we exclude composite households 
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from the sample. We also drop households from the sample if there are children who earn 
enough money to be liable to pay taxes.26 Our results are opposite to what economic theory 
would suggest. Households who have some room under the deducibility cap should be more 
likely to invest in life insurance products. Yet they are significantly less likely to do so. Also the 
level of possible tax savings from life insurance purchases does not yield the expected results. 
The more tax savings a household could receive from an investment in life insurance products, 
the less likely we find him to own life insurance. The results are robust to the choice of our two 
possible definitions of inevitable expenditures.  
 
Ownership by type of life insurance product 
Given that we would expect savings motives to be differently connected to the different types of 
life insurance products, we now turn to separate analyses of the demand for whole life insurance, 
private pensions, and term life insurance contracts. Table 6 displays the results of our basic 
specification applied to these three types of insurance products. Given that we can only 
distinguish whole life insurance and private pension contracts in the 2003 cross section of the 
EVS the sample is restricted accordingly.  
We first look at the influence of children and marital status: While the results look comparable 
for whole life insurance and term life insurance contracts, the results for private pensions look 
quite different. Children in the household increase the probability of holding term and whole life 
insurance, while the effect on private pensions is mixed and largely insignificant. Comparing the 
influence of the number of children we find the demand for whole life insurance to be reduced 
once a family has three or more children. At the same time, the probability of holding term life 
insurance is continually rising in the number of kids. We take this as evidence that a bequest 
motive and insurance for the children induce demand for insurance products with a term life 
component. Further, there seems to be a substitution between whole life insurance and term life 
insurance depending on the number of children which might be related to the available financial 
resources.  
Next, we find a stable and positive effect of marital status on the demand for whole life 
insurance. The estimated effect is largely independent of the existence and number of children. 
The effect of marriage on the demand for term life insurance is mixed and only significantly 
positive if no children are present. Last, private pensions seem to be less popular among married 
households. Like in the case of whole life insurance, this effect changes only little depending on 
                                                 
26 The appendix includes a detailed overview over the samples employed for the different specifications. 
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the existence and number of children in the household. The term life component being the main 
difference between whole life insurance and private pensions one might consider these results 
evidence in favor of a bequest/insurance motive. It remains an open question, however, why 
pure term life insurance does not benefit accordingly. 
 
Table 6: Probit regressions for life insurance ownership by type (2003) 
 ownership of … 
 whole life insurance private pensions term life insurance 
HoH male (D) -0.002 -0.010 0.002 
 (0.37) (2.37)* (0.46) 
unmarried, 1 child 0.035 0.014 0.041 
 (3.38)** (1.72) (4.20)** 
unmarried, 2 children 0.037 -0.009 0.079 
 (2.55)** (0.83) (5.81)** 
unmarried, 3+ children -0.048 0.005 0.091 
 (1.99)* (0.31) (4.15)** 
married, no children 0.022 -0.017 0.027 
 (2.39)* (2.59)** (3.58)** 
married, 1 child 0.041 -0.014 0.050 
 (3.77)** (1.88) (5.69)** 
married, 2 children 0.051 -0.029 0.075 
 (4.57)** (4.25)** (8.07)** 
married, 3+ children 0.029 -0.038 0.072 
 (2.27)** (5.21)** (6.82)** 
HoH self-employed (D) 0.068 0.071 0.022 
 (6.41)** (8.10)** (2.72)** 
HoH civil servant (D) 0.015 -0.028 0.007 
 (1.88) (5.31)** (1.31) 
above contr. cap (D) -0.039 -0.012 -0.010 
 (2.68)** (1.32) (1.10) 
income above the contr. cap  
(in MEUR) 0.461 0.051 0.022 
 (1.27) (0.22) (0.10) 
mortgage (D) 0.025 -0.025 0.059 
 (3.23)** (4.57)** (10.10)** 
debt share (real wealth) 0.043 -0.002 0.052 
 (3.37)** (0.25) (6.09)** 
average tax rate 0.264 0.125 0.106 
 (4.20)** (5.38)** (3.89)** 
Observations 42680 42680 42680 
Pseudo R² 0.1098 0.0724 0.1058 
Note: The t-statistics in brackets are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent estimators.  
* denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level 
 
 
We next turn to the influence of a possible old age savings motive. Given that term life insurance 
does not include capital accumulation, we would expect our proxies for the old age provision 
needs to have no effect on them at all. We find households with a self-employed household head 
to be significantly more likely to hold all kinds of life insurance. In support of the above 
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hypothesis the effect of self-employment on the probability of term life insurance ownership is a 
lot smaller.27 The effect of a civil servant household head also differs across products. While 
those products with a term life component tend to be more spread among civil servants, private 
pensions are significantly less popular among them. For households with an income above the 
contribution ceiling our evidence is again mixed. Overall, our results show little support for our 
theoretical considerations: Where the effect of income above the contribution ceiling has the 
expected sign, it remains statistically and economically largely insignificant. Additionally, the level 
effect of being at or above the contribution ceiling is negative (though mostly insignificant) for all 
three products.  
Returning to the influence of housing debt, we find strong evidence in favor of our hypotheses: 
Households with outstanding mortgages turn out more likely to own term and whole life 
insurance contracts. Both products include a term life component – which is frequently required 
to receive a home loan in Germany. Furthermore, the probability of holding whole life insurance 
and term life insurance increases in the share of debt on the household’s real wealth. Somewhat 
striking is our finding that households with a home loan are less likely to hold wealth in a private 
pension contract. Given that whole life insurance contracts and private pensions are quite similar 
products except for their term life component, households with a home loan might just pick the 
two-in-one package among the otherwise close substitutes. Another reason might be that 
households perceive their home as a substitute for additional old age provision and therefore 
reduce their additional savings in a private pension contract. This finding is in line with Schunk 
(2007) who investigates to what extent different forms of savings are competing with each other. 
However, the above logic makes sense only if there is a closer link between the old-age savings 
motive and private pensions than with whole life-insurance contracts. 
Finally, we consider the effects of tax incentives and find our hypotheses supported for all types 
of life insurance products. As for the pooled sample, we find the average tax rate to be one of the 
most important predictors for life insurance ownership. The effect is stronger by an order of 
magnitude for whole life insurance products; hence our results support the often raised claim that 
especially whole life insurance owed much of its popularity to its favorable tax treatment.  
 
                                                 
27 A possible explanation for the positive coefficient may be the fact that the self-employed do not have dependent’s 
insurance unless they are voluntarily insured in the public pension system. Hence the self-employed dummy may 
capture not only the need for additional private old-age provision.  
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Wealth in life insurance policies 
What we have investigated so far is only the question of whether or not a household decides on 
the purchase of a life insurance product or not. To gain further insight, we look at how much 
households invest and – resulting from this – how much wealth they accumulate in insurance 
products. We first look at wealth levels invested in whole life insurance products and private 
pensions. Given that we can only distinguish the two types of products in the 2003 cross-section 
of the EVS, we again restrict the sample accordingly. We employ a Heckman model to allow for 
selection effects. For part of the exclusion restrictions we pick the age-variables, the time-effects 
and the dummy for households above the contribution cap. Although wealth and contributions 
can be expected to vary with age, we expect both to be captured by income and wealth effects. 
For part of the dummy for households above the contribution cap theory suggests that there 
should be no level effect in wealth holdings or contributions for households above the cap. 
Instead, wealth and contributions should gradually increase in income above the cap. 
Table 7 contrasts the estimation results for wealth in whole life insurance and wealth in private 
pensions. We find married couples without children to hold significantly more wealth in 
insurance products. At the same time, households with children hold lower levels of wealth in 
both products. The differences are significant for almost all types of families when considering 
whole life insurance. Significance is mixed for wealth in private pensions. Given that we are 
controlling for differences in total net wealth and income, it seems obvious that households with 
children simply spend their money differently – be it on consumption goods or on other types of 
investments. Hence our results clearly reject the hypothesis that households with children should 
save more in life insurance products to provide insurance against the early death of an earner. 
The same hypothesis is supported in the case of married couples with no children. 
We next turn to households’ old age savings motive. As expected, we find households with a self-
employed household head to accumulate significantly more wealth in both types of products. The 
effect is some 20 percent larger for whole life insurance products, but for both types of insurance 
the effect is statistically highly significant and of vast economic significance. Controlling for 
income and wealth, the average household with a self-employed head accumulates 10.000 Euros 
more in private pensions and 12.000 Euros in whole life insurance products. Looking at the 
additional savings from income above the contribution ceiling, we find the expected sign for 
wealth in whole life insurance and the opposite sign for private pensions. Both effects are 
insignificant though. 
 
 
  
152
Table 7: Heckman selection models for wealth in different types of life insurance (2003) 
 
wealth in whole 
life insurance selection 
wealth in 
private 
pensions selection 
HoH male (D) -499 -0.005 -37 -0.044 
 (0.90) (0.29) (0.06) (2.29)* 
unmarried, 1 child -1'394 0.087 -635 0.063 
 (1.51) (2.99)** (0.75) (1.90) 
unmarried, 2 children -2'990 0.123 -2'337 -0.042 
 (2.22)* (2.96)** (2.20)* (0.86) 
unmarried, 3+ children 1'908 -0.146 -1'497 0.021 
 (1.05) (2.05)* (1.11) (0.29) 
married, no children 2'212 0.075 1'929 -0.071 
 (2.82)** (2.54)* (1.94) (2.22)* 
married, 1 child -1'431 0.116 -1'244 -0.056 
 (1.38) (3.68)** (1.21) (1.65) 
married, 2 children -2'976 0.156 -2'848 -0.134 
 (2.92)** (4.82)** (2.50)* (4.08)** 
married, 3+ children -4'516 0.080 -3'607 -0.184 
 (4.04)** (2.24)* (3.03)** (4.92)** 
HoH self-employed (D) 11'953 0.245 9'815 0.286 
 (8.00)** (7.60)** (5.96)** (8.51)** 
HoH civil servant (D) -936 0.026 -3'265 -0.135 
 (1.23) (1.05) (5.17)** (5.24)** 
above contr. Cap (D)  -0.137  -0.059 
  (3.66)**  (1.38) 
contr. Cap * inc (in MEUR) 45'718 1.491 -32'382 0.227 
 (1.29) (1.37) (1.02) (0.21) 
mortgage (D) -5'389 0.050 -5'954 -0.120 
 (6.30)** (2.26)* (5.10)** (4.32)** 
debt share (real wealth) 13'371 0.136 7'814 -0.011 
 (9.28)** (3.68)** (4.32)** (0.23) 
average tax rate -4'367 1.029 10'345 0.546 
 (1.13) (8.18)** (3.30)** (5.49)** 
mill’s     
lambda -23’789  13’270  
 (11.24)**  (6.30)**  
rho -0.67  0.58  
Observations 42'680 42'680 42'680 42'680 
Note: The variance-covariance matrix was estimated using nonparametric bootstrap estimation  
using 200 repetitions. * denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level. 
 
We move on to the connection of life insurance wealth with housing debt and find households 
with an outstanding mortgage to hold less wealth in life insurance products. At the same time, the 
level of wealth clearly increases in the ratio of home loans to housing wealth. We have pointed 
out before that many households will need to provide some kind of term life insurance to get a 
home loan approved. Private pensions do not include such term life component and this is 
mirrored in our results. Households with an outstanding mortgage are less likely to hold private 
pensions and their probability to hold private pensions also does not increase with the share of 
debt on the home. At the same time a higher share of debt always requires additional loan 
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securities. Both, wealth in private pensions as well as wealth in whole life insurance contracts, can 
serve this purpose. The positive coefficients for the share of debt for both types of insurance 
support these theoretical considerations.  
Last we turn to the effects of the tax rate the household is facing. While the Heckman model 
confirms our previous results that the probability of accumulating wealth in life insurance 
products increases in the household’s tax rate, we are somewhat surprised by the result, that only 
private pension wealth increases significantly for higher tax rates. For whole life insurance wealth 
the estimated coefficient is negative although not significant. 
 
Contributions to life insurance products 
Any wealth variable will comprise a history of savings and investment decisions and be 
influenced by the returns on capital. Also, today’s sociodemographic characteristics and 
economic variables can only proxy the corresponding history of variables which have determined 
the investment decisions along the way. We therefore turn to contemporaneous investment 
behavior knowing that also contractual commitments of the past may play a role in the observed 
contributions to life insurance contracts.  
Table 8 presents the results of selection models estimated for the contributions to term life 
insurance as well as to capital accumulating life insurance products, i.e. private pensions and the 
various types of whole life insurance policies. Looking first at the contributions to term life 
insurance contracts, we find only few of the reported variables to have significant impact. There 
are striking differences for households with a self-employed household head and households with 
a civil servant head. The first spend significantly more on term life insurance products while the 
latter spend significantly less. Considering that families with a self-employed head are often much 
more dependent on their main earner and civil servants profit from dependant’s pensions this 
finding is clearly in line with a motive to insure the family against the death of the main earner.  
Somewhat surprising is the result that contributions tend to be lower for households with a home 
loan. Contributions rise with the share of debt on the home but this effect is not statistically 
significant. Last, households facing higher tax rates tend to spend more money on term life 
insurance policies. 
Turning to our results for the contributions to whole life insurance and private pension policies 
we should note that the samples for the two regressions displayed in table 8 are not the same. 
The sample for the second regression is restricted to households where we could calculate the 
possible tax savings from contributions to life insurance products – i.e. composite households 
and households with children who are paying income taxes are excluded. 
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Table 8: Heckman selection models for contributions to different types of life insurance (2003) 
 
contributions to 
term life insurance selection 
contributions to 
cap. acc. life 
insurance selection 
HoH male (D) 6.6 0.009 137.9 -0.028 
 (0.19) (0.48) (1.51) (1.56) 
unmarried, 1 child -167.1 0.177 -281.4 0.073 
 (1.99)* (4.44)** (2.39)* (1.93) 
unmarried, 2 children -129.8 0.321 357.6 0.05 
 (1.14) (6.03)** -0.51 (0.98) 
unmarried, 3+ children -97.2 0.362 -627.8 0.176 
 (0.61) (4.69)** (3.62)** (2.23)* 
married, no children 67.0 0.119 -388.1 -0.073 
 (0.82) (3.49)** (2.15)* (0.02) 
married, 1 child -48.7 0.214 -452.0 -0.017 
 (0.51) (5.95)** (2.38)* (0.00) 
married, 2 children -46.8 0.310 -403.9 -0.019 
 (0.41) (8.16)** (1.81) (0.01) 
married, 3+ children -34.0 0.296 -532.5 -0.048 
 (0.28) (7.15)** (2.55)* (0.01) 
HoH self-employed (D) 844.2 0.095 1’955.1 0.168 
 (5.58)** (2.76)** (6.38)** (4.85)** 
HoH civil servant (D) -118.8 0.032 -311.9 0.052 
 (2.57)* (1.21) (4.94)** (2.09)* 
above contr. Cap (D)  -0.047  -0.123 
  (1.08)  (3.02)** 
income above the contr. cap (in 
MEUR) -3'152.4 0.086 13’889.3 1.549 
 (1.10) (0.08) (2.22)* (1.54) 
mortgage (D) -168.2 0.261 -746.4 0.118 
 (2.12)* (10.11)** (5.40)** (5.03)** 
debt share (real wealth) 152.6 0.236 1’175.9 -0.032 
 (1.54) (5.91)** (5.72)** (0.89) 
average tax rate 1'271.0 0.480 1’040.6 0.451 
 (2.60)** (3.38)** (1.34) (3.11)** 
possible further tax savings (in 
TEUR)   -545.1 -0.051 
   (2.09)* (0.67) 
deductibility cap reached    0.146 
    (6.07)** 
mill’s     
lambda 390.1  -1464.6  
 (1.66)  (5.85)**  
rho 0.26  -0.34  
Observations 42'680 42'680 37'247 37'247 
Note: The variance-covariance matrix was estimated using nonparametric bootstrap estimation  
using 200 repetitions. * denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level. 
 
Again, our results for the contributions made by the different family types are mixed: with one 
exception – unmarried households with 2 children – the estimated coefficients have a negative 
sign and the effects are statistically significant. While we would have expected that married 
households and households with children put more money into capital accumulating life 
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insurance products, the opposite is the case: Controlling for income and wealth, single 
households without children contribute significantly more.  
Looking at those groups of households who we would expect to save more in life insurance 
products for their lower replacement rates in the public pension system, we find our hypotheses 
supported: First, the self-employed save significantly more in insurance products. Each year, the 
average household with a self-employed head pays almost 2000 Euros more in insurance premia 
compared to an employee’s household. Also, among employees, we find our hypothesis 
supported, that households above the contribution ceiling to the public pension system 
contribute more as their income rises. The estimated positive contribution out of additional 
income is statistically significant, yet economically these contributions are negligible: on average, 
only 1.4 cents out of every additional Euro are going into life insurance savings. Civil servants 
pay smaller contributions compared to other employees. Again, the effect is statistically 
significant. 
Looking at households with a home loan we find the results for contributions to be in line with 
the previous results for wealth levels. Households with outstanding mortgages contribute less, 
but their contributions rise in the share of debt on their housing property.  
Finally, we inspect the influences of tax incentives. First, we find households with higher tax rates 
to save more in life insurance contracts. The coefficient – though economically significant – turns 
out to be statistically insignificant. Second, our results suggest, that the possibility to deduct 
contributions from taxable income is no incentive to contribute to a life insurance policy. The 
estimated coefficient has the opposite sign from what theory would predict and it is statistically 
significant.  
 
Portfolio shares 
Some of our theoretical considerations concern the portfolio share invested in life insurance 
products rather than wealth levels or contributions. Especially the effects of tax free interest 
earnings should affect portfolio choice. We conjectured that households with higher tax rates 
should invest a larger share of their portfolio in life insurance products as the difference in after 
tax returns compared to other assets rises in the actual tax rate. 
We use a two-stage Heckman approach as we did for the analysis of wealth holdings and 
contributions. Otherwise the samples and specifications employed are the same as for the pure 
ownership decision. Table 8 below presents three specifications: The first column contains the 
basic model which we augment by our measures for income inequality in the second column. The 
third column is directed at the influence of the tax deductibility of contributions. 
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Table 9: Heckman selection models for the portfolio share invested in life insurance (pooled sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
portfolio 
share selection 
portfolio 
share selection 
portfolio 
share selection 
HoH male (D) -0.012 0.010 -0.023 0.054 0.000 0.019 
 (5.09)** (1.22) (5.94)** (3.61)** (0.14) (1.74) 
unmarried, 1 child 0.006 0.167   0.007 0.183 
 (1.01) (10.91)**   (0.71) (8.23)** 
unmarried, 2 children 0.031 0.114   0.017 0.117 
 (3.97)** (5.23)**   (1.32) (3.76)** 
unmarried, 3+ children 0.064 0.018   0.065 0.027 
 (5.41)** (0.56)   (3.04)** (0.55) 
married, no children -0.021 0.225   -0.055 -0.057 
 (3.84)** (18.27)**   (5.50)** (1.91) 
married, 1 child -0.019 0.254 -0.009 -0.026 -0.062 -0.030 
 (3.13)** (17.38)** (3.54)** (2.36)* (5.25)** (0.94) 
married, 2 children -0.017 0.334 -0.009 0.044 -0.055 -0.009 
 (2.69)** (22.12)** (2.81)** (3.59)** (4.53)** (0.28) 
married, 3+ children 0.012 0.276 0.019 -0.016 -0.034 -0.056 
 (1.77) (15.60)** (5.38)** (1.17) (2.68)** (1.59) 
HoH self-employed (D) 0.124 0.252 0.126 0.195 0.102 0.300 
 (32.63)** (19.28)** (33.00)** (12.67)** (15.71)** (14.57)** 
HoH civil servant (D) -0.028 -0.051 -0.031 -0.110 -0.019 0.062 
 (11.66)** (6.28)** (13.01)** (10.98)** (4.84)** (4.35)** 
above contr. Cap (D)  -0.023  -0.026  -0.144 
  (1.86)  (1.48)  (6.65)** 
income above the contrib. 
cap (in MEUR) 1.302 0.788 0.852 1.113 0.972 1.758 
 (7.39)** (1.38) (7.01)** (2.09)* (4.20)** (2.31)* 
mortgage (D) 0.083 0.046 0.076 0.001 0.069 0.053 
 (31.26)** (5.36)** (30.74)** (0.12) (17.21)** (3.53)** 
debt share (real wealth) -0.058 0.178 -0.056 0.208 -0.025 0.117 
 (12.55)** (10.60)** (11.29)** (10.45)** (3.37)** (4.21)** 
average tax rate -0.125 0.984 0.007 0.442 -0.172 0.697 
 (4.92)** (10.65)** (0.31) (4.55)** (4.34)** (6.96)** 
smaller inc. Share 25-40%   0.004 0.016   
   (1.15) (1.18)   
smaller inc. Share 10-25%   0.009 0.049   
   (2.47)* (3.03)**   
smaller inc. Share <10%   0.013 0.024   
   (4.46)** (1.75)   
deductibility cap reached      0.139 
      (10.07)** 
possible further tax savings     -0.021 -0.117 
     (1.54) (3.49)** 
mill’s       
lambda -0.216  -0.229  -0.303  
 (22.75)**  (13.56)**  (21.00)**  
rho -0.667  -0.740  -0.842  
Observations 267282 267282 157175 157175 116523 116523 
Note: The variance-covariance matrix was estimated using nonparametric bootstrap estimation  
using 200 repetitions. * denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level.  
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Looking first at the effects of the tax rate on households’ investment behavior, we find the 
expected positive effect for the selection equation. This essentially only confirms our previous 
results. For part of the portfolio allocation, we find a negative effect of tax rates on the portfolio 
share invested in life insurance wealth. The effect turns out to be statistically significant except 
for the second specification which is focused on married couples and the effects of intra-
household income inequality. Other tax favored assets might just be even more important for 
these households. Capital gains in stocks also remain untaxed if a certain holding period is 
fulfilled – to give just one example. Note that this result is robust to the exclusion of any wealth 
and income related variables from the regression! 
The third specification concludes our analysis of tax favors towards life insurance products. As 
before, the deductibility of contributions turns out to be an ineffective device for the promotion 
of life insurance products. Overall, our hypotheses based on considerations of optimal portfolio 
theory are all rejected by our analysis. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Starting from a thorough description of the German life insurance market, we have highlighted 
the possible usability of savings in life insurance products for different savings motives. 
Furthermore, we have explained the scheme of tax favors towards life insurance products and 
outlined its effects from a perspective of portfolio theory.  
Depending on the degree to which households behave according to these theoretical 
considerations, we can draw some conclusions about the relevance of the various savings motives 
for German households and evaluate the efficiency of the existing tax incentives. At the same 
time, our insights about the determinants of life insurance demand in the past shed light on the 
possible consequences of the recent changes to the market environment. First and foremost, 
these changes concern the tax treatment of life insurance products. But also sociodemographic 
changes like the postponement of marriage and parenthood may affect the market. Finally, the 
recent pension reforms have increased the need for additional private old age provision for 
German households. 
The need for additional private old age provision has become the main sales argument for life 
insurance products in recent years. Given that all capital accumulating life insurance products in 
Germany can be chosen to be paid out as an annuity, they are an important candidate to 
substitute for the reduced public pensions. Lacking data on households’ public pension claims we 
rely on groups of households with reduced or no coverage from the public pension system to 
identify the need for additional private old age provision. We consistently find the self-employed 
– most of whom are not covered by the German public pension system – to save more in life 
insurance products and accumulate higher wealth levels. Apart from the self-employed, also 
employees with an income above the contribution ceiling will face reduced replacement rates. 
Our empirical evidence for the demand of this group is at best mixed. The effects of excess 
income on the effective replacement rate may be just too small to induce behavioral responses, 
especially if households receive such high incomes only for a small number of years. Otherwise, 
our results would imply that these households are either just fine with their lower replacement 
rates from the public pension system or save differently for their retirement.  
The second group of savings motives we investigate concerns the insurance of the family or a 
bequest motive. We consider the insurance against the loss of an earner and the intention to leave 
a bequest – be it altruistic or not – to be equivalent for our purpose and do not make attempts to 
distinguish them. Our focus is on three variables: The presence and number of children, marital 
status, and the distribution of incomes within among couples. In support of our hypotheses, we 
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find married households and households with children to be more likely to hold whole life 
insurance and especially term life insurance. Especially the term life component seems to be an 
important aspect for the insurance of the family. Pure wealth accumulation as a way to provide 
for the family turns out to be much less of an argument though. Controlling for income and 
wealth, the average contributions of married households and households with children are 
estimated to be lower than for unmarried households without children. Further, the estimated 
wealth levels are lower in most cases where children are present. With respect to income 
inequality within a couple Bernheim (1991) had conjectured that a large differential in survival 
contingent incomes should increase the demand for life-insurance. Our results provide some 
support for Bernheim’s hypothesis. Specifically, life insurance products are more popular among 
households with some income inequality. The estimated effect is diminishing for households with 
an extreme inequality of earnings though. These results hold for life insurance ownership as well 
as for the portfolio share is invested in life insurance products. 
Third and last among the savings motives, we inspect the effects of home-ownership and 
mortgage debt on the demand for life insurance products. We find households with a home loan 
to be more likely to hold some sort of life insurance with a term life component – i.e. whole life 
insurance or pure term life insurance contracts. Yet contributions to life insurance products and 
the corresponding wealth levels are lower in households with small outstanding mortgages. With 
an increasing share of debt on a home the level of wealth in life insurance contracts strongly 
increases though. This may reflect that households have already used some life insurance wealth 
to pay off part of their debt. An alternative explanation is that only a higher level of life insurance 
wealth allows households to take up an increased credit line. We would need longitudinal data to 
further investigate this question. The demand for private pensions in the presence of mortgages 
looks quite different: In fact, real estate debt reduces the probability to hold wealth in private 
pensions. If households consider their home a kind of old age provision we would expect private 
pensions to suffer most – exactly what we observe in the data. 
Assessing the effectiveness of the tax incentives, we have to differentiate between the two kinds 
of tax favors life insurance products enjoy in Germany. On the one hand, we find households to 
ignore the possibility to deduct contributions to life insurance products from taxable income. 
Instead, households with higher possible tax savings are less likely to invest in life insurance 
products and contribute less. On the other hand, there is the tax exemption for capital gains and 
interest earned within a life insurance contract. Theory predicts that households facing higher tax 
rates profit more from the tax advantage and should therefore contribute more to life insurance 
contracts and accumulate more wealth. We find these predictions supported by our data. An 
exception is the portfolio share invested in life insurance products. The portfolio share turns out 
  
160
to decrease in the households’ tax rate. One might speculate that households favor other tax 
favored assets. A more solid answer to this question would require a complete portfolio choice 
model which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Generally, all of our inference on the importance of different possible savings motives is indirect 
– a limitation shared by the majority of the existing literature – and strictly speaking it is limited 
to life insurance wealth. The immense importance of life insurance wealth in Germans’ financial 
portfolio should allow some generalization of our results though. Our findings support 
Feldstein’s (1976) predictions that households substitute between private wealth accumulation 
and public pension claims. An open question arising from our results concerns the old age 
savings of high income households. It remains unclear whether they just save differently or 
whether they are satisfied with the reduced replacement rates they receive from the public 
pension system. Germans also behave according to a bequest motive when it comes to the 
demand for term life insurance. At the same time our evidence concerning the accumulation of 
additional wealth is at best mixed like the existing literature on this aspect.  
Apart from our original interest in households’ savings motives and the resulting investment 
choices our analysis delivers some helpful insights about the future developments on the market 
for life insurance products: First, as the need for additional private old age provision seems to be 
an important factor in the demand for life insurance products, we can expect both – whole life 
insurance and private pensions – to benefit from the recent pension reforms. Second, also some 
of the changes in tax treatment towards life insurance products can be expected to have a strong 
impact. Given that only contracts with a distinct orientation towards old age provision – 
specifically in the form of a compulsory annuity payout scheme – continue to receive the 
favorable tax treatment, we can expect to see the shift in market shares from whole life insurance 
products to private pensions to continue. At the same time the deductibility of contributions to 
life insurance contracts has shown to be irrelevant for the investment decision – at least in the 
current form. Hence, changes to the deductibility rules should not harm the sales of the life 
insurance industry. Third and last, the recent changes to the promotion of private real estate 
formation may have second order effects on the demand for life insurance. The size of these 
effects will largely depend on the first order effects – i.e. changes in the demand for real estate 
and changes in the financing of possible purchases. Overall, private pensions can be expected to 
gain from the above changes while the cumulative effect on whole life insurance products is 
undecided.  
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Appendix 
 
Variables and definitions 
children  The EVS contains information only about the number of children in the 
household. We augment this measure by imputing children, whenever the 
amounts of child benefit allowance, maternity benefits or education benefits imply 
a larger number of children. While we are far from measuring the true number of 
children, we expect to arrive at a reasonable measure of children which are still 
financially dependent on their parents. 
marital status Throughout our analysis we consider a household head married whenever he is 
indicated to be married, no matter if the couple is living together or apart.  
job status Each person is attributed to the groups of employees, civil servants, or self-
employed depending on her main source of income.  
inevitable expenditures 
 The tight definition includes all compulsory contributions to the public pension 
system and to the other branches of the social security system (public health and 
long term care insurance). Further, insurance premia for private health insurance, 
private long term care insurance and car liability insurance are included. 
 The extended definition contains all above expenditures. It is distinct from the tight 
definition as payments to occupational pension funds, civil servants pension funds 
and voluntary contributions to the public pension system are added. 
 
 
Control variables in the regressions 
For reasons of clarity, the regression results presented in section V.2 are shortened with respect 
to the following control variables: 
 
west (D) Dummy: 1 if the household lives in the states of the former FRG 
wealth  household net wealth (second degree polynomial) 
inc  household net disposable income (third degree polynomial) 
n_agegrp(a) number of household members aged a to a+4;  a ? [20, 25, …, 75] 
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Samples descriptions  
Starting from a total of 267’434 observations in the pooled (1978-2003) sample, we exclude 148 
households with extreme outliers of total net wealth and of the ratio of debt to assets. 
 
regression years exclusions sample size
    
Tables 5(1) , 9(1) 1978-2003 -none- 267282 
Tables 5(2) , 9(2) 1978-2003 married couples only, possibly with children 157175 
Tables 5(3) , 9(3) 1993-2003 
singles or couples, possibly with children, unless the 
children are liable to taxation - no composite 
households 
116523 
Tables 6, 7 2003 -none- 42680 
Table 8 (1) 2003 -none- 42680 
Table 8 (2) 2003 
singles or couples, possibly with children, unless the 
children are liable to taxation - no composite 
households 
37247 
 
 
Death benefit insurance, apprenticeship insurance and trousseau insurance 
There are a number of special types of whole life insurance, the importance of which has strongly 
declined. Specifically, the EVS distinguishes death benefit insurance, apprenticeship insurance 
and trousseau insurance in the years 1988, 1993 and 2003. For the years 1988 and 1993, the data 
contains a question about the types of life insurance held in the household. For 2003, the 
separate amounts of wealth in the above categories allow us to infer ownership equivalently. 
Apart from the distinct age-pattern in ownership rates we also observe strong time effects. Death 
benefit insurance used to be rather popular among the elderly (see figure A-1). In 1988, as much 
as 30-35% of households headed by a 65+ year old owned at least one death benefit insurance 
contract. Within 15 years, ownership rates among the same age groups had declined by more 
than 15 percentage points. The absolute drops in ownership rates for apprenticeship insurance 
(figure A-2) and trousseau insurance (figure A-3) are smaller as their popularity has been lower to 
begin with. Both were held by 6-8% of the households aged 30 to 45 in 1988. Ownership rates 
had dropped to 2-3% in these age groups by the year 2003. 
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Figure A-1: Ownership rates in death benefit insurance by cohort (West Germany) 
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Figure A-2: Ownership rates in apprenticeship insurance by cohort (West Germany) 
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Source: EVS, own calculations, weighted results 
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Figure A-3: Ownership rates in trousseau insurance by cohort (West Germany) 
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Source: EVS, own calculations, weighted results 
 
 
Age-trajectories and confidence bands 
An often raised question concerns the accuracy of the estimated age trajectories – especially at 
old age. Figures A-4 and A-5 depict the average wealth levels and average contributions of 
selected cohorts over time. Each graph shows the estimated average (blue) and the 95% 
confidence interval around the estimated averages (red). The confidence bands get wider for the 
oldest age-group – households with a household head aged 85 to 89. Note that this age-group 
still contains between 200 and 300 observations for each cohort we observe up to such a high 
age. 
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Figure A-4: Cohort wealth trajectories with confidence bands 
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Figure A-5: Cohort trajectories in contributions with confidence bands 
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 Chapter 4 
 
Understanding the trends in income, 
consumption and wealth inequality and how 
important are life-cycle effects? 
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I. Introduction 
 
The term inequality seems to have a purely negative connotation when we look at the public 
debate about rising inequality. Especially in continental Europe, there is a vigorous public and 
political debate about the need and possible ways to mitigate the effects which are largely 
ascribed to globalization. This debate is only to a minor degree based on scientific results despite 
that fact that there is a substantial literature on inequality that reaches back into the 1960s. 
However, the sources of rising inequality are still not very well understood. Further, natural 
components in the observed trends, which may e.g. be induced by changes in the population 
structure, by the globalization, or by skill-biased technological change have received rather little 
attention so far. 
At the same time macroeconomists have been largely ignorant to the matter of inequality in the 
past. Incorporating heterogeneity into their quantitative models has only recently become 
possible with the availability of sufficiently powerful computers. With the grown opportunities to 
refine the quantitative models there is a growing need for empirical benchmarks for the 
calibration of these models.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we document the trends in income, consumption and 
wealth inequality in Germany over the past 25 years. While this has been done in the past e.g. by 
Becker and Hauser (2003), the goal of our work in collaboration with a large community of 
international researchers is to provide results for a variety of countries based on common 
definitions.1 We thereby aim to provide an empirical benchmark for future macroeconomic 
models. Given the popularity of OLG models for capturing the characteristics of aging 
economies, we put a special focus on the analysis of inequality in a life-cycle context.  
Understanding the sources of rising inequality, however, seems especially important also for the 
assessment of the need for political action against rising inequality. We therefore compare the 
trends in inequality from the raw data to the remaining inequality after filtering out structural 
                                                 
1 The results documented in this paper are closely comparable to our work for the joint project “cross-sectional facts 
for macroeconomists (CFM)”. The project, initiated by Dirk Krüger, Fabrizio Perri, Luigi Pistaferri, and Gianluca 
Violante includes empirical work from 10 countries. In collaboration with Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln and Dirk Krüger 
we provide the German contribution to the project. The chapters four and five of this paper contain the EVS 
analyses which we also provide for the CFM-project, but without the sample restriction applied in the CFM project. 
Specifically, we restrict the sample for the CFM-project to households headed by a 25 to 60 year old. Accordingly, 
also the life-cycle analyses focus only this age-band. For our analysis, we extend the focus over all age-groups. 
Section six of this paper provides an independent analysis, which is not part of the CFM-project and based on joint 
interests with Tilman Eichstädt.  
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changes in the population structure. Procedurally, we employ a variance decomposition to obtain 
trends in residual inequality. Similar exercises have been carried out e.g. by Schwarze (1996) who 
uses a Theil decomposition to assess the effects of the German reunification on the national 
trends in income inequality.  
While a considerable literature has investigated possible drivers behind income inequality, deeper 
analyses of the backgrounds to wealth inequality are rare. Among the few exceptions are the 
analyses by Hendricks (2007) and Scholz (2003). Hendricks estimates discount rates from life-
cycle wealth data and uses the estimated preference parameters to predict wealth inequality. He 
finds differences in discount rate heterogeneity to significantly improve the predictions of wealth 
inequality from life-cycle models except for the top of the wealth distribution. Overall, his results 
support the view that life-cycle savings can account for a large part of wealth inequality. 
Therefore, demographic changes may be among the drivers of wealth inequality. We concur with 
Scholz (2003) who argues that looking at changes in the cross-sectional distribution of wealth, we 
are unable to understand the evolution of household wealth and thus receive an inaccurate view 
on the evolution of wealth inequality. While Scholz focuses on a comparison of the wealth 
accumulation of the baby boom generation with their parents, our goal is a more general one. We 
aim to present a stylized pattern of wealth accumulation in a life-cycle context and assess the 
relative importance of active and passive savings as well as inheritances at different parts of the 
income distribution and different ages. 
The paper is organized as follows. We start out in section two with conceptual considerations 
about economic inequality and deduce the variables and definitions employed in the subsequent 
analyses. Section three shortly describes the data we use for our analysis. Section four presents 
the aggregate trends in the levels of income, consumption and wealth and the respective trends in 
inequality. We then turn to the decomposition of inequality in section five. We start with a cross-
sectional perspective on the parts of inequality connected to observable household characteristics 
before we then turn to the life-cycle effects in inequality which. Section six is dedicated to our 
analysis of the different drivers behind wealth accumulation in a life-cycle context. Section seven 
concludes.  
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II. Conceptual considerations about inequality  
 
Focusing on economic measures of wellbeing we certainly disregard a variety of dimensions 
which might be important for comprehensive assessment of differential wellbeing in a society. 
Important examples are the value of health and of social networks. While the contribution of 
such non-financial factors to individual welfare is non-trivial to quantify, also the right 
measurement of economic inequality has received considerable attention the literature. Income, 
consumption and wealth have all been employed and depending on the research question at hand 
the choice of different variables is only well-founded.  
We aim to provide a rather general survey of differential wellbeing in a life-cycle context and 
therefore present evidence on all three measures. Furthermore, all three could be employed for 
the evaluation of macroeconomic models. Before turning to the actual analyses, we shortly 
discuss the significance of income, consumption and wealth inequality with respect to individual 
welfare and introduce the data we use. 
 
II.1 Income 
The link between income and wellbeing is an indirect one. Given that economists usually 
consider wellbeing a synonym for utility and utility to be derived from consumption and leisure, 
income does not seem the measure of choice. At the same time income is rather easy to measure 
and can be interpreted as a measure of immediate consumption opportunities. The obvious 
income measure is therefore disposable (post-government) income, which we define as the sum of gross 
work and asset income plus private and public transfers net of taxes and contributions to the 
social security system. For an assessment of the redistributive effects of the government sector it 
might further be interesting to compare pre- and post-government income, as it is done by 
Schwarze (1996). In the literature, also analyses focusing on certain income components have 
received some attention. Especially research questions with respect to the labor market have 
investigated the distribution of gross work income and wages. Recent example for the case of 
Germany are Becker (2006) and Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2006). Both lines of research are beyond 
the purpose of this paper.2 
                                                 
2 In Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2008) we focus on the working age population and provide comparative analyses of 
inequality in pre- and post-government income as well as work income and wages. 
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II.2 Consumption 
As mentioned above, income is not necessarily a good measure of actual wellbeing. Consumption 
smoothing over the life-cycle as first suggested by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) as well as 
home production (Gronau, 1976) blur the link between income and consumption utility. 
Although consumption is much more directly linked to individual wellbeing, measuring inequality 
in consumption is not suited to thoroughly solve the problems. First, the issues around 
unaccounted utility from home production persist. Second, theory suggests that utility is not 
linear in consumption expenditures and may further depend on leisure. Third, consumption 
expenditures need not coincide with derived utility. This is especially the case for durable goods 
like cars or furniture. While it would conceptually be possible to distribute consumption utility of 
durable goods over their life-time, this is rarely done in practise. One of the main reasons is that 
most surveys lack information on the value of durable goods in the household.3 Further, 
household expenditures for durables tend to occur irregularly and infrequently. As a 
consequence, the usual time frame over which household consumption is recorded is too short to 
receive a comprehensive picture of durable consumption.4 For an assessment of consumption 
inequality it is therefore common practise to focus on non-durable consumption and we follow 
this approach.5 
 
II.3 Wealth 
Thinking about inequality in utility, analyses of wealth inequality seem out of place at the first 
thought. To the extent that wealth is ultimately used for consumption purposes, we should care 
about consumption inequality at the time of usage rather than about wealth itself. Given that we 
cannot measure future consumption, wealth may serve as a good proxy. Especially in the context 
of private old age provision, utility from wealth can be quantified, e.g. by converting projected 
net wealth at retirement into a lifelong annuity. An exact quantification would then depend 
largely on assumptions about certain probabilities, most importantly survival and changes to the 
household composition. In the subsequent analysis we assume that wealth will eventually be used 
                                                 
3 This also applies to the available household data in Germany and in our case the data from the German Income 
and Expenditure Survey (EVS). Specifically, the EVS contains only information on the number of selected durables, 
like cars, dishwashers, etc., but none about their value. 
4 For a discussion of the possible effects of the switch from an annual household diary to quarterly data in the EVS 
between 1993 and 1998 on consumption inequality see Sommer (2008). 
5 The construction of a harmonized definition of non-durable consumption in the EVS is documented in Sommer 
(2008).  
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for consumption in an unaltered household context.6 Furthermore we abstract from survival 
probabilities and thereby implicitly aim at the expected present discounted value of future 
consumption derived from a fair annuity. It is unclear, however, whether all wealth will actually 
be employed for retirement consumption or if it will be handed on – unused – to the next 
generation. As reverse mortgages remain to be rarely used to convert housing wealth into 
additional income, this argument seems especially applicable for real estate wealth. To account 
for the questionable use of housing wealth in this context, we present results for inequality in net 
financial wealth and net total wealth.  
Based on the above procedure, we largely disregard utility which wealth may provide by its plain 
existence. In fact, wealth may facilitate access to the credit market and thereby generate 
opportunities. Furthermore, – through the above credit channel or by itself – wealth may 
facilitate consumption smoothing and thereby lead to higher lifetime utility.7 In practise, it is quite 
difficult to quantify the utility from these functions of wealth. We would have to make 
assumptions about the magnitude and the incidence of income fluctuations. Furthermore, 
different kinds of wealth are differently suitable to fill the various functions. Real estate wealth, 
for instance, is highly valued as a collateral for credit, yet it provides essentially no bufferstock 
function against income fluctuations. There is, however, a third channel through which wealth 
may provide utility. Specifically, wealth may take the form of consumer durables like in the case 
of an owner occupied dwelling. In this case, we measure the derived utility by including the rental 
value of the residence in income and consumption.  
 
                                                 
6 An alternative assumption would be that only the adult household members will ultimately use the existing wealth 
for retirement consumption. This would imply the application of an equivalence scale which disregards children in 
the household. At the same time, financial support of the children, e.g. for their education, and inter-vivos transfers 
may be good reasons not to neglect the presence of children in the household. 
7 The importance of wealth for consumption smoothing has been assessed by Carrol and Samwick (1998) who 
estimate the share of wealth accumulated for this purpose to attain up to 46 percent of total wealth. 
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III. Data  
 
Inequality analyses foremost require a sufficiently large dataset. Whereas means can reasonably 
well be estimated from a rather smaller sample, being interested also in the dispersion and the 
tails of a distribution implies much higher demands on the dataset. For our purpose of analyzing 
inequality in a life-cycle context, we would ideally employ a long series of panel data covering 
income, consumption and wealth. This would not only allow us to separate age- and cohort-
effects but even provide the ground for mobility analyses.  
Only two German data sets fulfill the requirements with respect to a sufficient sample size and a 
sufficient time series. A comparison of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) and the 
German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) which have both been used for a variety of 
inequality analyses is provided by Becker et al. (2002). The German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) reaches back to 1984 and offers a sample size of up to 12’000 households. 
Furthermore a high-income sample has been added in 2003 which enhances analyses with respect 
to the rich. Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2008) employ the GSOEP for an analysis of income and 
wage inequality. Unfortunately, wealth has only become part of the questionnaire in recent years 
and consumption is untapped by the GSOEP.8  
We therefore rely on the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS), which covers income, 
consumption and wealth even at slightly more detail. The sample size of roughly 40’000-60’000 
households per year has predestined the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) for 
inequality analyses already in the past (see e.g. Hauser and Stein (2001), Hauser (2003), Becker 
and Hauser (2003)). The main downside of the EVS is certainly that it consists of independent 
cross-sections rather than a panel. Of the EVS cross-sections, which started in 1962/63, we 
employ the available scientific use files from the years 1978 through 2003 for our analysis. The 
survey was implemented at five year intervals so that we have six cross-sections available. 
Comparability of the surveys over time has been a secondary concern for the Federal Statistical 
Office behind adding recent developments in consumption and income and improving the 
survey conceptually. A large deal of the implied issues can be dealt with by imputation and 
harmonization procedures which are documented in Sommer (2008). Sommer also discusses the 
effects of two important structural problems in the EVS: Specifically, the Federal Statistical 
                                                 
8 Among the other German surveys especially the SAVE survey stands out with a comprehensive questionnaire on 
savings and wealth. Its sample size of roughly 2000 households and the still short panel dimension of 5 years 
between 2001 and 2007 are unsuitable for our purposes though. 
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Office applies a sampling threshold which has been shown to limit the ability of the EVS to 
capture the top income households (Merz, 2003). It seems questionable though to what extent 
other German surveys are more successful in capturing the very top of the income distribution.9 
To compensate for the differences in the default thresholds over time, we apply an indexation to 
the threshold and disregard observations above the most constraining threshold which was 
applied in 1988. Overall, this leads to dropping 53 observations out of a total 267’434 in all six 
cross-sections.10 The second important structural change concerns the household diary which is 
employed for the collection of income and consumption data. To reduce the time and effort on 
behalf of the participating households, the diary was switched from an annual to a quarterly one 
between 1993 and 1998. We can expect the distributions of income and consumption to be 
affected by these changes. However, the dimensions of the consequences are hard to quantify 
and will likely differ strongly by the variable under scrutiny. Unfortunately, little can be done to 
correct for the possible bias in the distribution of projected annual measures.11 Instead, 
comparative analyses of the pre-1998 data with the more recent data should involve careful 
interpretation. 
                                                 
9 Sommer (2008) shows that the GSOEP contains only a handful of households above this threshold even after the 
inclusion of the GSOEP-high-income sample. This indicates that there is simply not much hope of learning more 
about the very top of the German income distribution from the existing data. 
10 A comparison of our correction procedure to a procedure proposed by Hauser (2006) is provided in Sommer 
(2008). In that paper, we also address the effects of the two correction procedures on the distribution of selected 
variables. 
11 We discuss the direction and size of the expected bias in Sommer (2008) 
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IV. Trends in inequality in Germany 
 
Before we turn to the actual investigation of the determinants of inequality and with a special 
focus on inequality over the life-cycle we document the trends in the levels of income, 
consumption and wealth and describe the evolution of their dispersion over the last decades.  
 
IV.1 Trends in household income, consumption and wealth 
Income and consumption in Germany have grown at a slow but steady pace over most of the last 
25 years. Based on the EVS data we estimate a compound annual growth rate of per capita non-
durable consumption of 1.2 or 0.8 percent in real terms, depending on whether we include 
housing expenditures in non-durable consumption or not.12 Average disposable income per 
capita has grown at a similar rate of roughly 1 percent per year (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Trends in average per capita income and non-durable consumption  
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
                                                 
12 The definition of housing expenditures also includes hypothetical rent of owner occupiers. A full description of 
the expenditures included in our definition of non-durable consumption is given in Sommer (2008). 
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Figure 2 displays how average per capita net financial and net total wealth have evolved over the 
last decades. The growth in financial wealth appears much less impressive at first sight, but 
starting from much lower levels financial wealth has actually seen higher compound annual 
growth rates. Specifically, financial wealth has grown by an average 2.5 percent per year, whereas 
total wealth has grown by only 2.07 percent, indicating the somewhat lower growth rates of net 
real wealth. As a consequence, the share of wealth in financial assets has grown by about 3 
percentage points to roughly 31 percent in 2003.  
 
Figure 2: Trends in per capita net wealth  
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
 
Overall, income, consumption, and wealth have all seen rather slow growth over the last decades, 
especially in comparison with international figures.13 Note, that looking at household levels rather 
than per capita figures, the above growth rates are reduced further as the average household size 
in Germany has declined over the last decades from about 2.5 individuals per household in 1978 
to 2.1 in 2003.   
 
                                                 
13 The OECD (2008) provides comparative time series for household income and consumption. For wealth, we draw 
our information from the other country chapters of the project “cross-sectional facts for macroeconomists”. 
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IV.2 Trends in inequality 
While the previous section has documented that the historical growth rates in Germany are far 
from impressive, the rather generous public safety net has traditionally a reputation of achieving 
more favorable results with respect to inequality. Given that our results are based on data until 
2003, we expect little if any effects of the recent reforms to the social security system on the 
below trends in inequality. 
Before turning to the actual trends in inequality we need to make a choice how to measure 
inequality. Inequality not being a technical term there are different conceptions of what it takes 
for a distribution to become more equal or unequal. A large variety of inequality measures has 
been suggested in the literature, each of them with different characteristics when it comes to 
capturing different aspects of inequality.14 For our analysis we focus on the Gini coefficient and 
the variance of the logarithmized variables of interest. We are aware that other inequality 
measures are more sensitive e.g. towards inequality at the bottom of a distribution which may 
especially be a matter of public concern. We nevertheless employ the Gini for its traditional use 
in the literature and the variance as it is rather intuitive and straightforward to decompose.  
For all inequality analyses, we refer to what is commonly denoted as equivalized income, 
consumption and wealth.15 Using household figures, individuals in households with several 
income earners would be attributed proportionally higher levels of welfare than individuals in 
households with just one earner. The other extreme would be the use of per-capita data, which 
disregards returns to scale in consumption. While the first approach will lead to an 
overestimation of individual wellbeing in all households but single households, the second would 
equivalently cause an underestimation. The use of equivalence scales therefore aims to integrate 
the concept of individual utility and consumption in a context where individuals may draw utility 
from public goods within the household. A variety of adjustment scales have been proposed in 
the literature. We rely on the OECD equivalence scale which is widely accepted in the literature.16 
Given that we employ a pseudo-individual measure based on household data, we have to adjust 
the household weights accordingly. Specifically, we multiply the weight of a household by the 
                                                 
14 For an overview over the most common inequality measures see e.g. Coudouel et al. (2002) 
15 The equivalization of wealth data is highly debated in the literature and depends strongly on the assumptions of 
the use of wealth. As noted in the previous section, we rely on the assumption that wealth is ultimately used for 
consumption purposes in an unaltered household context. Alternative adjustments e.g. by the number of adult 
household members implicitly assume that children in the household will not draw utility from the existing stock of 
wealth. 
16 The OECD equivalence scale attributes a value of 1 to the first household member. For each additional adult and 
underage household member in the household 0.7 and 0.5 are added respectively. 
  
185
number of its members to ensure that individuals receive equal weight independent of the size of 
the household they live in.  
 
Income inequality 
No matter whether we measure income inequality by the variance of log income or by the Gini 
coefficient, we find a clear increase in inequality between the late 1970s and the late 1990s (see 
figure 3). Between 1998 and 2003, both measures indicate a drop in income inequality back to the 
level of 1993. Two structural breaks are to be kept in mind. The 1993 data is the first to include 
also East German households. The changes in inequality within the western and eastern states as 
well as between the two formerly separated economies have first been investigated by Schwarze 
(1996) for the years 1990-92. He finds a strong growth in income inequality in the eastern states 
which is overcompensated by a general catching up of the East with the West. It turns out that 
the increase in income inequality in the East has continued through the rest of the 1990s as we 
document in Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2008). Our analyses based on the GSOEP support the 
finding from the EVS that the increase in disposable income inequality for the unified country 
has come to a halt.  
 
Figure 3: Trends in income inequality, Gini coefficient and variance of log income 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
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Furthermore there is the switch from annual to quarterly income data in the EVS between 1993 
and 1998. It may explain part of the jump in inequality between 1993 and 1998 which seems 
somewhat larger than what Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2008) find based on the GSOEP. Their work 
differs from ours in two aspects: While they focus on the working age-population, we impose no 
restrictions with respect to age. Further, they employ traditional household weights, where we 
adjust the weights according to the household size. It turns out that the trends in inequality are 
quite similar. The level of inequality reported by Fuchs-Schündeln et al. is consistently higher 
though. Specifically, they report a variance of log disposable income which is about 0.1 higher, 
roughly 0.03 of which can be attributed to the use of different weights.  
 
 
Consumption inequality 
Like for income inequality, our two inequality measures yield comparable results. Starting in 1978, 
we find the degree of non-durable consumption inequality in the same order of magnitude as for 
income (see figure 4). At the same time, the increase over time turns out to be slightly smaller, 
especially when we exclude housing expenditures from our definition of non-durable 
consumption. Looking first at non-durables including housing, consumption inequality has been 
essentially constant throughout the pre-unification phase. For 1993 and 1998 we observe a small 
increase in inequality before inequality level recede almost to their pre-unification levels in 2003.  
Excluding expenditures for housing in our definition of non-durable consumption the trend in 
inequality roughly follows what we observe for disposable income although the consumption 
trend is more irregular between 1978 and 1998. We observe a first increase in inequality in the 
late 1980s and a second one for 1998. The drop in inequality between 1998 and 2003 is 
consistently found for both consumption definitions and matches our findings for disposable 
income.   
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Figure 4: Trends in consumption inequality, Gini coefficient and variance of log consumption 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
 
 
Wealth inequality17 
Inequality in total net wealth has distinctly increased between 1978 and 1993 and leveled off in 
subsequent years. The increase in the Gini between 1978 and 1993 amounts to roughly 4 
percentage points. Again, the results differ only slightly looking at the two different inequality 
measures. An exception is the slump in the Gini coefficient for the year 1988 which is unmatched 
by the variance of log wealth (see figure 5). 
Inequality in net financial wealth has seen an even steeper increase, especially in the Gini, which 
has increased by almost 10 percentage points between 1978 and 1998 and has only leveled off 
between 1998 and 2003. The increase in inequality measured by the variance of log wealth has 
been somewhat more moderate. Here, the trend towards higher inequality has not come to a halt 
though.  
                                                 
17 Note, that real estate wealth and wealth in life insurance contracts are fully imputed for the years 1978 through 
1988 based on structural information drawn from the 1993 cross-section. The imputation procedures have been 
carefully chosen to avoid the transmission of undesired distributional characteristics from the 1993 cross-section to 
the earlier years. Nevertheless, comparisons of distributional characteristics over time should keep this in mind. A 
full documentation of the imputation procedures is given in Sommer (2008). 
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Figure 5: Trends in net wealth inequality, Gini coefficient and variance of log wealth 
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Overall we find a much stronger increase in inequality for wealth than for income and 
consumption. Given that income and wealth are positively correlated, this comes with little 
surprise, as the existing income inequality is transmitted to wealth through savings. The stronger 
inequality growth in financial wealth coincides with higher growth rates as we have presented in 
the first part of this section. We postpone the question to what extent income, savings and 
wealth appreciation are the drivers behind rising wealth inequality to section six. 
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V. Decomposing the trends in inequality 
 
Having looked at the aggregate trends in inequality, we now aim to get a deeper understanding of 
the sources of inequality. We are especially interested in inequality connected to observable 
household characteristics, as the results can directly be transferred to the introduction of 
heterogeneous households in macroeconomic models.  
Today’s standard of modeling economies with a changing demography is to employ an OLG 
model. The prime characteristic of these models is their setup of the household sector. Rather 
than using one representative household, they include heterogeneity of households in age. A set 
of representative households born in different years optimizes over their respective life-cycles. 
Consequently, differences in the population age-structure are one of the key household 
characteristics for our decomposition of aggregate inequality. Further examples are differences in 
household types and heterogeneity in human capital endowments. That differences in human 
capital endowments can account for a large part of variation in lifetime utility has been shown by 
Hugget et al. (2006, 2007) as well as by Keane and Wolpin (1997). Ludwig et al. (2007) are an 
example where such differences in human capital endowment are included into an OLG 
framework. The empirical benchmarks for the calibration or the evaluation of such models 
should therefore include the above dimensions of household heterogeneity. For our below 
analysis of inequality in Germany, we additionally include a distinction of households from the 
Eastern and the Western states. This is inevitable as since 1990 the population consists of two 
quite heterogeneous parts which have assimilated over time but hitherto remain somewhat 
different.  
While all of the above household characteristics may be related to inequality, few if any of them 
can be influenced by political action. Furthermore, to the extent that natural changes in these 
characteristics are responsible for rising inequality there should be little reason for concern. 
Possible examples are the trend towards smaller households, especially single households, the 
German Reunification and the transition of the East German economy, as well as population 
aging. Where the public and political debate about rising inequality is founded on scientific results 
little thought is given to such natural trends and differences in inequality. We therefore also aim 
to strengthen these aspects with new scientific results. An example where public policy will 
induce rising inequality concerns the recent pension reforms. As the level of public pensions is 
reduced and replaced accordingly by private savings, wealth inequality will inevitably increase. It 
is important to understand that this will be case even if the ultimate distribution of retirement 
incomes remains unchanged.  
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Before vivifying the above questions with empirical results, it is helpful to think conceptually 
about the mechanisms in inequality trends. We show using the example of a variance 
decomposition that the above changes to the population structure are only one dimension of the 
possible drivers behind changing inequality. In fact, the total variance in period t, 2ts , can be 
written as the weighted sum of the variances within the k population subgroups plus a term 
driven by the differences between the subgroups’ means and the overall population mean tm  (see 
equation (1)). 
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Hence, three components may induce changes to the aggregate level of inequality: First, there 
may be changes in the means of population subgroups. A classic example is the catching up of 
the East German economy over the last decades. Second, the level of inequality within 
population subgroups may change over time. With the rise in inequality within a population 
subgroup, this carries forward also to the aggregate. Also this second component has played an 
important role for inequality levels of post-unification Germany. Specifically, inequality in income 
and consumption has been on the rise in the eastern parts of Germany in the aftermath of the 
reunification. Third, shifts in the population share of the individual subgroups affect aggregate 
inequality. The change in a group’s weight operates through both of the above channels. If a 
relatively unequal population subgroup gains weight, also aggregate inequality will increase. 
Similarly, inequality will rise if subgroups with a group specific average far from the population 
average gain weight. Equation (2) describes the above formally. 
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In the following, we present selected results on the drivers behind aggregate inequality. We start 
with a regression based analysis of the cross-sectional variance in income, consumption and 
wealth. By construction, we thereby focus on the variance explained by differences in the 
explanatory variables – in our case key household characteristics. Where applicable, we 
complement the discussion of the results by facts about the changes in inequality within the 
respective population subgroups. In the second part of this section, we address the changes in 
inequality over the life-cycle.  
 
V.1 The importance of sociodemographics for cross-sectional inequality 
To get a first impression of the influence of heterogeneity across households on inequality we 
analyse, what part of the cross-sectional variance in income, consumption and wealth can be 
explained by differences between observable household characteristics. To do so, we specify a 
simple regression model for log income, consumption and wealth. Explanatory variables are the 
household composition, the age, gender and job education of the household head, as well as the 
place of residence in the East or in the West. As we include the household composition in the 
decomposition, we revert to household level data, i.e. we do not apply an equivalization to the 
data.  
Figures 6-9 display what parts of the cross-sectional variance in log disposable household income, 
log consumption, and log wealth can be explained by the observable household characteristics 
mentioned above. We add the residual variance as a point of reference. For a comparison of the 
decompositions of the early cross-sections (1978-88) and the later cross-sections two important 
changes are to be kept in mind:  
First, there is the addition of the Eastern German population in 1993. The regional dummy will 
only capture the added variance from the differences in means between the two subsamples. As 
Schwarze (1996) and Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2008) show, differences in inequality within the 
respective parts of the country play an important role for the evolution of inequality at the 
national level though. We will discuss the effects of the reunification further in the context of the 
actual results. 
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Second, educational attainment is missing in the analysis of the pre-unification years for 
availability reasons. Thus for the years 1978 to 1988, the dispersion caused by differences in 
education will be subsumed in the explained variance of correlated variables and in the residual 
variance. Although the addition of education complicates the comparability of results over time, 
we decided to add education where possible, as the addition of heterogeneity in education has 
become a standard extension of macroeconomic models. 
 
Decomposition of income inequality 
Among the household characteristics included in the decomposition, only differences in the 
household composition account for a considerable part of the variance in log disposable income 
(see figure 6). Evidently, the variance connected to differences in the household composition 
increases over time. It turns out that this is largely caused by the proliferation of households at 
the extremes of the income distribution. The key reason is the trend towards single households. 
The incomes of single households have seen above average growth rates between 1978 and 2003 
but remain at the bottom of the income distribution. At the same time, the share of single 
households in the population has increased by roughly one third from 27.7 percent in 1978 to 
38.8 percent in 2003. The increased number of single households has therefore over-
compensated the inequality reducing effects of favorable income growth among single 
households.   
Noteworthy are also the regional dummy and the educational attainment of the household head. 
Both explain about a third of the variance explained by differences in the household type. While 
the explanatory power of education is fairly constant over time, the importance of the East/West 
distinction decreases considerably, indicating that the gap between disposable incomes in East 
and West Germany has shrunk. The effects of different levels of inequality within the respective 
regions are apparent in the slump in the residual variance in 1993. At that time, the level of 
inequality within the East was still substantially smaller than in the West, causing a drop in 
inequality at the national level.  
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Figure 6: Decomposition of the variance of log disposable household income 
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
va
ria
n
ce
 
o
f l
o
gs
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
residual hh-composition
age west/east
sex job education
 
Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
 
Decomposition of consumption inequality 
The pictures for income and consumption inequality look quite alike (see figure 7). The main 
difference is the smaller and decreasing residual variance in consumption where we had observed 
a slight increase in the residual variance for income.  
Like for income, differences in the household composition explain a great deal of consumption 
inequality. Education has a constant explanatory power in a similar order of magnitude as for 
income. However, there is little direct reason why education should matter as much for 
consumption as it does for income. An exception might be a higher willingness of higher 
educated households to invest in further education, quality food and health. Yet it seems much 
more likely, that differences in income related to different educational attainments carry over to 
consumption possibilities and ultimately to expenditures. The same argument can be transferred 
to our regional distinction. In fact, the variance connected to the differences in consumption and 
income between the East and the West has more than halved between 1993 and 2003. We omit 
the corresponding graph for our alternative definition of non-durable consumption for brevity as 
the results show no remarkable differences.  
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Figure 7: Decomposition of the variance of log non-durable consumption (incl. housing) 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
 
Decomposition of wealth inequality 
Last, we turn to the question what part of the wealth dispersion can be explained by observable 
differences between households. Figure 8 strikingly illustrates, that none of the household 
characteristics employed in the decomposition accounts for a relevant part of financial wealth 
inequality. Among the tightly cramped lines at the bottom of the graph, only age and the 
East/West distinction catch the eye. Concretely, a small but increasing part of the variance is 
connected to the age-structure of the population. At the same time, the differences in wealth 
holdings between West and East have declined over time, as observed previously for income and 
consumption. Also for net total wealth, the observed household characteristics explain rather 
little of the overall dispersion (see figure 9). Again, the East/West dummy explains a certain but 
diminishing part of the variance in total wealth, age a similar, though slightly increasing amount. 
The remarkable difference comparing the variance in net financial and net total wealth concerns 
the role of differences in household composition. Only for total wealth, variation in wealth levels 
across household types plays a role. The reason is differential home ownership across household 
types: In fact, only about 26 percent among households with one adult own real estate, but 54 
and 72 percent of the households with two and three adults respectively.  
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Figure 8: Decomposition of the variance of log net financial wealth 
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Figure 9: Decomposition of the variance of log net total wealth 
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V.2 Evolution of inequality over the life-cycle 
Overall, the above cross-sectional decompositions of inequality in income, consumption and 
wealth have revealed a number of important coherences. A substantial part of the dispersion in 
income and consumption is connected to different household types, which highlights the 
necessity to employ an equivalence scale in the assessment of inequality. Further, looking at the 
national trends in inequality in Germany, it is important to account for the German reunification. 
While the effects of the reunification are rather well understood, much less is known about the 
effects of a changing population age-structure. 
In the introduction of this section, we have proposed a general structure for the factors behind 
changes in inequality. We now apply these to the context of an aging society using the example of 
income inequality. The transfer to consumption and wealth inequality is straightforward.  
First, there are differences in average income across age-groups which we typically think of as the 
life-cycle income profile. It exhibits a hump shape with a steep increase over the first decades in 
the work force. Around age 50, average income levels off before it declines for the following age-
groups due to rising unemployment rates and early retirement. Income levels drop considerably 
between age 60 and 65, as the cohort gradually goes into retirement. Thereafter, average income 
is essentially flat for the oldest age-groups. If the life-cycle income profile grew steeper with 
larger distances of the average income of certain age-groups to the overall average, this would 
ceteris paribus increase the overall level of inequality. However, the results from the cross-
sectional decomposition above indicate that differences between age-groups play only a minor 
role for the overall level of income inequality. 
Second, the level of inequality within the individual age-groups may increase. Thinkable reasons 
would be a rising dispersion in market wages or hours worked. Given that we are looking at post-
government income also the government sector may play a role. Examples would be changes in 
the income tax scheme or in the payment of government transfers.  
Third and last, the population age-structure may change and thereby shift weight to or from age-
groups with extremely low or extremely high income levels. In the same manner, population 
weight may be shifted from rather unequal age-groups to more equal ones and vice versa. If fact, 
the retirement of the baby-boom generation will shift weight away from the highest income age-
groups. Whether inequality among the working age-population is higher or lower compared to 
the first post-retirement age-groups is to be determined in the subsequent analysis. Unless the 
inequality age-profile is flat, gradual effects on the distribution of incomes and consumption can 
be expected as more and more baby-boomers retire. 
In the following, we focus on differences in inequality between age-groups to assess the possible 
effects of changes to the population age structure on aggregate inequality. To elicit an age-profile 
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in inequality from our synthetic panel data, we have to take a stand with respect to time- and 
cohort effects.18 We alternatively assume time- and cohort-effects to be zero and compare the 
resulting age-profiles.  
Specifically, we estimate for both inequality measures I an OLS regression including age-group 
dummies A based on the age of the household head and year dummies Y, as described in 
equation (3). The alternative cohort-specification includes cohort dummies C instead of the age-
dummies, as described in equation (4). 
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The resulting life-cycle profile of inequality is then computed as follows: 
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The inclusion of the average year- and cohort-effect implies that the levels of our results can be 
interpreted as the age-profile for an average year and an average cohort respectively. 
 
Age-profiles in income inequality 
The results for income turn out to be rather sensitive with respect to the chosen specification 
(see figure 10). At the same time, the two inequality measures yield closely comparable results. 
Based on the time-effects specification we find a relatively flat age-profile. Inequality is smallest 
for the youngest age-groups. What follows is a two-step increase in income inequality towards the 
age-group 30-34 and then again between age 50 and age 64. In between, the level of inequality 
remains flat or decreases slightly. Inequality peaks for the age-group 60-64 and declines in the 
following 10 years. The remainder of the age-profile is flat again. If we think of a baby-boom 
generation moving through this stylized life-cycle, we can expect aggregate inequality to increase 
as the baby-boom generation moves through their last years in the labor force and to revert to its 
previous level as the baby-boomers reach age 70 and above.  
                                                 
18 By construction, age-, time-, and cohort-effects are perfectly collinear in a linear specification. Identification 
therefore relies on assumptions or the functional form of the specification (see Deaton and Paxson (1994), 
Brugiavini and Weber (2001), or Ameriks and Zeldes (2001)) 
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The age-profile estimated from the cohort-specification looks similar in its swings over the life-
cycle, but tilted by about 25° to be strongly upward sloping. The clearly different life-cycle path 
of inequality derived from the cohort-specification gives reason to investigate the underlying raw 
data in more detail. It turns out that the major shifts in income inequality have affected essentially 
only the working age population.19 Much of the results may therefore be driven by the 
assumptions implicit to the regression model. Specifically, the specification implies that time- and 
cohort-effects cause parallel shifts to an otherwise unaffected age-profile. The raw data suggests 
that neither assumption is justified for all age-groups. While a closer look at the raw data is 
probably the best way to understand the historical trends in inequality, the complex evolution 
makes things somewhat more difficult for macroeconomic modeling. In fact, income inequality 
over the life-cycle used to be much steeper in the past and has flattened out in recent years. Such 
structural changes throughout the historical data used for the calibration pose a challenge for 
projections. 
 
Figure 10: Age-effects in equivalized post-government income inequality 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
 
                                                 
19 The appendix contains a cohort-graph of the raw inequality data. 
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Age-profiles in consumption inequality20 
Consumption inequality does not exhibit the issues we observe for income inequality. Not only 
the different inequality measures but also the different specifications yield quite similar age-
effects. We find a continuously increasing level of inequality over the life-cycle (see figure 11). 
The age-trajectories are flat only between age 30 and 50 and then again beyond age 75. For part 
of inequality trends in an aging society, the upward slope of the age-profile suggests that 
consumption inequality will continuously increase over time as the population weight shifts 
towards older age-groups. However, this effect is attenuated by the age-profile in consumption 
levels. Specifically, average consumption levels after retirement are much closer to the population 
mean than the consumption levels of those age-groups immediately before retirement.  
 
Figure 11: Age-effects in equivalized non-durable consumption inequality 
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20 We only present results based on non-durable consumption including housing expenditures for brevity. The 
results from our alternative definition show only minor deviations.  
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Age-profiles in wealth inequality 
Figures 12 and 13 present the results on life-cycle inequality in net financial wealth and net total 
wealth respectively. Much more than for the case of income inequality, the results based on 
different specifications and inequality measures yield different results.  
Employing the cohort specification, we find a strongly upward sloping age-profile for both 
wealth measures based on the variance. Looking at the results for the Gini coefficient, the general 
life-cycle pattern resembles a u-shape. For financial wealth, inequality bottoms out around age 40 
and the upward slope over the remaining life-cycle clearly dominates the downward slope among 
the early age-groups. For total wealth, the pattern is shifted and tilted to the right. Inequality 
levels decline until age 55 and increase only slightly thereafter.  
 
Figure 12: Age-effects in equivalized net financial wealth 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1978-2003 
 
Looking at the results based on the time-effects specification we find the above age-profiles to be 
clockwise rotated. However, there is a considerable amount of variation in the degree of rotation 
to the age-profiles.  
Overall, the results for life-cycle wealth inequality are strikingly ambiguous. Especially surprising 
are the differences between the two inequality measures. The raw data exhibits a u-shaped cross-
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sectional age-profile for both measures.21 At the same time, the different slopes over the life-cycle 
of cohorts shed some doubt that wealth inequality actually takes a u-shaped path over the life-
cycle. In fact, the age-trajectories of individual cohorts based on the Gini are mostly flat or 
downward sloping, whereas the variance trajectories are remarkably upward sloping. 
Furthermore, the raw data suggests only minor differences between cohorts based on the Gini. 
Based on the variances of log wealth, we find the individual cohort trajectories much further 
apart.  
 
Figure 13: Age-effects in equivalized net total wealth 
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The different sensitivity of the two inequality measures with respect to extreme values may help 
us resolve the puzzle and add further insights. The variance being more sensitive to outliers we 
suggest that wealth inequality is rather stable across cohorts and over age with an exception of 
extreme values. At the same time, the number of extremely wealthy households increases over 
the life-cycle. Further, younger cohorts tend to contain more extremely wealthy households than 
the generation of their parents did at the same age. 
                                                 
21 A cohort-graph of the raw data is presented in the Appendix.  
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VI. Relating the expansion of  wealth inequality over the 
life-cycle to savings, asset allocation and inheritances 
 
We have documented in the previous sections, that wealth is much more unequally distributed 
than income and consumption. In addition, wealth inequality has increased over the last decades. 
Conceptually, both findings are rather unsurprising, as wealth is a stock variable. Changes to the 
existing stock of wealth are first of all driven by savings and appreciation. Savings in turn depend 
on income, which is highly correlated with wealth. Given that in Germany even among retired 
households only one in four is actually dissaving, savings can be expected to have largely 
dispersing effects on the wealth distribution. The same applies to appreciation effects. As long as 
real returns are positive, the effects of asset appreciation on wealth inequality should also be 
dispersing – at least in absolute terms. Hence, mainly inter-vivos transfers seem suited for wealth 
decumulation. However it is arguable, whether the intergenerational transmission of wealth 
through inter-vivos transfers and bequests has had equalizing effects on the wealth distribution in 
the past. Kohli et al. (2005) compare the actual wealth distribution with a counterfactual where 
they eliminate received wealth transfers. They find a slightly higher level of inequality in the case 
without transfers. Westerheide (2004) investigates the propensity to consume out of received 
transfers and finds it to be higher among the rich. Consequently, they both tend to attribute 
wealth transfers an equalizing effect. At the same time, they both document a strong income and 
wealth gradient in received wealth transfers. While poor households have profited more in 
relative terms, the absolute differences in transfers received remain large.  
Overall, all the above factors lead to a relatively small level of mobility within the wealth 
distribution – especially compared to income – as shown by Jianakoplos and Menchik (1997).22 
While there is a certain literature assessing the connections between life-cycle savings and wealth 
inequality (e.g. Pudney (1993), Hendricks (2002)), we are not aware of a more comprehensive 
analysis of the drivers behind wealth inequality in a life-cycle context. In the following, we aim to 
fill this gap based on a parsimonious model of wealth accumulation which we apply to the 
German EVS data. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Other analyses investigate wealth mobility as such (e.g. Edlund and Kopczuk (2007), Steckel and Krishnan (1997)). 
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VI.1 A parsimonius model of wealth accumulation 
Changes in wealth holdings over time can be classified into savings, appreciation and wealth 
transfers. In a household context, also the formation and the dissolution of households will play a 
role. Given that a well founded analysis of household formation effects on wealth holdings 
should be based on panel data, we defer this question for future research.  
 
We think of wealth accumulation as presented in equation (5): 
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Wealth in period t+1 consists of wealth in period t which has appreciated by the real rate of 
return r. Further, savings s and net transfers t received in period t are added. This equation of 
motion can be rewritten and expanded as follows: 
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Thus, wealth growth consists of three components: First, there is the appreciation effect, which 
depends on the real returns r of the k individual assets and their portfolio shares kM . This first 
component of wealth growth is often denoted as passive savings. Second, there is the effect of 
active savings, i.e. the value of net asset purchases, net contributions to insurance contracts and 
savings accounts, as well as net repayments of debt. This can also be expressed as the net savings 
rate sq multiplied by the contemporary disposable income y , which illustrates the influence of 
the income distribution on the wealth distribution. Last, there are net transfers which can be split 
into received transfers Rt and given transfers Gt . In practice, these transfers can take the form of 
inter-vivos transfers or inheritances.  
 
 
VI.2 Estimating stylized life-cycle profiles of wealth accumulation 
The above general considerations can easily be applied to a life-cycle context. In panel data we 
would follow the savings and the portfolio choice of households over time. Thus, starting from 
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initial wealth holdings we could add the observed active savings and the known net transfers. 
Further, we could estimate the expected appreciation effects from the known portfolio allocation. 
Given that we only have repeated cross-sectional data available, we revert to using groups of 
households sharing the year of birth of their household head for the construction of a synthetic 
panel. The household level data is replaced accordingly by cohort averages of wealth, savings, and 
portfolio shares, as we observe them at different ages over time. We define cohorts such that 
households from adjacent years of birth are grouped together. To provide insights into the 
different mechanisms of wealth accumulation among households with high and with low savings 
capacity, we further stratify the cohorts by their position in equivalized income distribution of the 
cohort. Put differently, we ultimately follow the wealth holdings, the savings and investment 
behavior of the top, upper middle, lower middle and the bottom of the income distribution of 
each birth cohort over their pseudo life-cycles.  
To actually interpret the life-cycle wealth growth trajectories of the cohorts defined as above, we 
have to insure that cohorts remain homogeneous over time as far as possible. First of all, we 
therefore exclude the East German sample and focus only on West German households. 
Furthermore, households should ideally be attributed to the same cohorts in case they are 
sampled several times over the years. The assumption that households remain in the same birth 
cohort may not do too much harm. A household will only be attributed to a different birth 
cohort if there is a change in the household head. Given that we define the household head to be 
the oldest male, such a switch in household headship will essentially only occur if the household 
head leaves the household or dies.23 The second assumption is a much more problematic one. 
While the relative income position of households within a cohort tends to relatively stable 
between age 35 and age 55, income mobility plays a more important role in the phase of job 
market entry and exit. We therefore carefully interpret our results and discuss the direction of the 
effects of income mobility. 
For the actual projection of wealth accumulation we proceed as follows: For each birth cohort 
and each year, we split the distribution of equivalized household disposable incomes in four 
parts. The top income decile, the 7th-9th income decile (“upper middle”), the 4th-6th income decile 
(“lower middle”) and the bottom three income deciles. In the following, we denote these 
fragments of the income distribution as quartiles. For each quartile y of each birth cohort c at a 
given age a  we estimate the growth in wealth per adult capita over the following five years. We 
                                                 
23 In the absence of male household members we choose the oldest female to be the household head. 
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choose a per adult capita measure to minimize the distorting effects of changes to the household 
composition.24  
For the actual estimation of the wealth growth through asset appreciation, we apply the observed 
average portfolio allocation to the initial average level of wealth (see equation 7). For the real 
returns of the individual asset classes, we deliberately decided against year-specific returns. The 
fluctuations in nominal returns and inflation rates over time have been comparatively large. 
Furthermore, we are foremost interested in the conceptual differences of wealth growth at 
different ages and for households at different positions in the income distribution. Therefore, 
incorporating the historical fluctuations in real returns seemed detrimental. We generally apply 
equal asset returns for all income quartiles and age-groups, although differences in financial 
literacy and restrictions in access to certain assets would imply an income gradient in asset 
returns. The main reason is that we have no means to quantify the suspected differential returns. 
An exception is housing wealth, where we estimate the differential growth rates for the income 
quartiles from the EVS data.25  
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In the results below, we break down the appreciation effects further into real wealth, financial 
wealth and debt. 
To estimate the wealth growth through active savings we project the average annual savings cyas  
of each cohort-age-quartile cell to the next five years (see equation 8). We thereby assume 
constant savings over the unobserved following four years. Given the short horizon of the 
projection of only five years, the inaccuracy induced by this assumption can be expected to be 
small for the vast majority of age-groups. Given that over five years, the new savings already earn 
interest, the projected five-year savings have to be augmented accordingly. For simplicity we 
assume that the new savings are allocated like the existing stock of wealth and therefore apply the 
                                                 
24 Using plain household levels, our results would be strongly affected by household formation and dissolution. 
Employing an equivalence scale which includes the children in the household, equivalent savings would depend on 
the birth or the moving out of children over the life-cycle of their parents. Only in the case of death of an adult 
where the remaining adult member inherits the stock of wealth using per adult capita measures can be expected to 
have distorting effects on the life cycle wealth path. 
25 The returns used for the projection are tabulated in the appendix, which also contains a description of our 
procedures of estimating the differences in housing price growth across income quartiles. 
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same rate of return. Furthermore, we include the additional appreciation of savings in active 
savings although these wealth gains should conceptually be counted as passive savings.  
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Last, there are average net transfers received. If possible we would proceed equivalently to the 
case of savings and project the known net transfers from the years of observation to the 
following four years for which we have no data as described by equation (9). 
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Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish bequests and gifts from support payments and other 
income streams between households in all years. Thus, we initially restrict our core model to the 
effects of active and passive savings. Total wealth growth of the cohort-quartiles over the 
following five is therefore calculated by 
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To get as close as possible to a comprehensive picture of the drivers behind wealth growth, we 
add a cross-sectional breakdown of received inheritances based on the EVS 2003. While this 
implies that we disregard possible cohort effects in inheritances it is simply the closest we can get 
given the available data.  
 
 
VI.3 Results for a broadly based cohort 
Before turning to the stylized age-profiles, we have a look at the raw results for a single broadly 
based cohort. The purpose is twofold: first, looking at the raw projections, we avoid the effects 
of the assumptions involved in the extraction of age-effects. Second, we deliberately choose a 
wide cohort for this exercise which includes households from 15 adjacent years of birth. Thereby 
we aim to convey the best-possible impression of how the German population has accumulated 
wealth over the last decades without entirely giving up the life-cycle context.  
To do so, we focus on a cohort which we can observe over most of their working life, i.e. the 
period where we would expect little intention to dissave and little changes to the household 
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composition through mortality. Specifically, we choose households headed by in individual born 
between 1944 and 1958. We follow these households from 1983 when they are 25 to 39 years old 
until 2003. By then, we observe the same cohort at an age between 45 and 59. 
We employ two measures for the contribution of the individual pathways of wealth 
accumulation. First, we use absolute wealth growth as derived above. This allows a comparison 
of the orders of magnitude across income quartiles. To relate the absolute wealth growth to the 
respective initial wealth, we additionally calculate growth rates. Specifically, we relate the absolute 
growth by the individual components i over the following t years to total initial wealth for each 
cohort-quartile-age cell. Finally, we annualize the growth rates and report compound annual 
growth rates contributed by the individual drivers.  
 
( ) 100*1/1 1 ¹¸·©¨§ - D+ cyaicya aa ticyaCAGR     (11) 
 
The key finding from our analysis is certainly, that wealth growth in Germany over the past 20 
years was mainly driven by savings whereas passive savings have actually been negative (see table 
1). Counting all wealth drivers together, households at the top of the income distribution 
achieved an average annual wealth growth of 4.8 percent in real terms. Also the middle quartiles 
were able to improve their wealth position, although at substantially lower rates of 2 and 1 
percent per year respectively. If a household was stuck at the bottom of the income distribution 
we project an average annual wealth loss of 1.8 percent per year. The composition of these 
numbers turns out to be driven by high savings, a conservative allocation of financial assets, and 
negative returns on real estate wealth.  
 
The effects of active savings 
Over a time span of twenty years, household from all parts of the income distribution have 
increased their wealth by means of active savings. This applies even to households at the bottom 
of the income distribution. Negative savings early in the life-cycle and when part of the cohort 
was already approaching retirement are overcompensated in those years where essentially the 
entire cohort was in their core working age. Looking at the higher income quartiles we find a 
clear income gradient in the contribution of savings to absolute as well as relative wealth growth. 
In fact, households that remained at the top, the upper middle, the lower middle and the bottom 
of the income distribution over this time, would have increased their wealth by 5.2, 3.1, 2.3 and 
0.8 percent per year.  
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Table 1: Wealth growth by source at different positions in the income distribution (in EUR 2001) 
wealth growth 
initial wealth in 1983 1983-88  1988-93 1993-98 1998-2003 
total growth 
1983-2003 
20-year 
CAGR 
18'758 € Income deciles I-III 
active savings -886 € 2'473 € 3'096 € -369 € 4'314 € 0.8% 
passive savings -1'974 € -2'786 € -3'462 € -3'150 € -11'372 € -3.7% 
inheritances 4 € 13 € 15 € 87 € 118 € 0.0% 
total wealth growth -2'856 € -301 € -351 € -3'432 € -6'940 € -1.8% 
46'670 € Income deciles IV-VI 
active savings 5'150 € 8'544 € 11'736 € 10'533 € 35'963 € 2.3% 
passive savings -5'136 € -6'084 € -5'839 € -5'719 € -22'778 € -2.6% 
inheritances 31 € 21 € 17 € 62 € 131 € 0.0% 
total wealth growth 45 € 2'481 € 5'914 € 4'876 € 13'316 € 1.0% 
66'953 € Income deciles VII-IX 
active savings 11'613 € 18'449 € 22'487 € 23'592 € 76'142 € 3.1% 
passive savings -7'857 € -8'807 € -8'543 € -7'820 € -33'027 € -2.7% 
inheritances 209 € 164 € 338 € 410 € 1'122 € 0.1% 
total wealth growth 3'966 € 9'806 € 14'282 € 16'182 € 44'236 € 2.0% 
95'220 € Income decile X 
active savings 36'916 € 56'139 € 72'408 € 76'449 € 241'911 € 5.2% 
passive savings -12'089 € -11'313 € -9'355 € -12'524 € -45'282 € -2.5% 
inheritances 1'865 € 2'745 € 5'303 € 6'724 € 16'638 € 0.6% 
total wealth growth 26'691 € 47'571 € 68'356 € 70'649 € 213'267 € 4.8% 
 
Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1983-2003; Note: inheritances estimated based on cross-sectional 
data from the EVS 2003, all numbers calculated in real terms. 
 
The effects of passive savings  
In contrast to active savings, which plays the expected role for wealth accumulation, passive 
savings have in fact been dissavings in Germany. One of the reasons is the low return on real 
estate wealth which does not even match the inflation rate. In real terms, housing wealth has 
depreciated by an average annual rate of between 0.5 and 1.7 percent (see table 2). High income 
households’ homes have seen a somewhat more favorable price development, leading to a small 
income gradient in real wealth depreciation.  
Additional to the unfavorable housing market, credit costs have depressed the total return on 
assets for all income groups. The effect is especially strong at the top and at the bottom of the 
income distribution. The reasons, however, are different. The poor suffer especially from high 
rates of debit interest, as they hold more of their debt in expensive consumer credits. For the 
rich, the large effects of debt are due to a higher leverage of their real estate wealth.  
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Table 2: Compound annual real growth rates by wealth category (1983-2003, in %) 
 Income Decile 
  I-III IV-VI VII-IX X 
financial wealth 1.1% 0.7% 0.7% 1.0% 
housing wealth -1.7% -1.1% -0.8% -0.5% 
debt -3.2% -2.3% -2.8% -4.1% 
Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1983-2003 
 
Only for financial wealth there have been positive real rates of return over the last decades. 
Somewhat surprisingly, we do not find the expected clear income gradient. In fact, the bottom as 
well as the top income quartiles have outperformed the middle class. Overall, the real returns on 
financial wealth as well as the differences across income groups are quite small. First of all, the 
asset allocation is rather uniform across the income distribution. The largest differences can be 
observed for direct stockholding. While the bottom income quartile held a maximum of 5.5 
percent of its wealth in stocks in 1998, the same share has never exceeded 10 percent for the top 
income decile. The fact, that asset allocation in Germany has remained rather conservative is 
certainly the main reason for the overall poor performance of financial wealth. 
 
The effects of inheritances  
For the assessment of the importance of wealth transfers we rely solely on cross-sectional 
information about inheritances from the EVS 2003. There is also information on other transfers 
from private households, be we cannot distinguish alimony and other income transfers from 
wealth transfers. The same applies to inter-vivos transfers to other households.  
The averages reported in table 1 tell only part of the story: comparing average inheritances to the 
wealth levels of a cohort, they seem almost negligible. Only the top income decile can be 
expected to receive substantial amounts of wealth. Over 20 years, inheritances augment initial 
wealth of the top income quartile by roughly 17 percent. Already the third quartile gains less than 
2 percent of its initial average wealth by means of inheritances. While the unconditional means 
look rather disappointing especially for the lower half of the income distribution, Kohli et al. 
(2005) has shown that for those households receiving an inheritance, their relative impact on 
previous wealth holdings may be quite considerable.  
 
 
VI.4 Age-profiles in wealth accumulation by source 
To elicit age-profiles from our repeated synthetic panel data we have to take a stand with respect 
to time and cohort effects. As commonly known, age-, time- and cohort-effects are by 
  
210
construction perfectly collinear. Therefore, structural assumptions are inevitable. In the 
following, we derive the age-effects under the assumption that there are no cohort-effects, i.e., we 
only include time-effects in the regression. We chose time-effects over cohort effects as we 
expect them to play a role for both key input variables – savings and portfolio choice. 
Specifically, savings have experienced some fluctuations over time. For portfolio choice, we 
observe quite similar trends towards more securities over time for essentially all cohorts.26 One 
might argue, that also cohort-effects seem to play a certain role for portfolio choice but hitherto 
this is much less the case for savings.  
 
Age-profiles for the contribution of active savings 
Figure 14 depicts the age-effects in absolute wealth growth through active savings over the 
following five years. Wealth growth through active savings has the expected hump shape for 
essentially all income deciles. Savings increase over the first half of the life-cycle. Peak savings are 
reached at age 40-44 for the bottom income decile, and around age 50 for the higher income 
classes. Savings drop steeply around retirement age and reach a local minimum between age 60 
and 70. For the subsequent age-groups, savings increase once more. The most likely reasons for 
this late increase in savings are health limitations which prevent households to consume more 
(Börsch-Supan and Stahl, 1991), increased precautionary savings for the case of high health and 
long-term care expenditures (Palumbo, 1999), as well as the non-sampling of institutionalized 
households which can be expected to be among the strongest dissavers. The effects of 
differential mortality within the existing sample have been assessed by Sommer (2008a) and have 
been found to be small. Overall, it is evident that especially the rich do not consume the wealth 
they have accumulated over the life-cycle in retirement. 
Looking at the levels of new wealth accumulated through active savings, we find them to be 
negligible for the bottom income deciles of essentially all age-groups. At certain ages, these 
households have negative saving rates and are thus predicted to reduce their stock of wealth. 
Over the entire life-cycle we estimate an average 5yr savings effect of -1150 €, i.e. a wealth loss of 
230 € per year. The differences compared to the broadly based cohort which we have analyzed 
above are caused by negative savings among the youngest age-group and the age-groups 50 and 
above. Households who remain in the lower middle income quartile over their life-cycle can be 
expected to accumulate close to 5’000 € by means of savings over a time span of five years. The 
neighboring upper middle attains about double the amounts through most of the life-cycle. The 
                                                 
26 For a detailed disaggregation of the trends in household portfolios see Sommer (2005).  
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gap between the second and the third income quartile widens only among the youngest age-
groups and around retirement. On average, the third income quartile attains real wealth gains 
over five years of 13’120 € just through savings. The saving levels of the top income decile are of 
a different order of magnitude: their five-year savings never fall below 20’000 Euros and average 
out at 47’900 Euros over the entire life-cycle.  
 
Figure 14: Age-effects for 5-year wealth growth by means of active savings  
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1983-2003 
 
To put the above absolute figures in the context of different wealth holdings over the life-cycle 
and across income deciles, we now convert the above absolute wealth growth into growth rates. 
The growth rates always relate to the initial wealth of an income quartile at a certain age. To give 
an example: In real terms, the top income decile of the age-group 50-54 is projected to 
experience an increase in total net wealth by means of savings of 5 percent per year over the 
following five years based on their initial wealth at age 50-54 (figure 15). 
The first feature of projected growth rates to catch the eye is certainly the clear income gradient. 
In all age-groups, households from higher income deciles are able to increase their wealth at a 
higher pace. The second finding from figure 15 is the trend towards lower growth rates as age 
increases. Again, this comes with little surprise, as the annual savings flows become smaller and 
smaller compared to the increasing stock of wealth which is accumulated over the life-cycle. Last, 
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we observe substantial wealth decumulation through dissavings for the bottom half of the 
income distribution among the youngest age-groups. The suspicion of borrowing against higher 
future income levels is supported by the income and consumption data of these cohorts.  
 
Figure 15: Age-effects for contributed growth rate through active savings 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1983-2003 
 
Generally, having in mind the life-cycle savings patterns in Germany, our results for active 
savings contain no big surprises. The key findings are certainly that the bottom 30 percent of the 
income distribution are unable to accumulate wealth through savings, as also documented by 
Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) based on the SAVE survey. Furthermore, we find the expected clear 
income gradient in wealth accumulation through active savings. 
 
Age-profiles for the contribution of passive savings 
Our analyses for passive savings yield essentially three key findings. First and foremost, we find 
considerable depreciation effects between ages 20 and 55. Essentially only the top income 
households are able to profit from passive savings, and only beyond retirement age. Second, the 
performance of poor households’ portfolios is better than one might expect. Over the entire life-
cycle, their returns on total wealth are level with the portfolios of middle income households. 
Especially at young age, their portfolios even outperform the middle class. Third and last, we find 
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a clear income gradient for the performance of financial wealth for the age-groups 35 and above 
and a reversed income gradient for the younger age-groups. 
We first look in some more detail at the u-shaped age-profile of projected passive savings. 
Throughout the entire working life, we observe only wealth depreciation which peaks in absolute 
terms around age 40 (see figure 16) and somewhat earlier at age 30-35 when looking at growth 
rates (see figure 17). The key to understanding the negative and u-shaped age-profile are 
mortgages. That is, depreciation effects play an increasing role among those age-groups with large 
numbers of credit-financed home owners. As the outstanding debt is repaid towards retirement, 
the depreciation effects decline correspondingly. In fact, wealth losses become negligible around 
age 60 and remain so for the remainder of the life-cycle.  
 
Figure 16: Age-effects for wealth growth by passive savings 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1983-2003 
 
Next, there are the low overall returns from passive savings. We have already highlighted the 
reasons above in the context of the wide cohort. Apart from the debt effects, the poor portfolio 
performance of households’ investments is largely due to a conservative allocation of financial 
assets as well as the negative real returns on housing wealth. It turns out, that the differences 
across quartiles are rather low throughout the entire life-cycle. The margin between the highest 
and the lowest projected returns ranges from 0.3 to 0.9 percentage points. For most age-groups, 
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the top income decile also attains the highest return on assets. The third and the second quartile 
follow in the expected order at a certain distance. The main surprise in returns from passive 
savings concerns the performance of low income households’ portfolios. Over all age-groups, 
they never have the worst projected performance. Furthermore, the bottom income quartile 
outperforms the middle income quartiles for a considerable number of age-groups. Before 
coming back to the surprisingly good performance of the portfolios of young low income 
households, we focus on passive savings from financial wealth. This seems especially worthwhile 
given the overall predominance of credit-financed homes for the above results. 
 
Figure 17: Age-effects for contributed growth rate through passive savings 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1983-2003 
 
 
Age-profiles for the contribution of passive savings from financial wealth 
The estimated age-pattern for projected growth rates in financial wealth are depicted in figure 18. 
Financial wealth contributes positive wealth growth for all ages and income groups. The actual 
real rates of return vary between 0.7 and 2.2 percent. The life-cycle pattern is essentially split in 
two parts. Among households below age 30, we observe an inverse income gradient and the 
dispersion across income quartiles is comparatively large at a margin of 120 basis points. 
Furthermore, it is here that we observe the highest returns. For the later age-groups, we observe 
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essentially flat life-cycle profiles. Real returns are highest for the top income decile at roughly 1.1-
1.2 percent per year. The lower income groups attain a real return between 0.7 and 0.9 percent. 
The reasons for these low portfolio returns are the ongoing popularity of safe assets like savings 
accounts and building society savings contracts among German households.27 
 
Figure 18: Age-effects for contributed growth rate through financial wealth appreciation 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 1983-2003 
 
 
Let us come back to the remarkably good performance of the lower income quartiles among the 
young. One might speculate that the favorable asset allocation is driven by student households 
which expect high income growth in the future and therefore reduce their investment in safe but 
low return assets in favor of securities. Furthermore, we would expect these households to have 
good knowledge about financial markets and therefore choose a more attractive long run 
portfolio allocation. Looking at the distribution of educational attainments across income groups 
supports the above speculation. For a solid understanding of the investment behavior of young 
low income households we would require panel data though.  
                                                 
27 For a more detailed description of trends in German household portfolios see Sommer (2005). 
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Cross-sectional age-profiles for the contribution of inheritances 
As mentioned above, it is impossible in most EVS cross-sections to distinguish wealth transfers 
from income transfers like e.g. alimony payments. Fortunately, the EVS 2003 allows us to 
separate inheritances from other transfers. In the following, we present results for a cross-
sectional distribution of received inheritances over age. Specifically, figure 19 depicts the averages 
of actual inheritances by income quartiles. The immense fluctuations indicate the difficulties 
involved in the measurement of such extremely rare events.28 Although the differences between 
the bottom income deciles are not significant for the majority of age-groups, the results suggest a 
certain income gradient in received inheritances.  
 
Figure 19: Cross-sectional age-profile for average inheritances by income quartile 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 2003 
 
 
We abstain from interpreting the age-pattern given the small number of observations at the 
bottom of the income distribution and the high degree of noise in the data. Table 3 therefore 
discards the context of age and focuses on the absolute and relative importance of inheritances 
for the different income quartiles at all ages. We find higher income households to expect 
substantially higher inheritances than households at the bottom of the income distribution. The 
                                                 
28 We dropped one extreme case for the bottom income quartile for the estimation. 
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stronger income gradient for the unconditional averages compared to the average actual 
inheritances implies that the rich are also considerably more likely to receive an inheritance in the 
first place. 
 
Table 3: Absolute and relative impact of bequests on wealth holdings by income quartile  
 income decile 
 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 
average annual (uncond.) bequests         
levels 1.90 € 8.94 € 67.22 € 945.52 € 
average implied wealth growth 0.03% 0.03% 0.17% 0.74% 
average annual actual bequests         
levels 2'927 € 3'065 € 6'551 € 27'097 € 
average implied wealth growth 51.4% 10.6% 17.1% 21.5% 
Source: own calculations based on the EVS 2003 
 
Putting these numbers in relation to wealth holdings, we arrive at similar results as Kohli et al. 
(2005) and Westerheide (2004). Specifically, the actual incidence of inheritances has a much 
stronger impact on recipients at the bottom of the income distribution than for their richer 
counterparts. In fact, inheritances boost total wealth among households from the bottom income 
quartile by an average of 51.4 percent. The corresponding effects for the next higher income 
classes range only between 10.6 and 21.5 percent. 
 
 
Issues and limitations of the above analysis 
In the absence of panel data, any life-cycle analysis will be based on less-than-ideal solutions like a 
synthetic panel. Especially the assumption that cohorts remain homogeneous over time is a 
questionable one. Above, we have already discussed the possible effects of changes to the 
household head and of differential mortality which we consider a minor concern for our analysis.  
However, the interpretation of the above results becomes delicate through our stratification of 
cohorts by income. Specifically, connecting the projections of equal income quartiles over age for 
a life-cycle interpretation is dangerous given the degree of mobility in the income distribution. 
That is, a considerable number of households will switch between different income quartiles over 
their life-cycle. An example are university graduates, who tend to enter the labor market several 
years later than the remaining population. Thus, these households will start from a rather low 
relative income position. Their subsequent life-cycle earnings path is steeper so that they will 
move up the income distribution. A similar case can be made for the job market exit. E.g. self-
employed households who do not receive a public pension may drop from an above average 
income level to rather low post-retirement incomes. Thus, our results can only be interpreted as 
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short run projections of average wealth growth of households at a certain age and a certain 
income position. If we nevertheless follow income quartiles over age, we will tend to 
underestimate wealth accumulation of households starting at the bottom of the income 
distribution and overestimate wealth accumulation at the top.  
The second important limitation of our analysis is connected to the assumptions involved in the 
projections. As our use of common average real returns is aimed at the estimation of stylized life-
cycle pattern of wealth accumulation, these projections are unqualified to replicate the actual 
year-to-year changes in wealth levels. Furthermore, we ignore important aspects of inequality 
within and between income quartiles. In fact, we most certainly underestimate the dispersion 
between income quartiles as we ignore a possible income gradient in asset returns due to different 
credit conditions and differences in financial literacy.  
Overall, our results certainly depend strongly on a small number of factors: The high saving rates 
which we observe for German households at all age-groups, their rather conservative asset 
allocation and the poor returns especially on housing wealth over the past decades. Consequently, 
the relative importance of active and passive savings can only be generalized to countries with 
similar characteristics. Vice versa, we would expect quite different results e.g. for the United 
States where real estate prices have evolved more favorably, where stocks are highly popular in 
household portfolios, and where saving rates are considerably lower. However, the case of 
Germany nicely illustrates the precarious wealth shrinkage in the case of leveraged real estate 
ownership with low or real estate returns. Only the high saving rates of German households have 
ultimately allowed a growth of net total wealth over the past decades. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we document the trends in inequality for Germany over the past twenty five years 
based on data from the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS). First of all, the results 
are prepared to provide a benchmark for future macroeconomic modeling which increasingly 
incorporates various forms of heterogeneity on behalf of the household sector. Against the 
background of demographic change, OLG models play a particularly important role in 
macroeconomic modeling. Thus, we take a great interest in the trends in inequality over the life-
cycle to provide these models with benchmarks for the calibration of life-cycle behavior. At the 
same time, our results can be employed to assess the prospects for inequality in an aging society.  
Like in most important economies, income, consumption and wealth inequality have been on the 
rise in Germany over the past decades. For international standards the growth in inequality has 
been comparatively moderate in Germany, but so have been the growth rates in the 
corresponding levels.  
Consumption inequality has been almost constant over the last decades. Important drivers of 
inequality have been the trend towards smaller households and the reunification. Correcting for 
household size and other observable household characteristics, the residual level of inequality has 
even declined slightly. Over the life-cycle we find a clear upward trend in consumption inequality. 
The prospects for consumption inequality are therefore dependent on two countervailing factors. 
The retirement of the baby boom generation will shift a large cohort away from the high pre-
retirement consumption levels. At the same time, consumption inequality within this important 
cohort can be expected to increase in upcoming years. 
For income inequality, we observe a distinct upward trend in inequality which has only leveled 
off between 1998 and 2003. The connections between income and consumption inequality seem 
to be sufficiently close to generate almost identical trends in the parts of inequality which can be 
explained by household characteristics. The main difference compared to income is the 
increasing rather than decreasing level of unexplained income dispersion. Looking at the results 
for income inequality over the life-cycle we find them to be somewhat sensitive to the chosen 
econometric specification. Only two aspects emerge pretty clearly: before age 30 and between age 
50 and 60, income inequality rises more strongly than for the remainder of the life-cycle. 
Furthermore the raw data suggests rather strong positive cohort effects between the cohorts born 
in 1930 and 1950. We observe them in the middle of their life-cycles, where the individual age 
trajectories in income inequality have shifted pretty strongly towards higher levels of inequality.   
Our results for wealth inequality differ considerably depending on whether we focus on financial 
wealth or total wealth. It turns out that financial wealth inequality has grown double as fast as 
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inequality in total wealth. Once again, a favorable development of inequality coincides with low 
growth rates – in this case for real estate wealth. Compared to income and consumption 
inequality, household characteristics can explain only a tiny part of the cross-sectional variation in 
wealth inequality. Looking at the life-cycle pattern of wealth inequality, the results once again 
depend strongly on the inequality measure and the econometric specification we choose. A closer 
look at the raw data confirms the different results but hints also at a possible explanation. 
Specifically, we find rather flat age-profiles and only little cohort differences based on the Gini 
coefficient, which is not very sensitive towards changes at the extremes of the distribution. The 
variance is much more sensitive to changes in the tails of the distribution and exhibits stronger 
cohort differences and upward sloping age-trajectories. This indicates that most of the grown 
inequality has happened at the extremes of the wealth distribution.  
We conclude this paper by supplementing the above life-cycle effects in inequality with a more 
detailed analysis of the drivers behind life-cycle wealth accumulation in Germany. To do so, we 
simulate wealth growth of households at different age-groups and with different positions in the 
income distribution by projecting their wealth growth based on active savings and their portfolio 
choice derived from our synthetic panel data. To arrive at stylized pattern of wealth 
accumulation, we apply average real returns to the observe portfolio allocation. In a second step, 
we elicit age-trajectories based on a simple regression. 
For active savings, we observe a strong income gradient. Except for the bottom income quartile 
which is largely unable to save, all households receive their strongest wealth growth through 
active savings. Total passive savings turn out to be dissavings over the entire working age and for 
all income groups. The reason are mortgages which are taken up with the purchase of a home 
and only paid back slowly towards retirement age. The actual real returns on housing wealth have 
been negative in Germany over the past decades. Given the large share of total wealth invested in 
the privately owned home the positive returns on financial wealth do not suffice to compensate 
the negative effects from leveraged real estate wealth. Overall, the real returns on financial wealth 
are rather poor and range between 1.3 percent for the top income decile and 0.7 percent for the 
lower income groups. The underlying reason is the asset allocation of German households which 
still holds fast to saving accounts and is cautious with respect to a higher exposure to the stock 
market.  
For inheritances we unfortunately only have cross-sectional data available. Based on the EVS 
2003 we show that the probability of receiving a bequest as well as the absolute amounts of 
wealth received increase strongly in income. The actual incidence of an inheritance has a much 
stronger impact on wealth growth for low income households though. These results are in line 
with the findings of Kohli et al. (2005) and Westerheide (2004). Yet over all households, the 
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importance of average inheritances for wealth growth turns out to be small. Only for the top 
income decile, the impact of inheritances is noticeable also for average wealth growth.  
Overall, our results on the relative importance of savings, portfolio returns and inheritances for 
wealth growth are certainly specific to the case of Germany. Especially for countries with lower 
saving rates and a less conservative asset allocation like most Anglo-American countries, we 
would expect quite different results. However, the unfortunate German case of negative real 
returns on real estate accentuates the risks involved in leveraged investments. Only the high 
saving rates have ultimately led to a growing stock of household wealth in Germany over the past 
decades. 
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Appendix I - graphs 
 
Figure A-1: Cohort analysis for the evolution of inequality in post-government income 
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Figure A-2: Cohort analysis for the evolution of inequality in non-durable consumption 
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Figure A-3a: Cohort analysis for the evolution of inequality in total net wealth 
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Figure A-3b: Cohort analysis for the evolution of inequality in total net wealth 
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Appendix II – assumptions and methodology 
 
In the following, we shortly describe the assumptions used for the projection of passive savings 
in section VI. We first tabulate the nominal rates of return and the inflation rates employed and 
then turn to the estimation of differential real estate returns by income quartiles. 
 
Nominal returns and inflation rates 
Table A-1 documents the nominal returns and inflation rates underlying our wealth growth 
projection in section six. We assume constant returns and interest rates for all cohorts at all ages. 
Only for real estate, we differentiate between returns in the different income deciles. 
 
Table A-1: Assumptions for nominal returns and inflation  
 income decile 
 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 
financial wealth         
saving accounts 3% 
building society saving contracts 3% 
stocks 8.30% 
other securities 5.95% 
life insurance 5% 
     
real estate 0.87% 1.08% 1.27% 1.54% 
     
debt         
consumer credit, installment credit 11.57% 
mortgages 7.04% 
     
inflation 1.90% 
Sources: MGI, Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations 
 
 
Estimating the rate of return on real estate for different income groups 
The EVS contains data on the market value of real estate wealth as well as detailed information 
on the primary residence. To avoid mixing price and quantity effects, we estimate prices per 
square meter based on the sample of households which owns only one piece of real estate. The 
compound annual nominal growth rates are then generated based on the median square meter 
prices of real estate in the respective income groups between 1988 and 2003. Figure A-4 
graphically illustrates the actual development of the square meter prices used for the above 
calculations in Euros (2001). 
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Figure A-4: Development of median square meter prices (in real terms) 
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 Chapter 5: 
 
Imputation and harmonization of income, 
consumption, savings and wealth data from 
the German Income and Expenditure 
Survey 
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I. Introduction 
 
The German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) has been the data basis to an extended 
literature on inequality and life-cycle analyses. The size and the richness of the individual cross-
sectional datasets with respect to income, consumption and wealth as well as its long tradition 
since the early 1960s have put the EVS into an exclusive position. Other datasets like the 
GSOEP have expanded their attention to wealth only recently or have started quite recently 
altogether (e.g. SAVE and SHARE). All these datasets will strongly improve the data situation in 
Germany with respect to savings and wealth. The GSOEP comes as a well established panel 
dataset and includes rich information on the households’ income and work history. The SAVE 
survey is focused on questions related to savings and investment behavior and adds an important 
dimension by including sociological and psychological questions. Last, SHARE focuses on the 
growing elderly population, includes information on health and social networks and allows an 
international comparison as the survey is implemented in 15 countries. While the future looks 
much brighter for research related to savings and wealth in Germany, much of today’s research 
still relies on the EVS.  
Key to successful analyses of longitudinal analyses of levels and distributions of any variable is 
the homogeneity of the variable over time. The homogeneity of a variable may be harmed in 
many ways, some of them subtle. The framing and the phrasing of a question may cause changes 
in households’ responses just as the interview mode. The effects are often hard to assess and 
even more difficult to correct for. Another obvious issue is changes to the questionnaire, some of 
which are inevitable, as new products arise and ought to be incorporated in a comprehensive 
survey. In this case, harmonized definitions can often be restored by simple recombination of 
variables into newly defined variables. Apart from such harmonization work, in the presence of 
missing data also imputations are necessary, before the data is ready for the actual analyses. 
Given that the EVS was originally intended for the construction of consumption baskets and the 
calculation of subsistence levels, comparability of variables, definitions and methodology was not 
the key criterion in the design of the individual cross-sectional surveys. Harmonization is 
therefore a key preparatory step to any work involving data from multiple years. But also missing 
data plays a role in the wealth section of the EVS. While the Federal Statistical Office has a 
tradition of providing fully imputed scientific use files, some key variables were not part of the 
questionnaire in the early years. Specifically, housing wealth and wealth in life insurance policies 
were not questioned until 1993. In recent years, the Federal Statistical Office has changed its 
approach towards wealth imputation. Thus also the two most recent surveys, 1998 and 2003, 
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contain missing wealth data. The necessary imputations of the 1998 and 2003 data have been 
carried out by Ammermüller et al. (2005). Their procedure mimics earlier imputations by the 
Federal Statistical office, but disregards the earlier cross-sections which are available as scientific 
use files. Further, none of these previous imputations is well documented nor is the imputed data 
flagged. Last, these procedures are knows to involve mean imputation which is dissatisfactory 
from a methodological point of view. We therefore suggest a regression based imputation 
approach which includes the addition of a stochastic component to preserve the dispersion of the 
imputed variables. 
Overall, our work aims to generate fully imputed data sets for the EVS years 1978 through 2003 
and provide comparable definitions on income, consumption, savings and wealth. Further, we 
investigate the influence of selected structural changes to the EVS. Specifically, we shed some 
light on the effects of the often criticized sampling threshold with respect to household income 
and the switch from an annual diary to quarterly ones between 1993 and 1998.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the missing variables in the different cross-
sections of the EVS and our imputation procedures. Section 3 discusses our decisions on the way 
to generate harmonized definitions of household income, consumption, savings and wealth. 
Section 4 investigates the effects of above mentioned conceptual changes on comparability over 
time. 
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II. Imputation 
 
Missing information is essentially only a problem in the wealth section of the EVS. Where 
household have refused or were unable to answer questions in the other sections, the data has 
been fully cleaned and imputed by the Federal Statistical Office. None of the imputation 
procedures is well documented though.  
Missing wealth data in the early EVS cross-sections – 1978 through 1988 – originates from voids 
in the questionnaire. Specifically, neither a sufficient question on wealth in life insurance 
contracts nor on real estate wealth is included. We are able to fill this gap using available 
covariates which are closely connected to the value of life insurance wealth and real estate wealth 
respectively. In recent years, the Federal Statistical Office abstained from imputing the wealth 
data. Specifically for the years 1998 and 2003, the user is provided with unimputed data. Filter 
questions on wealth ownership are included which allow us to apply a two-stage imputation 
procedure. The main difference between our imputation approaches for the early and the two 
most recent cross-sections is the data from which we gather the outside information for the 
imputation process. The imputation of the years 1998 and 2003 is based on contemporary 
information from complete observations. Given that certain wealth categories were not 
questioned in the years 1978 through 1988 we are missing information for all households in these 
years. We resolve this issue by drawing the necessary information from the neighboring 1993 
cross-section.  
Previous imputations of the early cross-sections have been made by Börsch-Supan et al. (1999), 
who employ an age-dependent ratio of surrender values to insurance sums to impute life 
insurance wealth. Similarly, they use average ratios of ratable values and market values to impute 
housing wealth. Both ratios are drawn from the 1993 cross-section. Ammermüller et al. (2005) 
focus on the imputation of the 1998 and 2003 cross-sections. Their procedure mimics earlier 
imputations by the Federal Statistical office, and involves the use of conditional means for cells 
of similar households. Thus, both procedures are limited in their ability to preserve the dispersion 
of the imputed variables and their correlation structure with other covariates. We therefore rely 
on regression based imputation methods which we adapt accordingly given the different 
conceptual problems at hand in the different years. 
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II.1 Imputation of the early cross-sections (1978-1988) 
The 1993 cross-section was the first to contain surrender values for life insurance contracts and 
market values for real estate property. Fortunately, the data from 1978 through 1993 shares a 
considerable amount of additional information on life insurance contracts and real estate. We 
exploit the connections between these variables and the actual wealth measures in the year 1993 
to impute the older data.  
Yet the use of outside information from a different year may entail some problems. Clearly, any 
imputation will impose the relations between the variables used in the imputation process from 
the outside data on the data to be imputed. Hence in our case, the imputed data from 1978 
through 1988 will inherit the characteristics of the joint distribution of the variables involved in 
the imputation process from the 1993 cross-section. The imputation should therefore rely on 
structural coherences which are largely time-invariant. If this can be successfully implemented, 
then changes in the distributions of the imputed variables (e.g. housing wealth) between 1978 
through 1993 will legitimately be driven by changes in the joint distribution of the variables 
involved in the imputation process (e.g. living space, ratable values, and characteristics of the 
building). Given that we cannot check the underlying assumptions of our imputation procedure, 
possible limitations are to be kept in mind when analyzing trends in the distribution of wealth 
data between 1978 and 1993. 
 
II.1.1 Wealth in life insurance contracts 
There are several ways in which the value of a life insurance policy could be measured. If we are 
interested in the actual value of the accumulated wealth, we should calculate the present value of 
the expected payouts from the contract – assuming that no further contributions would be made. 
There are two reasons why we might want to deviate from this measure. First, the wealth 
resulting from the above concept will not be available to its owner. The insurance company will 
only offer a lower surrender value.1 And second, the above measure will depend strongly on the 
assumptions about future access returns generated by the insurance company, which are credited 
to the contract.2 But also for reasons of availability of the desired information, most surveys 
question the surrender value of life insurance contracts which is part of the annual reports sent 
out by the insurance companies. 
                                                 
1 Taking out a credit to be paid back with the payments from the insurance contract the owner will also not be able 
to access the full present value. The reasons are credit costs, disagios, and the spread in interest rates. 
2 According to German laws 90 percent of the insurance companies’ profits have to be handed on to their 
customers’ contracts. 
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The surrender value was part of the EVS questionnaire in the years 1993 through 2003. The 
earlier cross-sections 1978 through 1988 questioned only the insurance sum. Fortunately, the 
1993 cross-section contains the surrender value and the insurance sum, as well as a large number 
of covariates allowing us to impute the missing information on the surrender values in the older 
cross-sections.  
 
Regression based imputation 
We estimate an OLS model for the surrender value of life insurance policies (sv) in 1993 (1) and 
use the regression results for the imputation of the years 1978 through 1988 (2). 
Our core explanatory variables (X) include the contributions made and the insurance sum. The 
latter is available as a categorical variable in the years to be imputed and as a continuous variable 
in 1993. For the estimation we translate the cutoff points of the brackets into 1993 values and 
mimic the equivalent brackets in the 1993 data. The brackets differ between the cross-sections 
1978 through 1988.3 This and the applied indexation yield slightly different regressions for the 
imputation of the three years with missing data. Otherwise, we use identical procedures for the 
imputation. 
 
( ) 1993,1993,1993,1993, , iiii uAXfsv +       (1) 
 
( ),,,1993, ititti AXfsv b    1988,1983,1978 t    (2) 
 
While the insurance sum tells us something about the ultimate volume of the insurance contract 
the contemporary contributions are an indicator for the savings that go into the contract and may 
– in relation to the insurance sum – be an indicator for the time span over which contributions 
are made. Specifically, observing a contract with small annual contributions relative to the 
insurance sum we can expect it to receive payments over many years, maybe even several 
decades. Vice versa for a contract with relatively large annual contributions. Yet without further 
knowledge about the inception date and the contribution history it will be quite difficult to assess 
how much wealth has been accumulated in the contract. Hence we include the age of the 
household members (A) to proxy for the contribution history. As we cannot attribute life 
insurance wealth to a specific household member, we try to capture the household composition 
                                                 
3 Table A-1 in the Appendix gives an overview over the changes in the categories which carry over to slightly 
different regressions in the imputation process. 
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by including count-variables for the number of adult household members in age-groups of 5-year 
width and a dummy specification for the number of children. The sample size of the EVS cross-
sections (between 40’000 and 60’000 households, among them roughly 50 percent holding wealth 
in life insurance contracts4) allows us to include interactions of our age-group counts with the 
core explanatory variables and among these variables. 
We deliberately exclude other sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables from the 
regression to minimize the effects of induced connections from the 1993 data. The main reason 
is that we are ultimately interested in the analysis of wealth, savings and investment behavior 
throughout the life-cycle. Including information on other wealth categories, income, marital and 
parental status we were able to increase the predictive power of our model only marginally. At 
the same time, the inclusion of variables like income may generate artifacts in the distribution of 
the imputed data. We give an example for this potential issue in the description of the imputation 
procedures around real estate wealth. With respect to the inclusion of age variables we decided in 
favor of an inclusion, as the theoretical connection between age and accumulated wealth in life 
insurance contracts turned out to be statistically important.5 
 
Stratified cold-deck error sampling 
All regression based imputation procedures will underestimate the true amount of variation in the 
missing variables unless measures are taken to compensate accordingly. Given the non-normal 
distribution and the heteroskedasticity of the error terms resulting from our estimation, we use a 
procedure, which can be described as cold-deck error sampling. Specifically, we draw from the 
distribution of error terms 1993,iu  resulting from our estimation based on 1993 data and add them 
to the predicted values tisv ,

 of the missing 1978-1988 data.  
In a first step, we keep only estimation errors within two standard deviations of the mean 
standard errors conditional on age to avoid draws of extreme outliers. This reduces the error 
sample by roughly 4 percent. Next, we draw from the errors using clustering to account for the 
complex structure of the error terms. The clusters are defined as a matrix of age-groups and the 
                                                 
4 For a detailed analysis on the prevalence of life insurance products in German households’ portfolios see Sommer 
(2007). 
5 The explained share of the variation in life insurance wealth decreased from 52.1 percent to 51.2 percent when 
dropping information on income, marital and parental status and other assets. This share declines to roughly 34 
percent if the age-structure of the household is dropped from the model. 
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categories of insurance sums described above.6 Clusters containing only a small number of 
observations are merged with neighboring clusters.7 From this procedure, we arrive at a final 
number of roughly 100-150 clusters for the actual imputation.8 Last, we re-draw errors from the 
same distribution when encountering errors outside the 95% confidence interval of the 
distribution of residuals in each age-group. This step becomes necessary, as some clusters are 
merged across age-groups.  
 
II.1.2 Housing Wealth 
Two different questions concerning housing wealth have been included in the EVS over the 
years. The first concerns the ratable value, which was questioned between 1978 and 1993. The 
main advantage of this value is that it is rather easily available to the household and a reliable 
figure, as it is used for the calculation of property taxes and hence not subject to subjective 
judgement. Unfortunately, the ratable value typically falls substantially below the market value 
although it is strongly correlated.9 For a good estimate of the actual value of a household’s real 
estate wealth we are better off in the EVS cross-sections since 1993, which incorporate questions 
on the actual market value. Being aware that this measure will contain a much larger 
measurement error it is still our preferred measure.10 Given the overlap in the questionnaires with 
respect to market and ratable values in the 1993 cross-section, we proceed much like in the case 
of life insurance wealth and exploit the variance covariance-structure in 1993 to impute the 
market values in the previous cross-sections using regression based imputation. 
                                                 
6 The age-groups are defined with 5-year width and based on the age of the household head. Head of household is 
the main earner. 
7 We strived to reach a minimum cluster size of 40-50 observations per cluster. Further, we try to merge only clusters 
with a comparable distribution of errors. For clusters involving small insurance sums, we mostly merged equal age-
groups with the neighboring insurance sum category. Among retired households we also merged across age-groups – 
especially among clusters with high insurance sums. 
8 Table A-2 in the Appendix gives an overview over the sample sizes and the number of clusters involved in the 
imputation process. 
9 The coefficient of correlation is roughly 65 percent in the 1993 cross-section which holds information on both, 
market and ratable values. On average, the ratable value made for 12 percent of the market value in the same year. 
10 Benitez-Silva et al. (2008) show e.g., that households tend to overestimate the value of their homes by 5-10 percent 
comparing them to actual sales data. 
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Regression based imputation 
We estimate an OLS model for the market value of the household’s real estate wealth based on 
the sample of property owners. We rely exclusively on information about the property and 
especially on the characteristics of the owner occupied home. In contrast to the case of wealth in 
life insurance contracts, the inclusion of information about the household composition, its age-
structure and the household members’ income seemed to hurt rather than help our purpose. To 
give an example: Assume that young households which are still in the workforce and earn larger 
incomes are part of cohorts which live in larger homes compared to their parents’ generation 
throughout their lifecycle. The inclusion of income variables – a positive and significant predictor 
of real estate wealth – will then pick up these cohort effects. The imputation of housing wealth in 
previous cross-sections would then imply higher levels of housing wealth for the older cohorts in 
their pre-retirement years. While the gains from including income and household composition 
variables in the imputation process seem small, there is reason to believe that the inclusion of 
such variables would induce artificial connections in the data.11 
The set of variables used in the imputation process includes the ratable value and the rental 
income of the property. The latter includes actual rental income as well as imputed rent for 
owner occupiers. Further, we include information on the size, the type and the age of the 
building, the city size and the heating system. Again, we take a uniform approach for the 
imputation of the years 1978, 1983 and 1988 and make minor adjustments depending on the 
harmonized definitions which can be established in 1993 and the individual year to be imputed.12 
Like in the case of life insurance wealth we exploit the size of the dataset to include various 
interactions of the above variables.  
Last, we correct our predicted values for a distinctive feature of ratable values. Specifically, for all 
buildings – independent of their year of construction – the ratable value denotes the hypothetical 
value of the building in the year 1964. Hence, our imputations will reproduce the relations 
between the market values and the deflated hypothetical values of this base year. Given that this 
relation has been inflated over time, we apply a correction factor to our results based on the rent 
price index.  
 
                                                 
11 The share of explained variation in the 1993 real estate market values decreased from 53 to 51 percent when 
skipping all the information related to the household members from the regression used for the imputation of the 
1978 data. The corresponding figures for the years 1983 and 1988 differ from the above by less than 2 percentage 
points.  
12 The appendix contains an overview over the information about the building used for the imputation (table A-2). 
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Cold-deck error sampling 
To restore the dispersion of the imputed data to a realistic level we draw from the distribution of 
errors generated in the regressions based on the 1993 data and add these error terms to our 
predicted values in the previous years. We refrain from using clusters as the errors show little if 
any signs of heteroskedasticity with respect to the age of the building or its ratable value. Hence, 
we only truncate the error sample at two standard deviations above and below zero. Similar to 
the case of life insurance wealth, roughly 4 percent of the observations from the error sample are 
lost because of this procedure.13 In a second step, we redraw from the errors if the imputed 
market value was negative or resulted in an unrealistic ratio of the ratable value to the market 
value.14 
                                                 
13 Table A-4 in the Appendix gives an overview over the sample sizes involved in the imputation process. 
14 We used the ratios between ratable values and market values in the 1993 cross-section as a reference and chose a 
maximum ratio of 0.5 to be realistic. 
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II.2 Imputation of the cross-sections 1998 and 2003 
As mentioned above, the Federal Statistical Office has abandoned the provision of fully imputed 
data in recent years. The incomplete data concerns only wealth but essentially all asset categories. 
For the years 1998 and 2003, the data contains filter questions on ownership. In 2003, this is the 
case for each asset and debt category. In 1998, the filter questions are less detailed – specifically, 
all financial assets are questioned in one filter question. Further, the 1998 questionnaire allowed 
households to answer the filter question with yes without indicating an actual amount of wealth. 
For 2003, we can further distinguish households which refused to answer the filter question. We 
impute both cross-sections using a similar approach: We start by checking the filter questions for 
consistency and make corrections where necessary.15 Next, we impute the filter question where 
households refused to answer. From this, we define the samples which are to receive actual 
wealth imputations by asset category. We employ regression based imputations on both stages, 
i.e. for the imputation of the ownership question and the imputation of actual wealth levels.  
 
II.2.1 Imputation of the ownership question 
In 2003, between 0.5 and 2 percent of the households refused to indicate whether or not they 
held certain assets. An exception is mortgages, where almost 30 percent of households did not 
answer the filter question (see table 1). The vast majority of these households does not own a 
home, thus they may just have considered the question inapplicable.  
We use a probit model to estimate the probability of households to hold certain assets or owe 
certain kinds of debt. Eymann (2000) has shown for the case of Germany, that unobserved 
factors like financial knowledge are important determinants of asset ownership. This generates 
correlations between the ownership of the various assets. We also observe these correlations in 
our data and therefore mutually include the ownership of other assets or debt in the imputation 
process. As the imputations become interdependent, we implement an iterative imputation 
process. Each iteration, all ownership variables are imputed successively, ordered by the number 
of missings in each asset category. Households are considered owners or non-owners if the 
predicted probabilities exceed or fall below 50 percent respectively. A round of iterations is 
completed as soon as the imputed ownerships remain unchanged for all households and asset 
categories. 
                                                 
15 Specifically, 64 households (~ 0.15 percent of all households) indicated to hold zero housing wealth, but declared 
receiving rental payments, contributing to maintenance reserve funds, owing mortgages etc.  
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The first round of iterations includes ownership dummies for all other assets. It eliminates 82.5 
percent of all missing data points. The remaining belong to observations with multiple missings. 
Round by round we drop more ownership variables from the imputation model until all 
ownership variables are fully imputed. Last, we rerun the full specification with all ownership 
variables to allow the structure of multiple ownerships to be conveyed also to those observations 
with multiple missings, which had been imputed using the restricted model.16  
 
Table 1: Effects of the imputation on asset and debt ownership (EVS 2003) 
  
real 
estate 
building 
soc. 
savings 
contracts 
other 
assets 
with 
banks 
saving 
accounts securities 
mort-
gages 
con-
sumer 
credit 
ownership        
yes 25623 21101 18335 32928 20081 15397 6904 
no  16922 21286 23541 9383 22337 14688 35475 
dont 
know / 
refuse 
135 357 868 433 326 12659 365 
recodes 64 - - - - - - 
% miss. 0.5% 0.8% 2.0% 1.0% 0.8% 29.6% 0.9% 
without 
imputation 
total 42744 42744 42744 42744 42744 42744 42744 
yes 25734 21196 18530 33342 20144 16033 6904 with 
imputation no  17010 21548 24214 9402 22600 26711 35840 
         
growth of owner-HHs        
  0.4% 0.5% 1.1% 1.3% 0.3% 4.1% 0.0% 
        
ownership rates        
before imputation 50.07 43.2% 38.8% 75.3% 40.2% 41.3% 15.1% 
imputed obs. 45.55 17.8% 16.8% 93.9% 13.9% 3.6% 0.0% 
after imputation 50.05 43.0% 38.3% 75.6% 40.0% 28.0% 14.9% 
        
Source: Own calculations based on EVS 2003 
 
 
The resulting ownership rates for the fully imputed data change only marginally compared to the 
raw data (see the bottom part of table 1). The obvious reason is the small overall number of 
refusals. A clear exception is the ownership rate of mortgages. As mentioned above, the vast 
majority of refusing households does not own a home. The share of households owing 
mortgages drops correspondingly from 41.3 percent in the raw data to 28 percent in the imputed 
data. Despite the small overall effect of the imputation on estimated ownership rates, we observe 
                                                 
16 For 2003, this last round causes a total of 21 changes counting all six categories together. For the entire 
imputation, 24 iterations were necessary.  
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substantial differences in the estimated ownership rates of the denier households compared to 
the remaining sample. Somewhat surprisingly at first, the differences take different directions for 
the individual asset categories.  
Investigating the characteristics of the denier households, we find them to be older and earn 
lower incomes than the remaining sample (see table 2). Further, the share of household heads 
with no educational attainment is considerably higher among the deniers. The facts that saving 
accounts play a more important role in the portfolios of older cohorts and at the bottom of the 
income distribution suggest that the diverging effects of the imputation on ownership rates is no 
reason for concern. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of households with missing wealth observations 
 
real 
estate 
building 
soc. 
savings 
contracts 
other 
assets 
with 
banks 
saving 
accounts securities 
mort-
gages 
con-
sumer 
credit 
 
       
age of household head 
missing 56.6 58.0 55.4 53.5 59.0 49.1 57.9 
non-missing 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 52.7 51.4 
       
post government income 
missing 22'601 € 22'794 € 24'882 € 23'573 € 23'756 € 23'561 € 24'131 € 
non-missing 29'550 € 29'580 € 29'623 € 29'586 € 29'562 € 32'729 € 29'564 € 
       
share of household heads without educational attainment 
missing 12.7% 12.2% 11.3% 14.4% 11.6% 7.9% 10.2% 
non-missing 6.2% 6.2% 6.1% 6.2% 6.2% 5.4% 6.2% 
 
       
Source: Own calculations based on EVS 2003 
 
 
II.2.2 Imputation of wealth holdings 
With the ownership question imputed we turn to the missings in actual wealth holdings and find 
the share of missings in the 1998 and the 2003 cross-section to range between 0.1 and 2.6 percent 
of all observations. For the imputation, we take separate approaches for housing wealth and all 
other kinds of assets and debt. For both cases, we employ OLS regressions among households 
which have been identified as owners and use hot-deck error sampling to restore the dispersion 
of the imputed data.  
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Housing wealth 
For housing wealth we applied the established imputation procedure of the early cross-sections 
1978-88. We base our regressions upon the contemporary information on the coherences 
between the market values, rental incomes, rateable values, building characteristics, and several 
interactions between the aforesaid variables.17 Among the building characteristics are the size and 
age of the primary residence as well as its location – proxied by city size and states. Obviously, 
this approach has its limits for households owning several pieces of real estate and renters who 
own property. At the same time, the non-responding households tend to have lower incomes and 
are thus rather unlikely to own multiple pieces of property. 
 
Financial wealth 
Given the near log-normal distribution of wealth holdings, we convert all measures of wealth and 
debt involved in the estimation into logs. For the prediction of actual wealth and debt levels we 
employ the correction factor suggested by Bakersville (1972) to compensate for the antilog-bias.18  
We successively impute the individual asset and debt classes, starting with those asset classes with 
the least missings. Like in the case of ownerships, we mutually include actual asset and debt 
holdings in all categories in the regression model. Again, the imputations become interdependent 
and we iterate over the identical regression and imputation steps until convergence.19 To 
overcome the problem of multiple missings, we first exclude individual asset categories from the 
regressions. For the next round of iterative imputations, we generate intermediate subtotals of 
total debt and gross wealth which we include in the regression instead of the individual asset 
holdings. This allows us to generate a preliminarily imputed dataset. Last, we use these 
preliminary asset and debt holdings to rerun the initial imputation model. Thereby, we allow the 
complex interdependencies of the asset allocation to be conveyed also to those observations with 
multiple missings, which had been imputed using the restricted models. 
                                                 
17 For 1341 observations also the rateable value is missing. For these cases, we apply the same imputation algorithm 
and exclude the according variable and its interactions. 
18 Beauchamp and Olson (1973) have shown that the procedure proposed by Bakersville (1972) still does not 
eliminate the full bias but concede that the bias is small unless the variance is quite large. We carried out some 
comparative checks with an unbiased estimator. We found the differences to be comparatively small and thus 
decided for the more parsimonious calculations. 
19 We define convergence as achieved if for all asset categories the sum of absolute changes from the previous to the 
actual iteration is less than one 0.1 percent of the mean asset holdings in this category. The entire imputation took 
roughly 100 iteration steps. 
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The imputation procedure for the 1998 cross-section differs slightly from the 2003 procedure. 
This is due to the fact that in 1998, the filter question only allows us to identify households that 
indicated holding some kind of financial wealth without filling in amounts. Unlike in 2003, a 
more detailed breakdown of refusals by asset category is not possible. For 1998, we therefore 
impute wealth only at a rather general level. Specifically, we use the categories gross financial wealth, 
life insurance wealth, and consumer credits.20 Mortgages turn out to be fully imputed in 1998 just as life 
insurance wealth in 2003. 
 
Hot-deck error sampling 
For all kinds of assets and debt, we draw from the distribution of errors generated in the 
regressions and add these error terms to the predicted values of the imputed observations. 
Contrary to the procedure described above for the imputation of the years 1978-88, we use a hot-
deck procedure as we are also using contemporary information for our imputations. The 
procedure itself is quite alike though: We truncate the error sample at two standard deviations 
above and below zero. If the final imputed values turn out negative, we redraw individual errors 
until we arrive at positive values. 
 
Effects of the imputation on net household wealth 
For 2003, the imputation raises average net household wealth by 5.6 percent (see table 3). The 
largest increase is in real estate wealth, which increases by roughly 7’500 Euros or 6.9 percent. 
Also mortgages are heavily underestimated in the unimputed data. Here, the increase amounts to 
almost 5 percent. Overall, the imputation leaves households with higher levels of net real wealth. 
The imputation effects are substantially lower for all components of financial wealth at a 
weighted average of 1.6 percent. Average outstanding debt in consumer credits is largely 
unaffected by the imputation. 
As mentioned above, the 1998 cross-section required a slightly adapted imputation approach, as 
no breakdown of unreported financial wealth into asset classes is available. Table 4 gives an 
overview over the effects of the imputation on average wealth holdings for the year 1998. Life 
insurance wealth increases by 4.3 percent, other financial wealth by 1.1 percent. This leads to an 
overall jump in gross financial wealth of 2 percent. On the liabilities side, the raw data 
underestimates average consumer credits by 6.4 percent. Real estate and mortgages contain no 
                                                 
20 For 2003, the category gross-financial wealth is broken down further into four subcategories which we employ directly 
in the imputation process. The other categories are equally used in both years. 
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missings in 1998, so that net total wealth is rather little affected by the imputation compared to 
2003.  
 
Table 3: Effects of the imputation on average wealth and debt levels (2003) 
 
before 
imputation 
after 
imputation % change 
real estate 110'533 € 118'116 € + 6.9% 
 + gross financial wealth 40'578 € 41'210 € + 1.6% 
saving accounts 7'758 € 7'947 € + 2.4% 
building society 
savings contracts 2'543 € 2'646 € + 4.1% 
other assets with 
banks 8'275 € 8'493 € + 2.6% 
securities 10'652 € 10'774 € + 1.1% 
life insurance 11'350 € 11'350 € n.a. 
= gross total wealth 151’112€ 159'326 € + 5.4% 
- total debt 25'422 € 26'622 € + 4.7% 
mortgages 24'212 € 25'401 € + 4.9% 
consumer credit 1'210 € 1'221 € + 0.9% 
= net total wealth 125'690 € 132'704 € + 5.6% 
Source: own calculations based on EVS 2003 
Note: weighted results in EUR 2003 
 
 
Table 4: Effects of the imputation on average wealth and debt levels (1998) 
 
before 
imputation 
after 
imputation % change 
real estate 100'980 € 100'980 € n.a. 
+ gross financial wealth 31'852 € 32'496 € + 2.0% 
life insurance 9'439 € 9'846 € + 4.3% 
other financial 
assets 22'413 € 22'649 € + 1.1% 
= gross total wealth 132'832 € 133'475 € + 0.5% 
- total debt 19’877 € 19'962 € + 0.4% 
mortgages 18'570 € 18'570 € n.a. 
consumer credit 1'308 € 1'392 € + 6.4% 
= net total wealth 112'955 € 113'514 € + 0.5% 
Source: own calculations based on EVS 1998 
Note: weighted results in EUR 1998 
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Obviously, the effects of the imputation on household wealth holdings are more complex than 
describable by just the changes in mean wealth levels. Figure 1 gives some more insights: 
Displayed are the absolute and relative changes in net wealth percentiles caused by the 
imputation. In absolute terms, the imputation has the strongest impact on the upper half of the 
distribution – the 43rd to the 98th percentile are all shifted by at least 5000 Euros. In relative 
terms, the importance of the imputation is just reversed. The bottom 10 percent of the 
distribution have zero or negative wealth. Imputation accounts for 25 to 100 percent of the shift 
of the following 10 percentiles. From the 20th up to the 60th percentile, the imputation had a 
rather uniform effect on the distribution. Without imputation the wealth levels of this part of the 
wealth distribution would be approximately 20 percent lower. The relative importance of the 
imputation steadily declines towards the top end of the distribution. 
 
Figure 1: Effects of the imputation on the distribution of net total wealth (2003) 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EVS 2003 
Note: relative change is defined as the difference between post- and pre-imputation wealth levels as a 
share of post-imputation wealth. 
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Comparative evaluation of the imputation 
Comparing the results of our imputations to the work of Ammermüller et al. (2005) we find only 
little differences for 1998 as regards the sample means. Also for 2003, our results are broadly in 
line with their work.  
Like us, Ammermüller et al. use separate imputation approaches for housing wealth and financial 
wealth. They propose two different imputation schemes for the imputation of financial wealth: In 
the first scheme only those observations are imputed where the presence of assets in a certain 
category is known and the actual value is unknown. The alternative scheme also imputes those 
observations where the filter question also remained unanswered. Remember that we use a two-
stage approach, in the first stage of which the filter question is imputed. Thus, our results can be 
expected to end up between the two approaches suggested by Ammermüller et al., which proves 
to be true: Their two schemes increase gross financial wealth in 2003 by 1 and 4.1 percent 
respectively compared to 1.6 percent in our imputations.  
For part of real wealth, Ammermüller et al. applied three different imputation schemes. The first 
only imputes those observations where ratable values are available. The actual imputation applies 
a scaling factor to deduce the market values from ratable values. The second approach also deals 
with those households who are known to hold housing wealth but did not indicate ratable values. 
For the additional households, Ammermüller et al. apply mean imputation for groups of similar 
households in similar buildings. Those households who did not answer the filter question on real 
estate ownership remain unimputed also in this second approach. Only the third approach deals 
with these cases where the actual ownership is uncertain. Instead of imputing the ownership 
question, they estimate average real wealth holdings based on a reduced dataset. They drop the 
uncertain cases and a random selection of households which are known to hold no real estate. 
They choose the number of dropped non-owners such that the share of real estate owners in the 
sample remains. Their underlying assumption is that the share of real estate owners and the 
distribution of real estate wealth is the same among households who answered the filter question 
and those who did not. We estimate the share of real estate owners to differ only slightly in the 
two samples – 45 percent among the refusers, 50 percent among the remaining households. Our 
estimated wealth levels differ substantially though, just as expected by Ammermüller et al. in their 
discussion of the different approaches. Specifically, the average imputed wealth level of the 
owners among the households refusing to answer the filter question is 45% lower than the 
average real estate wealth among all other real estate owning households. The average post-
imputation gross real wealth estimated by Ammermüller et al. reaches 112’438 € and 119’494 € 
using the first and the second approach respectively. Our result of an average real estate wealth of 
118’116 € is the same order of magnitude but slightly lower than one might expect given that the 
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second approach by Ammermüller et al. still leaves roughly 200 observations unimputed. We 
suspect at least part of the stronger wealth growth in their imputation to be caused by their 
choice of mean imputation. We find imputed real estate wealth to be roughly 20 percent lower 
than wealth reported by the households. This is matched by a 23 percent lower average level of 
post-government income.21 
Overall, we find our results with respect to average post-imputation wealth levels to be largely in 
line with this earlier work – despite the different methodological approaches. As the EVS data is 
quite frequently also employed for distributional analyses, the procedures of these previous 
imputations seem unsatisfactory though. Especially the use of mean imputation and the lack of a 
stochastic component in the imputation process will lead to a reduced level of dispersion in 
household wealth holdings. Further, only a regression based imputation approach will be able to 
preserve the connections between wealth holdings and other socioeconomic variables, which is a 
necessary basis for subsequent multivariate analyses.  
 
 
                                                 
21Note that income is not part of the regressions involved in our imputation of real wealth, as we have illustrated 
above. 
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III. Harmonization of  EVS data 
 
As we have mentioned before, Germany is still lacking a longitudinal data source which would be 
suited for life-cycle considerations of income, wealth, savings and consumption.22 The use of a 
synthetic panel based on the German income and expenditure survey (EVS) causes some 
complications but also the EVS sample itself is not free of conceptual issues. In the following, we 
will focus on issues which arise because of changes to the questionnaire before we turn to 
conceptual issues in section 4. The changes concern the level of detail at which asset, income, and 
consumption categories are questioned. We observe both, an increasing and a decreasing level of 
detail for different variables over time. Furthermore, the household diary was switched from an 
annual to a quarterly time frame. In the following we provide comparable definitions which can 
be applied to all available cross-sections of the EVS. 
 
III.1 Income 
Although the EVS was originally intended for the construction of consumption baskets, the level 
of detail at which income is questioned is enormous. The data allows us to distinguish household 
income by source and by person. Incomes from a number of sources, which are difficult to 
attribute to a single person, tend to be questioned for the entire household. Examples are asset 
income or child benefits. Where income is available at the individual level, up to six persons in 
each household are questioned. If more people live in the household, there is no income data 
available for these further individuals. The share of households with more than six adult 
members was 0.01 percent over the years 1978-2003 though. In absolute numbers we are talking 
about 30 households out of a total 267’434 in the pooled sample. 
Where possible we start by harmonizing the individual level income data. To arrive at 
harmonized definitions we group income categories to the smallest common summary category 
and adjust quarterly and annual measures. We will come back to the issues connected to the 
switch from annual to quarterly data between 1993 and 1998. 
                                                 
22 The GSOEP provides a well established database for analyses of income dynamics. In 2002 and 2007, a wealth 
questionnaire was added. The savings questions are insufficient though and consumption is not questioned in the 
GSOEP. The other longitudinal datasets like SHARE and SAVE also contain no or only little consumption data. 
Further, their panel dimension is rather short so far. SHARE is additionally focused on the elderly and therefore only 
suited for a restricted area of life-cycle and inequality analyses. 
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Once the individual variables are harmonized we generate aggregate variables in two dimensions: 
subtotals and totals by person and household incomes by income categories. The subtotals are 
generated for the following income categories, for each of which we describe the key definitions 
and harmonization decisions made:23 
 
Income from dependent employment 
Our core definition of employment income includes all regular payments from the main 
occupation and possible secondary jobs as well as irregular payments. The latter include 
Christmas bonuses and other bonuses, settlement payments, employer co-payments to private 
and voluntary public health insurance as well as employers’ contributions to employees’ savings 
schemes. As non-cash income components can only be separated from other income for the 
years 1998 and 2003, we also include these payments in kind in our definition of income.24 But 
there are also important conceptual reasons to do so. First, any income related analysis cannot 
ignore payments in kind as they may substitute for pecuniary payments. Excluding the monetary 
value of payments in kind would lead to an underestimation of wages in a labor market analysis 
or underestimate financial opportunities and the economic wellbeing of the household in an 
inequality context. Second, induced by the household budget, also analyses of consumption and 
savings are affected if payments in kind are disregarded. They generate consumption utility and 
are therefore correctly comprised in household consumption in the EVS. The difference between 
income and consumption being savings payments in kind have to be equally treated as part of 
household consumption and income. Otherwise, the reception of payments in kind instead of 
pecuniary payments would per se change household savings. 
 
Income from self-employment 
Whereas theoretical considerations would suggest splitting income from self-employment into 
work income and asset income depending on the degree to which the self-employed work is 
capital intensive, this distinction is rarely implemented in practice.25 We follow the EVS definition 
                                                 
23 For a more detailed overview over possible harmonized definitions in the EVS, see the appendix. 
24 In 2003, only 0.68 percent (weighted) of the households indicated having received incomes in kind for dependent 
work. For these households, such incomes in kind account on average for roughly 3 percent of their dependent work 
income. 
25 Assumptions about the production technology would have to be made and information on the capital stock 
involved is necessary. Like in most other household surveys, no such information is available in the EVS framework. 
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and consider all income from various kinds of self-employment in this category. They include 
farm income, service-, trade- and industrial-business income as well as income from work in 
private practice, e.g. of lawyers and doctors. Note, that we also include private withdrawals from 
the business in our definition of income from self-employment. While we would conceptually 
consider private withdrawals equivalent to a sale of assets such distinction is rendered impossible 
by the construction of variables within the EVS. Specifically, only the 2003 cross-section allows 
us to separate withdrawals and other income from self-employment. Income from partial or full 
sales of private businesses can be distinguished in all years and is not included in the above 
definition. 
 
Public transfers 
The notion of public transfers contains a large number of quite heterogeneous payments. We 
therefore define the following harmonized subcategories: public pensions, health related public 
transfers, unemployment related public transfers, public support transfers, and a residual category 
of other public transfers. 
Public pensions include payments from the public pension system, pensions for civil servants and 
veterans’ pensions. All three include both, pensions from own employment history as well as 
survivors pensions. Further, we also subsume foreign pensions and pensions paid by the public 
accident insurance into this category.  
Health related public transfers comprise civil servants’ health assistance, regular and irregular 
payments from the public health insurance, sickness benefits, maternity benefits, as well as 
subsidies from the public pension scheme to voluntary public or private health and long term 
care insurance. Also payments from the long term care insurance are included. 
We define unemployment related public transfers to include all kinds of unemployment benefits 
and payments intended to support reentry into the job-market, as well as old age part-time 
payments. 
The public support payments include child benefits and child raising benefits, social welfare, 
housing benefits, payments from European social funds, and advance payments for alimony.  
Finally, we generate a residual category of other and unclassified public transfers. It includes 
apprenticeship grants, home owners’ benefits and compensations for damage and losses during 
and immediately after the Second World War.26 But also selected income categories are included 
which we would want to assign to one of the above categories if they were not grouped together 
                                                 
26 The German term is “Lastenausgleichsrenten”. 
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in a way which prevents us from doing so. Generally, all of the above subcategories should be 
available and comparable across years except for some minor inevitable discrepancies. 
 
Private transfers and private pensions 
Our definition of private transfers refers to all kinds of non-government payments received 
without involving a defined work-effort. Hence alimony payments, gifts, inheritances, strike 
support payments from unions, as well as support from churches and other charitable institutions 
are included. We also subsume payments from private insurance contracts in this category. 
Excluded are only payments from private life-insurance contracts and any pension payments for 
which we generate an independent subtotal.   
Although Germans’ pension income still largely relies on public pensions, there is a variety of 
private and occupational pension schemes which are included in this last income category. 
Specifically, it comprises pensions from private insurance contracts, as well as a number of 
employment related pensions which differ in the extent to which they are based on employers’ or 
employees’ contributions. First, there are occupational pensions for certain groups of self-
employed, e.g. for lawyers, doctors and farmers. Second, there are occupational pensions from 
medium- and large-sized firms. Last, there are additional private pensions for employees in the 
civil service.  
Note that we deviate from previous work in that we include private pensions in private pension 
income. Conceptually, we treat the start of a private pension as lump-sum dissaving of life 
insurance wealth which is then turned into an annuity. The resulting stream of private pension 
payments is then considered as income. Our main reasons not to split the annuity income into 
dissavings and asset income as suggested by Börsch-Supan et al. are the following:27 First, the 
individual has no longer access to the underlying wealth once it is turned into an annuity and 
neither a surrender value (which does not exist in the payout phase) nor a present discounted 
value of the future pension payments shows up on the household balance sheet. Hence, treating 
part of the annuity as dissaving would not result in a corresponding reduction in household 
wealth. And second, given the lack of detailed information about the underlying insurance 
contract, any estimation splitting the annuity into asset income and dissaving seems rather at hoc. 
Note further, that the definitions of the two above categories – private transfers and private 
pensions – cannot be entirely harmonized across years. The sum of the two categories is 
consistently defined across years though. 
                                                 
27 Börsch-Supan et al. (1999) split annuity incomes into dissavings (2/3) and asset income (1/3).  
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Asset income 
The EVS allows a separation of several categories of asset income except for 1978. Specifically, 
we can distinguish interest payments, dividends and income from other kinds of shares. The sum 
of these three categories defines our notion of gross financial asset income. Adding rental income 
we arrive at gross total asset income. Analogous to the case of non-cash income we treat imputed 
rent from owner occupied housing as part of income and consumption. We further define net 
total asset income by deducting interest payments for outstanding mortgages. An analogous 
treatment of interest payments for consumer credits is not straightforward as the EVS 
questionnaire summarizes credit repayments and interest payments in one question. At the same 
time, it seems questionable whether households would be able to distinguish the two, as most 
consumer credits are installment plans with constant monthly rates where interest rates tend to 
be published only for advertisement purposes. We treat the installment payments entirely as 
savings. While this might cause inconsistencies with the wealth questionnaire, which asks about 
outstanding consumer credits, we expect households to fill in the sum of remaining payments in 
the case of installment plans as argued above.  
 
Deductions from income 
The deductions from income can be broadly split into tax payments and contributions to the 
social security system. Taxes include income tax, as well as the connected church tax and 
“solidarity tax”. The latter was introduced following the German reunification and was officially 
intended to finance the unification costs. Further, there are wealth taxes, estate and gift taxes, and 
other taxes like car, dog, fishing and hunting taxes. Conceptually, we would consider wealth, gift, 
and estate taxes deductions from income, whereas car, dog, fishing and hunting taxes should be 
treated as consumption expenditures. Unfortunately, we can only distinguish wealth taxes from 
the other taxes.28 Hence, we treat all these taxes as deductions from income. Further, we include 
the taxes imposed on landlords who received tax favors for engaging in the construction of social 
housing but rent out to non-eligible renters. Last, we calculate net tax payments by deducting tax 
refunds. 
The second group of deductions concerns all compulsory contributions to the public health 
insurance, the public pension system, the public unemployment insurance and the public long 
term care insurance. A debatable question is whether to include voluntary contributions to the 
                                                 
28 The procedures of wealth taxation were judged unjust in 1995. Since 1997 then the taxation of wealth was 
suspended.  
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social security system – e.g. by self-employed individuals – in the deductions or not. While they 
are free to contribute to the public pension system or to save privately – e.g. in a life insurance 
contract – we decided to include these voluntary contributions nevertheless. There are several 
reasons to do so: First, both payments go to the government sector and should hence be treated 
equally for the calculation of “post government income”. Second, consider the alternatives: If the 
voluntary contributions are not considered deductions from income, they either have to be 
treated as savings or as consumption. Treating them as savings would imply the accumulation of 
some kind of capital. In the case of voluntary contributions to the public pension system we 
might consider the accrued pension claims social security wealth. Again it seems unreasonable 
not to treat compulsory and voluntary contributions alike. Treating them as consumption would 
imply that two otherwise equal households – one contributing compulsorily and the other 
voluntarily – would differ in their consumption expenditures causing misleading results on actual 
consumption inequality. Last, we will not be able to distinguish payments from the system to the 
individual depending on whether she is compulsory or voluntarily insured. That is, even if we 
treated payments to the system differently, payments from the system would have to be treated 
equally. 
 
Market income 
We define market income to be the sum of gross incomes from employment. I.e. we include all 
kinds of income from dependent work as well as from self-employment. Neither taxes nor 
contributions to the social security system are deducted. To ensure comparability of incomes 
from self-employment and dependent employment, also employers’ contributions to the social 
security system should be included. While this procedure is also recommended by the Canberra 
Group (2001), it has often not been carried out – largely for reasons of the work involved. Only 
recently, the Sachverständigenrat (2007) ignored employers’ contributions to the social security 
system and we follow their approach. Generally, the concept of market incomes is especially 
suited for any analysis focused on wages.  
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Pre-government income29 
Adding private transfers, private pensions and asset income to the above definition of market 
income, we arrive at pre-government income. This notion can be considered the hypothetical 
situation without a government sector (and without behavioral reactions). 
 
Post-government income 
Pre-government income and post-government income differ by the amount of taxes and social 
security contributions paid as well as tax refunds and any kind of public transfers. The 
comparison of pre- vs. post-government income allows us to estimate the net contribution of 
private households to the financing of the public sector. At the individual level, the same 
comparison illustrates the amount of redistribution.  
 
 
III.2 Wealth 
Also the asset questionnaire of the EVS has seen some changes. Surprisingly, most of the 
changes have not been caused by the introduction of new products. Instead, a few asset 
categories have been grouped together in 1993 reducing the level of detail at which we can 
generate harmonized definitions which are applicable for all years. For any analysis based on 
these harmonized definitions it should be kept in mind that an increasing level of detail at which 
households are questioned about their assets has been shown to increase the amount of wealth 
reported (see Juster, Smith and Stafford (1999)). 
 
Financial Wealth 
We define gross financial wealth as the sum of assets held with banks, in building society saving 
contracts, and in securities. Assets held with banks mostly include saving accounts, saving 
certificates, and term deposits. The securities include stocks, government and commercial bonds, 
as well as mutual funds. Note that also mutual funds on housing assets are included. Further, we 
add the surrender value of life insurance wealth. The EVS cross-sections 1998 and 2003 
additionally include privately lent out money, and for 1993 we have additional information on 
                                                 
29 Note that for the project “Cross-sectional facts for Macroeconomists”, we deviate from the definitions of pre- and 
post-government income in that we exclude real estate income in both cases. 
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checking account balances.30 We include neither in our definition of financial wealth for reasons 
of comparability. For a comprehensive measure of financial wealth we are also lacking cash 
holdings, which the EVS like most other surveys has never questioned. Deducting outstanding 
consumer credits we arrive at our definition of net financial wealth.  
 
Real Wealth 
A comprehensive definition of real wealth would include housing and business equity, as well as 
valuables and durable goods. For reasons of data availability we restrict our definition of real 
wealth to housing equity. Especially the lack of business equity will have effects on evaluations of 
wealth inequality as it likely accounts for a large share of private wealth among business owners. 
Unfortunately, the EVS only included questions on business wealth in the year 1983 and referred 
to fiscal values instead of market values. For part of valuables some data is available on purchases 
and sales. We also know about the existence and number of certain durable goods, e.g. cars, 
fridges or dishwashers but no information about their value is included.  
As mentioned above, we therefore define gross real wealth to be the market value of all pieces of 
real estate owned by the household. To arrive at net real wealth, we deduct the amount of 
outstanding mortgages.  
 
III.3 Consumption 
The level of detail at which the EVS questions consumption expenditures is enormous. 
Additionally, the Federal Statistical Office provides thematic subtotals, namely expenditures for 
food, apparel, rent, energy, furniture and household appliances, health and body care, traffic and 
communications, education and leisure, and a few rather mixed categories. A number of 
expenditures have been grouped in different categories over time so that the more detailed 
consumption categories turn out quite helpful for the construction of harmonized definitions. 
Regrouping the above categories provided by the Federal Statistical Office, we define 
harmonized variables and calculate subtotals for non-durable and durable consumption.  
                                                 
30 In 1993, the average balance on up to five checking accounts owned by the household was 1402 EUR (2001) in 
the Western and 2224 EUR (2001) in the Eastern states. Adding this to our above definition of household gross 
financial wealth would generate increases of 3.8% in the West and of 17.3% in the East. 2% of West Germans and 
1% of East Germans indicated not having a checking account. 
Including privately lent out money to the definition of gross financial wealth would imply increases of about 1.6-
1.8% which neither differ much between West and East nor between 1998 and 2003. In absolute terms privately lent 
out money accounts for an average 531 and 735 EUR (2001) in 1998 and 2003 respectively. 
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Like for the case of income a general note is necessary concerning the treatment of free 
consumption. The early cross-sections of the EVS included free consumption in the respective 
expenditure categories and simultaneously included such incomes in kind in the definition of 
income. We follow this procedure for the later years although a distinction of actual consumption 
expenditures and free consumption is possible to an increasing extent. Apart from the objective 
to generate definitions which are consistent over time any analysis which refers to utility and not 
exclusively to expenditures should include free consumption. 
 
Durable and non-durable consumption 
We generate the following thematic consumption categories, which can immediately be attributed 
to durable or non-durable consumption: Food, clothes, energy, health, bodycare, travel, communication, 
education, rent, and household services all count exclusively as non-durable consumption. Furniture and 
real estate maintenance are the only consumption categories which are considered durable 
consumption only. The categories leisure, vehicles and the residual category miscellaneous are mixed 
categories which have to be split into durable and non-durable sub-categories. 
Among the non-durable consumption categories food includes both, expenditures for food at 
home and for food away. Clothes include purchases of apparel and shoes whereas dry-cleaning, 
repairs and alternations of clothes are part of household services. In the latter, also expenditures for 
household articles and housekeeping are included. Energy includes all expenditures for heating 
and electricity. Fees for doctors, dentists, nurses and other medical services, as well as 
expenditures for pharmaceuticals and health related equipment constitute the health category. 
Bodycare is a rather small category which comprises expenditures for hairdressers as well as for 
equipment and items associated with bodycare. Travel includes expenditures for holidays as well 
as for business travel. All expenditures for telecom, internet and postal services are part of 
communication. Note that telephone and computer equipment are not included. The popular 
bundling of phones and telecom services in recent years may blur the intended separation 
though. Unfortunately, a different approach is hampered by the definitions of electronic devices 
in the EVS. Education includes student fees, as well as fees for extracurricular courses and 
coaching. Further, we also count expenditures for child care, kinder gardens, books and writing 
material as education. Last, there is one of the 
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households – housing. We define rent to comprise both, actual rental payments of tenants and 
hypothetical rent for owner occupied housing, and deduct income from sublease.31  
As explained above, furniture is one of only two pure durable expenditure categories: It includes 
typical furniture like beds and closets but also all kinds of electronic household equipment, 
carpets, collections of any kind and work of art. Maintenance of real estate includes payment for 
repair material and services involved in the preservation of a house or apartment. We decided 
against the alternative of treating such expenditures as savings. The main reason is that they are 
not intended to increase the value of a piece of real estate. They might still oppose depreciation 
but we do not impute depreciation which would decrease the value of real estate either. We 
consider all wealth changes between periods valuation changes unless they involve purchases or 
sales. The fact that the maintenance expenditures generate utility which reaches clearly beyond 
the time of expenditures turns them into durable goods. 
The remaining categories leisure, vehicles, and miscellaneous are part durable and part non-durable. 
Where possible we split the categories accordingly. In case of doubt or indivisibilities we include 
the expenditures into durable consumption as a clean measure of non-durable consumption 
seemed more important to us. First, daily consumption utility is largely connected to non-durable 
consumption expenditures. Durables like dishwashers and washing-machines certainly contribute 
considerably to household utility yet the utility flow is much less connected to the actual 
expenditures which are usually irregular or one-time expenditures. The same reason makes 
durable consumption a complex concept. On the one hand, the single expenditures tend to be 
larger and less frequent, and the purchase decision is most often a more conscious and thought 
through than with most non-durable goods. Hence, the reliability of the actual answers is likely to 
be better with durables than with non-durables. At the same time, the distribution of 
expenditures which happen at a frequency larger than the questioning period will appear more 
unequal than they truly are. We will come back to this issue in the discussion of conceptual 
changes in the EVS. 
Vehicles can be split into actual purchases of vehicles, repairs and services. We attribute repairs 
and services to non-durable consumption and purchases to durable consumption. Leisure 
comprises expenditures for photo, TV and HiFi equipment, and computers which are all 
included in durable consumption. Further, other leisure related equipment (e.g. sports and 
camping gear) is added. Non-durable leisure expenditures comprise all repairs of the above items, 
                                                 
31 Our procedure is aimed at calculating a measure of consumption which is linked to actual consumption utility. 
Thus, we deduct rent for sublet rooms as the household does not enjoy the utility from these rooms. 
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pet food, television fees as well as tickets for all kinds of entertainment. Unfortunately, we also 
had to include dishes and gardening tools for reasons of varying non-separabilities in different 
years. The residual category Miscellaneous contains a variety of highly mixed and often non-
separable expenditures. Examples are expenditures related to lawsuits, but also funeral costs, 
donations, and purchases of personal items like purses, watches, and jewelry. We attribute only 
expenditures for financial services and insurance premia to non-durable consumption.  
 
 
III.4 Savings  
Conceptually, there are three ways of measuring savings: First, we can deduct consumption from 
disposable income. Unless we treat inter-household transfers separately, the difference should be 
savings. Second, we can add up all additions and withdrawals from the individual wealth accouts 
and we should yield the same result. Both definitions can be used in the EVS framework and 
have been shown to yield comparable results (Börsch-Supan et al. (1999)).32 The third possible 
definition is based on wealth changes. Given the cross-sectional nature of the EVS we cannot 
identify households which have participated repeatedly. What remains possible is to estimate 
wealth changes of synthetic cohorts. Conceptually this third definition differs from the previous 
two in that it includes passive savings, i.e. appreciation or depreciation of the stock of wealth. A 
comparison of the resulting savings estimates from is further complicated by two aspects: First, 
the samples of a cohort drawn at two points in time may be affected by a number of selection 
effects. Reil-Held (2000) and Gaudecker and Scholz (2006) have shown that differential mortality 
with respect to income plays a role among elderly Germans. Given the correlation between 
income and wealth it seems likely that mean wealth levels of cohorts will increase over time just 
because of higher survival rates among the rich. Apart from such changes in the population, also 
differential success in the sampling of cohorts over time may be an issue if they are not 
compensated by sample weights. The second issue concerns the time intervals between 
observations. We observe income, consumption and payments to and from the individual wealth 
accounts over one year or one quarter. Yet wealth is measured only at five year intervals. While 
we may estimate 5-year savings by a projection of our annual measures, such procedure will 
remain crude as we cannot account very well for irregular incidents like inter-household inter-
vivos transfers and bequests. Further, effects of household formation and separation cannot be 
controlled for in a cross-sectional framework. The unusual and innovative procedure in the 
                                                 
32 The income, savings and consumption data are for cross-validation such that major inconsistencies would most 
likely be eliminated in the data cleaning process carried out by the Federal Statistical Office. 
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GSOEP of questioning personal wealth holdings rather than household wealth may allow some 
deeper insights into wealth changes related by household formation.33 
 
Savings in financial assets 
We define gross financial savings as the sum of payments going into the individual savings 
categories. Deducting the withdrawals and sales in the same asset categories, we arrive at net 
financial savings. The breakdown of financial savings by category is non-trivial given the repeated 
changes in the questionnaire. We can consistently distinguish savings in savings-accounts, 
building society saving contracts, securities and other assets held with banks, as well as life 
insurance contracts.   
 
Savings in real assets 
Conceptually, savings in real assets should comprise real estate, business wealth and valuables like 
gold. All three are captured in the EVS and we include them in our definition of real savings, 
despite the fact that we do not have corresponding wealth categories. The reason is that certain 
asset reallocations – e.g. a purchase of gold which is financed by a sale of stocks – would 
otherwise have an effect on total savings. Obviously, there are good reasons to proceed 
differently as well: in the above example, our definitions would imply zero savings but a 
reduction in wealth holdings, as we do not observe gold as a wealth category. Thus, depending on 
the analysis at hand, a different definition may be the preferred choice. 
 
Savings in debt 
It is unclear, whether all debt should be considered negative financial wealth. Given that the 
takeout of mortgages is usually linked to the purchase of a piece of real estate, we add net 
repayments of mortgage debt to real savings and include net repayments of financial debt in 
financial savings. Any different approach should be matched by an equivalent classification of 
real and financial wealth. 
                                                 
33 The 2002 wave of the GSOEP was the first to include wealth questions since 1988. While the 1988 wave 
questioned wealth at the household level, the 2002 wave introduced these questions for the individual household 
members. In 2007 individuals have again been questioned about their individual wealth holdings. With the availability 
of the data it will be possible to track wealth effects of household formation and separation. 
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IV. Conceptual changes in the questionnaire and ways to 
deal with the resulting issues 
 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the EVS and its original purpose – the construction of 
consumption baskets – comparability over time has never been among the first concerns in the 
sample design process.34 At the same time, the Federal Statistical Office has actively worked on 
improving the survey along several lines. 
In the following we discuss two important structural changes which may affect the comparability 
of data based on different cross-sections: The switch from annual to quarterly household diaries 
between 1993 and 1998, and the changes to the sampling threshold based on net monthly 
household income. A number of further changes have been implemented or attempted over the 
years, which are beyond the scope of this paper though. 
 
IV.1 Switching from annual to quarterly household diaries 
All income and consumption variables for the years 1998 and 2003 are quarterly data. For the 
years 1993 and before, the data contains monthly and annual values. For the case of income, the 
vast majority of income categories is provided as annual data. The conversion of monthly and 
quarterly data into annual data seems trivial at first. Yet differences in the samples, as well 
fluctuations of payments at the aggregate and at the individual level across quarters may cause 
trouble for the correct estimation of various moments and hamper the comparability of results 
based on different cross-sections of the EVS. In the following we discuss the importance of the 
possible issues mentioned above with a special focus to employing a simple quadrupling 
approach for the quarterly data. 
 
The quarterly samples 
For part of sample means, just multiplying each income and consumption variable should indeed 
yield reliable results, if the samples are conceptually equivalent and equally sized. Under these 
circumstances, we can e.g. substitute  
 
                                                 
34 Upon request, the Federal Statistical Office provides synoptical tables about the comparable questions in the 
different years.  
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Note, that it is not necessary, that consumption levels are the same across quarters! 
The Federal Statistical Office aims to field comparable subsamples each quarter. Table 5 
illustrates that the efforts have led to satisfactory results considering the distribution of 
employment statuses of household heads. A comparison with respect to gender, industry of 
employment, job education, and region yields similar results. E.g. mean household public pension 
income in the third quarter exceeded the first quarter’s income by 2.2 percent. Actual pensions 
were raised on July 1st 2003 by 1.04 and 1.19 percent in the West and in the East respectively. 
From the above, we conclude that the quarterly samples are sufficiently similar for our purposes.   
 
Table 5: Comparison of samples across quarters – employment status of household head 
 quarter 
 1 2 3 4 
Total 
farmer 86 78 73 70 307 
in %  0.83 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.72 
self-employed 506 529 460 459 1’954  
in %  4.86 4.66 4.36 4.4 4.57 
civil servant 1’039 1’124 1’065 1’087 4’315  
in %  9.98 9.89 10.1 10.42 10.09 
employee 3’859 4’272 4’022 3’965 16’118  
in %  37.06 37.6 38.16 38.03 37.71 
worker 1’274 1’368 1’280 1’308 5’230  
in %  12.23 12.04 12.14 12.54 12.24 
unemployed 530 587 491 453 2’061  
in %  5.09 5.17 4.66 4.34 4.82 
retiree 2’279 2’481 2’348 2’298 9’406  
in %  21.88 21.84 22.27 22.04 22.01 
pensioner 495 558 499 512 2’064  
in %  4.75 4.91 4.73 4.91 4.83 
student 177 189 144 135 645 
in %  1.7 1.66 1.37 1.29 1.51 
other non-working 169 176 159 140 644 
in %  1.62 1.55 1.51 1.34 1.51 
Total 10’414 11’362 10’541 10’427 42’744  
Source: EVS 2003, unweighted 
 
Unfortunately, the sample sizes turn out slightly different. The sample questioned in the second 
quarter is about 8-9 percent larger than the samples from the other quarters. The sample weights 
do not adjust for this imbalance. Thus, estimating the annual averages by quadrupling the 
quarterly values from each subsample we will overweight the second quarter. For all payments 
which fluctuate throughout the year, we will thus arrive at biased estimates for the means.  
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Fluctuations and the estimation of means and variances 
Whether or not the existing differences across quarterly samples play a role strongly depends on 
the fluctuations in income and consumption measures across quarters. It is important to 
understand, that aggregate and individual fluctuations have different effects and the typical 
frequency of payments plays an important role. In the following we focus on the estimation of 
means and variances. We show that a simple quadrupling approach yields good results for the 
estimation of means. At the same time, little can be done to verify variance estimates within the 
EVS framework. Outside information might help to implement a correction procedure though. 
 
Aggregate vs. individual fluctuations 
Aggregate and individual fluctuations across quarters are conceptually independent. Aggregate 
payments may rise and fall over time while individual payments are perfectly correlated over time. 
The other way round, aggregate payments may be constant independent of the correlation of 
individual payments over time. In reality, most aggregates fluctuate over time and most quarterly 
payments will be positively correlated at the individual level. Fortunately, aggregate fluctuations 
only matter for the estimation of means and individual fluctuations matter only for the estimation 
of the variance.  
 
Aggregate fluctuations  
We have argued above that in the presence of varying sample sizes across quarters we will 
estimate biased means from quadrupled quarterly measures if there are strong fluctuations. It 
turns out that not only averages of specific consumption or income categories fluctuate 
throughout the year. Even comprehensive measures like total consumption exhibit significant 
differences between quarters. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate projected annual measures based on observations from the different 
quarters. The significantly higher income from dependent work among household questioned in 
the fourth quarter comes with no surprise: The obvious reasons are End-of-Year and Christmas 
bonuses. Somewhat more surprising is the fact that consumption expenditures in the first quarter 
are significantly lower than consumption in the remaining quarters.  
Figure 3 shows exemplarily, that the individual components of total consumption may fluctuate 
more strongly and quite differently from the aggregate. While average expenditures for energy are 
essentially stable throughout the year, we find expenditures for clothes and health to be much 
more cyclical. 
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Figure 2: Average projected annual income and consumption by quarter of observation 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 2003, projected quarterly measures in EUR, weighted  
 
Figure 3: Average projected annual consumption expenditures by quarter of observation 
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Source: own calculations based on the EVS 2003, projected quarterly measures in EUR, weighted  
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No matter how striking the aggregate fluctuations in some income and expenditures categories 
are – the resulting bias in estimated sample means remains small. We calculated averages over 
quadrupled quarterly values instead of correctly summing up the quarterly averages: the estimated 
annual means differed by 0.8 and 3.6 per mille for income from dependent work and 
expenditures for travel respectively. Thus, the simple approach of quadrupling the quarterly 
values does little harm to the estimation of most sample averages. 
 
Individual fluctuations 
Independent of aggregate fluctuations, there may be fluctuations over time at the individual level. 
For illustration imagine two households who spend equal amounts on food on an annual basis. 
Their expenditures are made by daily turns such that there are a maximum of day-to-day 
fluctuation in individual expenditures and a maximum of daily variance in expenditures across 
households. Once we increase the observation time the fluctuations over time and between 
households decrease. Thus, in contrast to sample means, the estimated distribution of variables 
will change depending on the time span we look at. In our case, the comparison of the 
distributions of income and consumption over time is far from trivial given the switch from 
annual to quarterly household books between 1993 and 1998. 
Let us focus on the estimation of variances: For a correct projection of the quarterly distribution 
to an annual one we need information on the individual fluctuations over time. The below 
formula illustrates, that for the case of variances little is needed to correctly estimate the variance 
of annual payments from quarterly data.  
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The quarterly variances are easily available. Yet we observe households in the EVS 1998 and 
2003 only for one quarter each. Hence, there is no way to estimate the correlations of payments 
over time.  
Only a few possible solutions come to mind: First, we may refer to external sources like the CEX 
to estimate between quarter correlations for individual consumption and income categories. The 
key assumption using such external information is the comparability of individual fluctuations 
across countries. Second, we may use ad-hoc assumptions. Calculating the variances from 
quadrupled quarterly data is equivalent to the assumption of perfect correlation of expenditures 
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across quarters. While ad-hoc assumptions are generally a quite unsatisfying approach it may yield 
reasonable results with respect to a wide variety of consumption and income categories. 
Specifically, expenditures for rent, energy, and food, as well as regular income from dependent 
employment and pension incomes will vary only little over time. Rent, energy and food account 
for roughly 68 percent of non-durable consumption. Regular incomes from dependent work 
account for 78.6 percent of total gross work income and income from public pensions 
accumulate to almost 68 percent of total public transfers.35 Thus, for the majority of income and 
consumption, a cross-quarter correlation of payments near unity may be a reasonable 
assumption. For other expenditures like travel, vehicles, clothes and health the correlations may 
be significantly lower though. The same applies to income from self-employment and bonus 
payments from dependent work. Overall, ad hoc assumptions might not do all too poorly. For an 
evaluation and possible fine tuning of the assumptions we crucially rely on outside information.36  
 
Infrequent payments 
If payments occur less frequent than necessary to be captured within the given time span of the 
diary, noteworthy additional issues arise. Shrinking the observation time from a year to a quarter, 
some households will correctly report zero payments for a quarter although payments would be 
observed within a longer time horizon. Generally this issue is well known in the context of 
consumption inequality and the main reason to investigate non-durable consumption rather than 
total consumption. Durable goods tend to be purchased infrequently and will thus less often be 
registered if the observation time is shortened. Other examples are car taxes and car insurance 
premia, Christmas bonuses, donations and lump sum payments from insurance contracts. 
Based on the three-month diary in 1998 and 2003 we will underestimate the share of households 
receiving or making payments, which happen at larger intervals. The bias will be smaller if the 
diary is kept over a longer time span, like in 1993 and before. At the same time, the use of 
quadrupled quarterly values will still yield the correct average annual payments. Yet the 
                                                 
35 Included are only civil servants pensions and pensions from the public pensions system. E.g. veterans’ pensions 
and pensions from the public accident insurance are not included. 
36 Apart from the above two approaches, we can try to back out the average between quarter correlation of 
payments from the EVS data. If we assume constancy of the variance of payments over time, we can exploit the 
known annual variance from the 1993 data and the quarterly variances from the 1998 or 2003 data. Given that there 
are six cross-quarter correlations for each equation, we can only estimate the average correlation coefficient though. 
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conditional distribution of payments cannot be estimated unless the frequency of payments and 
thus the probability of a positive observation are known.  
Looking only at the amount of average seasonal variation, we are likely to underestimate the true 
amount of individual variation over the course of the year. Generally, there are several possible 
ways of dealing with the resulting issues which are especially important for distributional analyses. 
We decided against imputation procedures and suggest running extensive sensitivity and 
validation checks. The main reason to avoid the effort of imputation is the lack of individual level 
information on the cross-quarter correlations. We observe each household only in one quarter 
each and therefore depend on outside information about the correlation structure. Any 
imputation could therefore be based only on the aggregate fluctuations and would thus be unable 
to restitute the true individual level correlation structure.  
Sensitivity and validation checks are certainly a less elegant and somewhat less satisfying solution. 
Yet they can be easily applied and adjusted for the individual question at hand. E.g. investigating 
changes in inequality over time, we can compare changes in inequality of income categories 
which are known to be time invariant or to be subject to little fluctuations. Unless strong 
differences in the trends in inequality are present between fluctuating or one-time income 
categories on the one hand and regular and stable income categories on the other hand, 
restricting the focus in such way will allow us to compare the income and consumption data 
based on different time spans. 
 
IV.2 Changes to the sampling threshold 
Representativity for a certain population is typically one of the first objectives of a survey. This 
applies also to the EVS as its original purposes have been the construction of consumption 
baskets and the calculation of subsistence levels. While the description of the EVS claims its 
representativity for the German population, a number of limitations have been investigated in the 
literature (see e.g. Merz (2003)). In fact, the EVS sample does not include the institutionalized 
population, foreigners have only been included in the sample since 1993, and top income 
households are not sampled. The exclusion of the institutionalized is a typical procedure in most 
surveys and applies to all EVS cross-sections. Thus, it does not induce comparability issues. The 
inclusion of foreigners in 1993 is to be kept in mind for comparative analyses just like the 
inclusion of the population from the Eastern states. The changes to the sampling threshold with 
respect to income cause much more complex issues. Specifically, households with a net monthly 
income above this threshold are not included in the sample. Given that the changes do not 
follow a specific logic, different shares of the upper tail of the income distribution are likely cut 
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off. Estimates about the size of the population above the thresholds rely on tax statistics or 
national accounts data.  
Merz (2003) employs income tax statistics and finds roughly 37’000 out of roughly 38 million 
households to be missing in the EVS 1993 due to the sampling threshold. He stresses further 
though, that high income households below the threshold are additionally underrepresented. 
Given the general criticism towards the sampling threshold we also compared the restricted EVS 
sample to the (technically unrestricted) random sample of the GSOEP. We find only a few 
households in the GSOEP with net household incomes above the EVS threshold (see table 6). 
Only after the inclusion of the high-income sample into the GSOEP the number of households 
above the EVS threshold increases to 18 out of roughly 12’000 in 2003. Overall, these results cast 
some doubt on the chances to sample a sufficiently large number of high income households 
which would allow reliable statistical inference about the top of the income distribution. 
 
Table 6: Sampling threshold and effects of different adjustment schemes 
threshold 
thresholds (in 
EUR (2001)) 
applied by… 
observations 
dropped 
applying an 
adjustment 
procedure year obser-
vations 
 EUR   EUR (2001)  
threshold 
as % of 
weighted 
median 
RDA IND RDA IND 
GSOEP 
obser-
vations 
above the 
EVS 
threshold 
1978 46'941 10'226 18'322 810% 18'165 17'043 5 10 n.a. 
1983 43'614 12'782 18'065 859% 16'887 17'043 5 5 n.a. 
1988 44'185 12'782 17'043 803% 17'043 17'043 0 0 4 
1993 40'230 17'895 20'249 963% 16'892 17'043 24 23 0 
1998 49'720 17'895 18'634 920% 16'274 17'043 28 13 1 
2003 42'744 18'000 17'567 842% 16'763 17'043 2 2 18 
Source: EVS, GSOEP, own calculations 
Notes: “RDA” (relative distributional adjustment) labels the procedure proposed by Hauser (2003), “IND” our 
alternative approach of applying an indexed threshold. 
 
 
Apart from the general criticism with respect to the application of a sampling threshold and the 
desire to learn more about the upper tails of the distributions of income and wealth, any 
comparative analysis will have to deal with the jumps in the sampling threshold. As the actual 
share of households missing in the EVS is unknown, it is impossible to focus on a fixed 
percentile range of the income distribution to achieve comparable samples over time. Therefore, 
we must rely on procedures defining a comparable distribution: Hauser (2006) suggests using a 
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common cutoff threshold which is defined from within the actual distribution. Specifically, he 
suggests defining the common threshold relative to the median. Alternatively, we have applied an 
indexation to the threshold. In both cases, all EVS samples are cut off at the lowest threshold 
which was in place between 1978 and 2003. The latter procedure caps a possible divergence of 
the income distribution by choosing an upper limit which is constant in real terms. Hauser’s 
procedure is somewhat less constraining at first sight. Yet a runaway top in the presence of rather 
time invariant median would also be softened. Further, the reference to the median depends on 
the truncated distribution. Thus, the changing original thresholds will still affect the adjusted 
threshold. Overall, both procedures are certainly limited, as the missing part of the true 
distribution remains unknown.  
Let us turn to the actual effects of the adjustment procedures, which are summarized in table 6. 
Both procedures identify the 1988 threshold as the most constraining one. Overall, only few 
observations have to be dropped to achieve pseudo-equal sampling thresholds. Further, the two 
approaches yield similar results with respect to their influence on estimated income and wealth 
levels.37  
We conclude that the often criticized sampling threshold is unlikely to truncate the sample 
significantly compared to the established random sample of the GSOEP. Reliable analyses of the 
top income households remain a difficult task, especially in the context of a voluntary survey. 
Oversamling of the rich is essentially the only solution. For part of the discretionary jumps in the 
EVS threshold, a correction is highly recommendable, especially when focusing on highly skewed 
variables like stock market wealth.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Table A-5 in the appendix illustrates the effects of the adjustment of the sampling threshold on estimated sample 
means. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1: Categories of insurance sums in different years (in DM) 
year 
  
category 1978 1983 1988 1993 
1 <3.000 <3.000 <3.000 
2 3.000 - 5.000 3.000 - 5.000 3.000 - 5.000 
3 5.000 - 7.000 5.000 - 7.000 5.000 - 7500 
4 7.000 - 1.0000 7.000 - 1.0000 7500 - 1.0000 
5 1.0000 - 15.000 1.0000 - 15.000 1.0000 - 15.000 
6 15.000 - 20.000 15.000 - 20.000 15.000 - 20.000 
7 20.000 - 30.000 20.000 - 30.000 20.000 - 30.000 
8 30.000 - 50.000 30.000 - 50.000 30.000 - 50.000 
9 50.000 - 75.000 50.000 - 60.000 50.000 - 60.000 
10 >75.000 60.000 - 80.000 60.000 - 80.000 
11   80.000 - 100.000 80.000 - 100.000 
12   >100.000 100.000 - 200.000
13     >200.000 
co
n
tin
ou
s 
da
ta
 
Note: Individually harmonized definitions are used for the imputation of the different years. 
 
Table A-2: Samples and clusters involved in the cold-deck error sampling as part 
of the imputation of life insurance wealth in 1978-88 
year   
  1978 1983 1988 
total clusters 140 168 182 
merged 39 34 36 
clusters used for error sampling 101 134 146 
       
total obs. to be imputed 34830 31921 31716 
errors (based on 1993 regression) 21254 21254 21254 
dropped as outlier errors 819 844 932 
errors used for cold-deck sampling 20435 20410 20322 
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Table A-3: Information about the building included in the imputation process 
year 
variable 1978 1983 1988 1993 
<1919 <1919 <1919 <1919 
1919-1948 1919-1948 1919-1948 1919-1948 
1949-1960 1949-1960 1949-1960 1949-1960 
1961-1971 1961-1970 1961-1970 1961-1970 
1972+ 1971-1977 1971-1977 
- 
1971+ 1978+ 1978-1987 
year of 
construction 
- - - 1988+ 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2+ 3+ 3+ 3+ 
type of 
building       
(# of units) 
other other other other 
- - district district 
central central central central 
appartment appartment appartment appartment 
heating 
system 
oven oven oven oven 
<5000 
<20000 <20000 5000-20000 <100000 
20000-100000
100000-
500000 
city size 
>100000 >20000 >20000 
>500000 
Note: Individually harmonized definitions are used for the imputation of the different years. 
 
 
Table A-4: Samples involved in the cold-deck error sampling - real estate wealth 
  year 
  1978 1983 1988 
total obs. to be imputed 22665 23117 24872 
errors (based on 1993 
regression) 12068 15842 17140 
dropped as outlier errors 517 633 670 
errors used for cold-deck 
sampling 11551 15209 16470 
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